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Bank Resolution and Creditor Distribution: 
The Tension Shaping Global Banking – Part 
I: “External and Intra-Group Funding” and 
“Ex Ante planning v. Ex Post Execution” 
Dimensions* 
David Ramos* 
Javier Solana* 
Banking has drastically changed since the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis and its aftermath. Of all the reforms that impinge upon the 
ability of global banks to run their business, none is more 
consequential than the new frameworks on bank resolution, 
which try to end “too-big-to-fail.” Yet bank resolution’s 
“macro” goals, such as systemic stability, limitation of 
contagion, and avoidance of moral hazard, run in the face of 
insolvency law and the more “micro” principles underpinning it. 
Among the latter, none is more pervasive than the need for 
fairness between creditors, and between (and within) creditor 
classes, enshrined in the ranking and priorities’ systems under 
insolvency law. At first glance, these demands could set bank 
resolution and insolvency laws on a collision course with each 
other. On closer examination, however, the picture is much more 
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complex, for the tension between bank resolution and insolvency 
law is giving rise to a series of equilibria that are giving shape 
to the modern face of global banking. This and a succeeding  
article provide an analytical framework to aid in grasping the 
full picture, which is a difficult, and often overwhelming, 
enterprise. The proposed analytical framework breaks down the 
complexity of international banking into three different layers: 
the “individual bank v. group” dimension, the duality of crisis-
management (ex post) and crisis-prevention (ex ante) tools, and 
the cross-border dimension. We explore each of these three 
layers incrementally, drawing from precedent analysis as we 
progress. Part II of this article provides a general analysis of the 
tensions between bank resolution and insolvency law and 
introduces the analytical framework. It then moves on to explore 
the first two layers within that framework: the group dimension, 
and the duality of crisis-prevention and crisis-management tools. 
A separate article will address the cross-border dimension. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The collapse of numerous financial institutions since the outbreak of 
the 2007 financial crisis evidenced the inadequacy of insolvency law to 
manage the resolution of complex financial institutions. In the years that 
followed many of these collapses, new bank resolution frameworks have 
been put in place that aim to address the shortcomings of insolvency law; 
most notably, the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) in the United 
States (US),1 and the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) 
in the European Union (EU).2 
But even if these new frameworks try to take bank resolution out of 
the scope of insolvency law, questions about how losses will be 
 
1  Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, § 12 USC 5380. 
2  See Directive 2014/59/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 
May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions 
and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 
2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 
2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 
648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council (hereafter: BRRD). 
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distributed among creditors remain. These distributional questions are at 
the heart of insolvency law, and, to the extent that priority rules in 
insolvency represent a legislature’s basic benchmark of fairness, they 
cannot be ignored. The potential for conflict between how each of these 
frameworks addresses those distributional questions is a serious concern 
if we are to rely on new resolution frameworks to help us weather the 
next financial crisis. 
At first sight, this potential conflict seems to recall an old paradox: 
what happens when an unstoppable force (a new resolution framework 
that will prevent the next financial crisis) meets an immovable object (a 
standard of fairness that is reflected in insolvency law)?3 Or perhaps the 
question is not so much a paradox but a mind trick: if the force prevails, 
the object was not immovable; if the object does not move, then the force 
was not unstoppable. 
Our goal in this paper is to explore this seemingly intractable 
problem. First, we provide a general description of banks’ funding and 
structure, and of the origins and justification of bank resolution. We also 
explore the frictions that bank resolution rules create with insolvency at 
the level of policy goals, interpretative principles and decision-making 
procedures, and we present an analytical framework to examine how 
those frictions will give rise to practical problems when resolution 
authorities apply the new bank resolution rules. This analytical 
framework is comprised of three layers that reflect the main sources of 
complexity in bank resolution: the bank-group dimension, the co-
existence of ex-ante and ex-post resolution mechanisms, and the cross-
border dimension of bank resolution. We examine each of these layers in 
turn and we do so in an incremental manner, the analysis of each layer 
building on the analysis of any preceding layers. 
In Section III we examine the first layer. We discuss how frictions of 
policy and principle can increase uncertainty about the treatment of key 
categories of bank liabilities in the context of bank resolution, including 
those liabilities held by third parties and those held within the group. We 
examine the second layer in Section IV. Here, we discuss how the rules 
on ex-ante planning try to sidestep the uncertainty identified in the first 
layer by changing the nature of liabilities that are external to the banking 
group and that are subject to bail-in, and by changing the very structure 
of banking groups. We also explore how these changes might affect ex-
post crisis-management. 
The third layer, which encapsulates the cross-border dimension of 
bank resolution, adds yet another level of complexity to the problems 
 
3  The formulation of the paradox is attributed to attributed to a Chinese proverb found 
in a philosophical book written in the 3rd century, entitled Han Feizi. 
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identified in the first two layers. We examine this third layer in the 
second part of this paper, where we also reflect on how the attempts of 
financial regulators to deal with these problems are effectively reshaping 
the face of global banks. In the second part of the paper, we also draw 
some conclusions about what bank resolution was supposed to achieve, 
the obstacles it encountered, and the direction it, and global banking, are 
taking as a result. 
II. BANK RESOLUTION: A (LAYERED) ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
This section presents the analytical framework that we will use to 
conduct our analysis of bank resolution frameworks in this and the 
succeeding article. We first provide a brief description of the complex 
bank structures that introduces key concepts that will be relevant for the 
ensuing analysis. We also provide a brief description of bank resolution 
frameworks worldwide (A). Then we describe how differences between 
bank resolution and insolvency law at the level of policies (B) and 
principles (C) can give rise to interpretative problems in cases where 
some creditors will have to be protected at the expense of other creditors. 
We conclude this section with a description of the analytical framework 
that we will use to examine these problems (D). 
A. Context 
i. Banks’ Funding and Structure 
To gauge the impact of different resolution and insolvency rules, one 
needs, first, to know the type of claims arising from banks’ funding 
structures to which those rules would be applicable. It is possible to 
distinguish three explanatory dimensions among these funding 
structures: i) the transnational dimension, ii) the external-internal 
dimension, and iii) the institutional dimension.  
The transnational dimension distinguishes between domestic and 
cross-border banks, especially the different models within the latter class. 
In addition to the problems that domestic banks pose for resolution and 
insolvency rules, cross-border banks pose unique problems that stem 
from their transnational dimension. We focus our analysis on cross-
border banks.  
Banks’ corporate and funding structures are not uniform, but they 
tend to move around stable choices, which, in the transnational context, 
tend to be influenced by macroeconomic, financial, and regulatory 
6 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:1 
 
conditions.4 Using banks’ “business models” as a criterion for 
classification, we can distinguish between “multinational banks”, which 
maintain sizeable foreign branches and subsidiaries in multiple 
jurisdictions, and “international banks”, which, despite their important 
international presence, generally conduct their cross-border activities 
from the jurisdiction of their headquarters.5 A second criterion6 uses 
“funding models”, and distinguishes between “centralized” funding, 
where banks borrow in international interbank markets, raise funds from 
non-bank investors through international deposits, or issue debt in 
international capital markets, and then use intragroup funding to 
distribute those funds; and “decentralized” funding, where banks fund 
their operations locally and each subsidiary enjoys a high degree of 
autonomy raising funds in its own name.7 
Business and funding models can vary across jurisdictions, with 
Spanish banks being an example of multinational banks with 
decentralised funding;8 Japanese banks, an example of international 
banks with centralised funding;9 and US or UK banks, a mixed case.10 
Models can also vary with time, in response to macroeconomic or 
financial conditions. The post-crisis environment has signalled a retreat 
of global banking and of banks’ international activities and exposures11 
in response to the perception that cross-border links were a source of 
contagion,12 leading banks to pivot from international to multi-national 
business models.13 In terms of the banks themselves, the impact was less 
 
4  This allowed banking institutions not only to change their investment profile, but 
also to diversify their sources of funding, by resorting to international interbank markets, 
including wholesale funding markets. See Leonardo Gambacorta, Adrian van Rixtel & 
Stefano SCHIAFFI Changing Business Models in International Bank Funding5-6 (Bank for 
Int’l Settlements BIS Working Papers No. 614,  2017) 
https://www.bis.org/publ/work614.pdf.  
5  See Robert McCauley et al, After the Global Financial Crisis: From International to 
Multinational Banking? 64 J. of Econ. and Bus. 7,11 (2010). 
6  See Gambarcorta, supra note 7, at 4. 
7  And according to its own credit rating. See Merck-Martel et al, Business Models of 
International Banks in the Wake of the 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis, Bank of 
Spain, Revisista de Estabilidad Financiera No. 29, 101 (2012). 
8  See Gambarcorta, supra note 7, at 5. 
9  See id. 
10  Id. For example, some US banks use UK subsidiaries for managing European 
operations and funding, and UK banks use US subsidiaries for the same purpose. 
11  See Pablo Garcia Luna & Adrian Van Rixtel, International Interbank 
Activity in Retreat, Banking for Int’l Settlements Q. Rev., Mar. 2014, at 14,15. 
12  See Nicola Cetorelli & Linda S. Goldberg, Global Banks and International Shock 
Transmission, IMF Economic Review 1, 1 (2011); Hyun Song Shin, Global Banking Glut 
and Loan Risk Premium, 12th Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference 1, 3 (2011). 
13  See McCauley et al, supra note 8, at 8. 
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significant for US and Japanese banks, whereas European banks retreated 
more.14 In terms of markets, interbank funding markets suffered the 
most,15 while local funding of operations remained stable or increased 
after the crisis.16 
The external-internal dimension hearkens to the importance of 
banks’ intra-group structures. Intra-group financial flows are critical for 
transnational banks; they are used to allocate resources across borders 
and thus stabilize lending in some countries,17 to limit dependency on the 
availability of domestic funds, and to subject subsidiaries’ funding to the 
competition with other subsidiaries.18 Intra-group funding may 
compensate funding gaps in “normal” years, but it can also create 
funding gaps in intra-group positions during a liquidity crisis, thereby 
becoming a source of cross-border contagion.19  
Surveys have shown that bank groups tend to assiduously resort to 
committed facilities (senior loans), subordinated loans (which are 
preferred to equity injections due to tax and dilution reasons), and 
guarantees as the main mechanisms of intra-group support.20 Yet mere 
 
14  See Emilio Muñoz-De La Peña & Adrian van Rixtel, International Banking After the 
Crisis: Increasingly Local and Safer?, IMF Chap. 2 of the Apr. Global Fin. Stability Rep. 
55, 56  (2015). 
15 See id. at 56. 
16  IMF, International Banking after the Crisis: Increasingly Local and Safer?, at 55-91, 
Global Financial Stability Report,  (Apr. 2010); Muñoz De La Peña and Van Rixtel, 
2015; ECB, Report on Financial Structures, at 33 (Oct. 2016) (explaining that within the 
euro area, banks have experienced a general ‘rebalancing’ in funding, away from 
wholesale funding, and towards deposit funding). 
17  Intragroup funding tends to increase in times of uncertainty as banks use internal 
capital markets to adjust for liquidity risk. Buch and Goldberg (2015). Indeed, studies of 
banks’ cross-border liabilities show that after the crisis liabilities from related banks 
increased as a proportion of foreign liabilities, unlike cross-border liabilities from 
unrelated banks and non-banks. The proportion of liabilities from related banks increased 
by 2,7% (from 24,7% to 27,4% of foreign liabilities), whereas those from unrelated banks 
and non-banks decreased by 3,7% and 5,7%. This means that cross-border groups rely 
more on intragroup transfers, and less on private sector sources. See Gambacorta, van 
Rixtel, Schiaffi supra note 7 at 19.  
18  D. Dahl, R.E. Shrieves, The Extension of International Credit by US Banks: A 
Disaggregated Analysis, 1988-1994, J. INT. MONEY FINANCE 18 at 153-167 (1999) 
(explaining that for banking groups in particular US studies show a ‘substitution effect’ 
between subsidiaries, i.e. a negative correlation between a subsidiary’s credit growth and 
the loan growth for other subsidiaries). 
19  N. Cetorelli, L. Goldberg, Global Banks and International Shock Transmission: 
Evidence from the Crisis, IMF ECONOMIC REVIEW 59 at 41-76 (2011). 
20  Bank for International Settlements, The Joint Forum: Report on Intra-group Support 
Measures, at 10-13 (Feb. 2012) (explaining that Other mechanisms of intra-group 
support are letters of credit, equity injections, bond swaps, and bond lending, or repo 
agreements, although they were less frequent). 
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references to “funding” do not fully capture the relevance of intra-group 
financial flows for the group’s structure and organization, which is better 
captured by concepts such as ”internal capital markets”.21 Most large 
banking groups have centralized capital management (globally or 
regionally), either keeping excess capital at a centralized level, or even 
raising capital at the parent level, which is then allocated across 
subsidiaries, which compete between them for resources.22 
Most banking groups also have centralized liquidity management. 
They rely on different mechanisms of liquidity monitoring and they keep 
liquidity pools at a global or regional level that can be used as needed.23 
In the US resolution plans filed in 2015, for example, with few 
exceptions,24 bank groups used a specialist entity25 or other type of 
structural arrangement26 to coordinate liquidity management. There is 
 
21  See J. C. Stein, Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate 
Resources, JOURNAL OF FINANCE 52 (1), at 111-133 (Mar. 1997);  See R. Rajan, H. 
Servaes, L. Zingales,The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient 
Investment, JOURNAL OF FINANCE 54 (1), at 35-80 (Feb. 2000) (focused on the negative 
aspects of internal capital markets); D.S. Scharfstein, J. C. Stein, The Dark Side of 
Internal Capital markets: Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment, JOURNAL 
OF FINANCE 55 at 2537-2564 (Oct. 2000). 
22  Bank for International Settlements, supra note 23, at 7. 
23  Ibid at 8. 
24  See FDIC, Banco Santander SA. Resolution Plan for US Operations. Public section 
at 16 (Dec. 16, 2015), 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/plans/santander-165-1512.pdf 
(explaining that there are some exceptions, such as Santander, which indicates that 
subsidiaries are generally self-funded, although it also states that most wholesale 
borrowing (in the US) is conducted through SHUSA (the US holding company), and 
SBNA (the major operating Company)); See also FDIC, HSBC Holdings plc HSBC Bank 
USA, National Association US Resolution Plan Section I – Public Section, at 2 (July 1, 
2014), https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/plans/hsbc-idi-1807.pdf 
(stating that banking entities manage their own liquidity pursuant to parameters set 
centrally). 
25  See FDIC, Bank of America Resolution Corporation Plan Public Executive 
Summary, at 27, 35 (July 1, 2015) 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/plans/boa-165-1707.pdf; 
 Barclays Resolution Plan Public section at 32-33 (July 2015)(explaining BCI Funding 
and NYBR Funding); FDIC, BNP Paribas Resolution, Plan Public Section, at 15 (Dec. 
31, 2015) https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/plans/bnp-idi-
1512.pdf. 
; FDIC, Citigroup Resolution Plan, Public Section, at 26, 28, 32 (July 1 2015) 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/plans/citi-165-1507.pdf 
(explaining the liquidity provision shared between the parent holding company and the 
main banking entity, CBNA). 
26  FDIC, Credit Suisse Global Recovery and Resolution Plan, Public section, at 22 
(does not clarify how the liquidity is managed); Deutsche Bank Resolution Plan, Public 
Section, at 8, 11, 12, 21 (2015) (references to a Pool Funding and Global Liquidity 
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less clarity about the extent to which the emphasis is placed on the 
“management” component of liquidity management, which means that 
the system is “notional”, meaning based on internal accounting with no 
intra-group transfer of funds, or placed in the accumulation of “assets”, 
in which case the cash pooling is “real”, with intra-group transfer of 
resources.27 The description of Lehman Brothers’ “Global Cash and 
Collateral Management” (GCCM) system in the Examiner’s Report28 
illustrates the complexity of intra-group liquidity management systems.29 
Lastly, the institutional dimension emphasizes how business or 
funding models respond to regulatory conditions, as well as to 
macroeconomic and financial conditions. US banking groups, for 
example, are organized around a Financial Holding Company (FHC)30 
 
Management business units, but it is unclear how the responsibilities are distributed 
across the group); Goldman Sachs Group, Inc Global Resolution Plan, Public Filing, at 
23 (June 30, 2015); Morgan Stanley 2015 Resolution Plan, at 8, 26 (July 1, 2015) 
(indicating that it has a ‘Global Liquidity Reserve’ held between parent and subsidiaries, 
but not specifying how it is allocated, or managed); JP Morgan Chase Resolution Plan 
Public Filing, at 16 (July 1, 2015). 
27  See, e.g. Jochen Vetter; Christian Schwandtner, Cash Pooling Under the revised 
German Private Limited Companies Act (GmbHG), GERMAN LAW JOURNAL VOL. 9, at 
1156 (2008)(explaining that the distinction is used in the law of countries that have 
theorized about these intra-group arrangements, although the literature is not bank-
specific). 
28  In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc, No. 08-13555 Report of Anton R Valukas, 
Examiner, March 11, 2010, Volume 5 of 9. Section III.B: Avoidance Actions; Section 
III.C Barclays Transaction, p. 1549 (hereafter: Examiner Report). The report largely 
relied on Lehman’s Motion to continue using its Global Cash and Collateral Management 
(GCCM) system. Motion 669 In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc, No. 08-13555 10 
October 2008. 
29  The report  provides an excellent description of (i) the parent holding company’s 
role as “central banker” and the intra-group Treasury Group’s role in managing the firm’s 
liquidity pool, or its subdivision in groups, including the Cash and Collateral 
Management Group; (ii) the categories of intra-group transfers, including the daily 
transfers from affiliate accounts to a consolidation account, not automatically but upon 
demand, the cash transfers between group entities’ accounts, and the recording with no 
cash transfer of other intra-group transactions between such entities as “payables” and 
“receivables”, plus the cash management transactions that took place outside the GCCM; 
or (iii) the role of in-house and external bank accounts. See Examiner Report at 1549-
1562. 
30  The Glass – Steagal Act imposed the separation between ‘banking’ and ‘investment’ 
activities. This was followed by the Bank Holding Company Act, which tried to ensure 
that the Glass – Steagal prohibition was not circumvented by using a bank holding 
company to put seemingly incompatible activities under the same corporate roof. Still, by 
then the use of holding companies was popular, and the Federal Reserve gradually 
changed its view on the Glass – Steagall prohibition, with the support of the Supreme 
Court. Thus, large, diversified groups presided over by a holding company became even 
more widespread. The death – knell for the Glass – Steagall was the Financial Services 
Modernization Act (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 1999) Pub.L. 106–102, 113 Stat. 1338, but 
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sitting atop the operating subsidiaries because the rules traditionally 
required separating commercial and investment banking or insurance, a 
separation gradually eroded by banking groups.31 Banking groups in 
Continental Europe have traditionally been characterized by “universal 
banking” models with diversified but strongly coordinated groups 
presided over by a credit institution, i.e. not a holding company.32 This is 
due, in part, to an institutional environment not conducive to strong 
decentralized capital markets but to markets dependent on major banks, 
which enjoyed a closer relationship with the State.33 
After the 2007/08 financial crisis, regulatory conditions have become 
an even more important factor in the determination of banking groups’ 
funding structures and business models.  For example, in functional 
terms, “structural” measures have mandated the separation between 
deposit-taking and loan origination activities, on the one hand, and 
riskier capital markets activities, on the other, although there has been no 
uniformity about the kind of “risky” activities encompassed by the 
 
this came just after the merger between Citibank and Travellers (an insurance) had been 
authorized. Pre – crisis times also saw significant strategizing by investment banks that 
wished to become diversified financial groups under a holding company, while at the 
same time avoiding consolidated supervision by the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve, which some of them achieved through the Consolidated supervisory Entity 
(CSE) program of the SEC.  
31  Naturally, corporate structures would not have sufficed to erode the mandatory 
separation of banking and investment included in the Glass-Steagall Act. It was 
accompanied by a growing consensus that the prohibition was ineffective, and 
constrained competition without clear benefits in return. In light of legislative deadlock, 
the evolution of the prohibition was marked by a gradual reinterpretation of the 
provisions by the Federal Reserve Board and the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC) sanctioned by the Supreme Court and federal courts. See e.g. George G. 
Kaufman, Larry R. Mote, “Glass-Steagall: Repeal by Regulatory and Judicial 
Reinterpretation,” BANKING LAW JOURNAL, at 388-421(1990) (explaining that post-crisis 
mergers have left few systemically important institutions predominantly engaged in 
investment banking). That is the case of Goldman Sachs, or Morgan Stanley. Bear 
Stearns was bought by JP Morgan Chase, Lehman Brothers entered bankruptcy, and 
some of its assets were acquired by Barclays, and Merrill Lynch was acquired by Bank of 
America.  
32  Opinions vary as to the causes. Some would argue that this was due to a competitive 
advantage in mobilizing vast financial resources in aid of industrialization See Alexander 
Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective,Harvard Univ. Press 
(1962)(stating that others would emphasize the pro – commercial bank institutional 
framework, which made it easy for politically connected banks to tighten their grip on the 
still incipient capital markets); See Caroline Fohlin, Universal Banking in Pre-World War 
I Germany: Model or Myth?, Explorations in Economic History Vol. 36, at 305-343 
(1999). 
33  See e.g. John C. Coffee, Jr., “The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law 
and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control,” YALE L.J. Vol. 111, at 1, 51-
58 (2002). 
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prohibition, the strategy of separation, and its application at the group 
level. In addition, different countries have tended to favour their own 
banking models.34  
 
In geographical terms, regulators have used the new liquidity rules 
under the Basel framework on bank capital adequacy, which includes the 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio 
(NSFR), to push forward the idea of “self – sufficiency”, i.e. that every 
subsidiary, or even every branch, of international banks must be capable 
of fulfilling its own liquidity requirements without group assistance, 
something that favours “multinational banks” with decentralised 
funding.35 Other measures have restricted cross-border funding even 
further, such as the “Foreign Bank Organizations” (FBO) rule in the US, 
which requires separately capitalized US Intermediate Holding 
Companies (IHC) to structure the US operations of foreign banks,36 the 
“subsidiarisation” approach of the UK Prudential Regulation Authority 
(PRA),37 or the limitation of intra-bank group exposures by Swiss rules.38  
 
34  The US “Volcker rule” prohibited banking groups from engaging in proprietary 
trading and the sponsoring of hedge funds. Section § 619 Dodd-Frank Act.  German 
and French rules are broader in scope, prohibiting activities beyond those two, but are 
limited to banking entities, i.e. they can be undertaken by other entities within the same 
banking group, provided certain safeguards are respected. British rules have taken the 
opposite course, by ‘ring – fencing’ depository institutions, and leaving a free rein on 
large trading banks within the same banking group. See Independent Commission on 
Banking. Final Report (Vickers Report) September 2011.  France and Germany favoured 
the subsidiarisation of capital markets activities. The EU’s proposed rules followed the 
Liikanen report and adopt the Franco-German approach. Articles 6, 8, 9, 10 (prohibitions 
and requirements implementing the rules) of the Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on structural measures improving the resilience 
of EU credit institutions, COM (2014) 43 final (Jan. 29, 2014) (hereafter “Proposal 
Structural Measures”). See also High-Level Expert Group on reforming the structure of 
the EU banking sector, chaired by Erkki Liikanen, Final Report (2012), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/high- level_expert_group/report_en.pdf. 
The proposal included a grandfathering provision for UK banks (article 21), although 
Britain will soon cease to be part of the EU.  
35  R. McCauley; P. McGuire; G. Von Peter, “The architecture of global banking: From 
international to multinational”, BIS Quarterly Review, 25–37 (March 2010). 
36  Infra 5.3.2. The rules also place restrictions on the ability of foreign banks to use US 
– raised dollar funding to fund their global activities. See H. S. Shin “Global banking glut 
and loan risk premium” Mundell-Fleming Lecture at the 2011 IMF Annual Research 
Conference, IMF Economic Review, 60, at 155-92. 
37  Bank of England, International banks: the Prudential Regulation Authority’s 
approach to branch authorisation and supervision. (28 March, 2018). 
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/prudential-regulation/publication/2018/international-
banks-pras-approach-to-branch-authorisation-and-supervision-ss. 
38  See L. Goldberg; A. Gupta, “Ring-fencing and “financial protectionism” in 
international banking,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Liberty Street Economics, 
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The result has been an important change in emphasis on the factors 
considered relevant in intra-group arrangements. For example, in the 
more recent US resolution plans for major banking groups,39 there is less 
emphasis on the regular management of liquidity needs (often by a 
specialized entity) and more on the arrangements to pre-position liquidity 
resources on material entities, and on the availability of liquidity support, 
typically provided by the parent or holding company.40 These initiatives 
can protect against certain risks, but they can also trap capital and 
liquidity where they are not needed, and make it more difficult for bank 
groups to smooth liquidity needs across borders or to exploit business 
opportunities. 
ii. Bank Resolution Frameworks 
Before we explore in greater detail how the complexity of banks’ 
funding and structure may give rise to tensions between the goals of 
insolvency law and bank resolution, we need to briefly describe how 
resolution frameworks and tools work in different jurisdictions. Like the 
preceding introduction to banks’ funding and structure, this overview of 
bank resolution frameworks will introduce basic concepts of our 
analysis. 
 
(January 9, 2013),  http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2013/01/ring-fencing-
and-financial-protectionism-in-international-banking.html. 
39  These are being determined by regulatory agencies’ guidance. See, e.g. Federal 
reserve System - FDIC Final Guidance for the 2019 and subsequent resolution plan 
submissions by the eight largest, complex U.S. banking organizations. FRB Docket No. 
OP-1644; and also Guidance for 2018 §165(d) Annual Resolution Plan Submissions By 
Foreign-based Covered Companies that Submitted Resolution Plans in July 2015, March 
24, 2017.  
40  See, e.g. Bank of America Corporation 2019 Resolution Plan, 31 July 2019, pp. 15-
17, 23, 43 (emphasis on liquidity support by NB Holdings); Citigroup Resolution Plan 
Public Section, 31 July 2019, pp. 3, 16. BNP Paribas Resolution Plan Public Section 
2018, pp. 13-14 although stating that the holding company (BNPP USA Inc) and the 
broker-dealer (BNP Paribas Securities Corp.) provide funding and services to other group 
companies, also emphasizes that material entities are self-funded. In Barclays US 
Resolution Plan 31 July 2018, there is still a reference to the centralized “management” 
through its Treasury function of capital and liquidity needs (pp. 39, 44), but the emphasis 
is on the pre-positioning of resources at each material entity (pp. 19-21), and on the 
existence of a Secured Support Agreement (SSA) whereby liquidity would be provided 
by the holding companies (BUSLLC, the IHC, and BGUS, the holding company below 
it) (pp. 11, 15-17, 28). Credit Suisse 2018 US Resolution Plan Public Section emphasizes 
the structural changes undertaken to improve resolvability, including a Support 
Agreement, involving the holding company and the Material Legal Entities dependent on 
its funding (pp. 5, 10, 13). 
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The Key Attributes for Effective Resolution Regimes41 prepared by 
the Financial Stability Board (FSB) have guided many of the regulatory 
initiatives to improve the resolution of banks. Yet as the FSB reports and 
peer reviews show,42 complete resolution frameworks are only in place in 
areas that were hit harder by the financial crisis, notably the US and the 
EU, as well as other jurisdictions like Switzerland or Japan, but progress 
is patchy elsewhere. By way of summary: 
The first difference is the existence and scope of a separate regime to 
deal with bank crises. Regulators in some jurisdictions, like the US or 
Japan, had already vested their deposit insurers with receivership powers 
and, after the 2007/08 financial crisis, decided to supplement those 
powers with a specific regime for systemically important financial 
institutions (SIFIs).43 In the EU, regulators have introduced a whole new 
41  FSB Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions, 15 
October 2014. 
42  See e.g. FSB, TEN YEARS ON – TAKING STOCK OF POST-CRISIS RESOLUTION 
REFORMS, Sixth Report on the Implementation of Resolution Reforms (July 6, 2017).; see 
also Second Thematic Review on Resolution Regimes Peer Review Report (March 18, 
2016). See also http://www.fsb.org/what-we-do/implementation-monitoring/monitoring-
of-priority-areas/effective-resolution-regimes-and-policies/. 
43  See 12 USC sections §§ 1818, and 1819 (a) Ninth (FDIC authority), supplemented 
by §§ 5384 et seq (Orderly Liquidation Authority). For Japan, see the Deposit Insurance 
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framework for all banks (and investment firms), regardless of the 
systemic importance.44 In Switzerland, there is a regime for banks and 
investment firms, and regulators permit an extension to other firms 
subject to a public interest test.45 Lastly, while China seems to have 
supplemented the existing framework of powers of the People’s Bank of 
China (PBC) with new powers for the Banking Regulatory Commission 
(CBRC) and the deposit insurer (DIFMA), China still lacks a complete 
framework.46 
The second set of differences relates to resolution tools. All systems 
contemplate purchase and assumption (P&A) or sale of business.47 
Nevertheless, China does not seem to have fully developed these tools, 
while the US and Japan rely on the bridge bank as the preferred tool for 
orderly liquidation, generally restricted to SIFIs.48 The EU lists the sale 
of business, bridge bank, asset segregation (or “bad bank”) and bail-in as 
key tools,49 while Switzerland regulates bankruptcy and reorganisation 
separately, and tools such as the bridge bank and bail-in are 
contemplated under the latter.50 
These choices determine which forms of interference with the rights 
of creditors, and, generally, investors, are more likely. In the US or 
Japan, it would be in a transfer to a bridge bank to preserve critical 
functions, while shareholders and creditors are left behind, while in the 
EU it would be through the use of bail-in powers.51 This results in a great 
divergence of approaches towards bail-in powers. While they are the 
 
Act of 1971, chapters IV-VII, articles 70-126, which deal with the purchase of deposits 
and other claims, management of business by an administrator, the transfer of business of 
failed institutions, the purchase of claims that are difficult to collect, or the responses to 
financial crises, and articles 126-2 et seq. (Chapter VII-2) on orderly resolution. 
44  Article 1 BRRD (see the previous section). 
45  FINMA Banking Insolvency Ordinance, Art. 2 (August 30, 2012) 
(hereafter: BIO-FINMA), provides that the rules apply to Banks, securities 
dealers, and central mortgage bond institutions. Section (2) states that the 
reorganisation provisions do not apply to firms or persons without the requisite 
license, but that FINMA may declare them applicable when there is sufficient 
public interest. 
46  FSB Second Thematic Review on Resolution Regimes Peer Review Report, 18 
March 2016, pp. 5, 11, 12. 
47  See id. at 12-13. 
48  In the US, see 12 USC §§ 5384 (a) (3) and § 5390 (h). In Japan the bridge bank is 
already a central tool to deal with the succession of business of failed financial 
institutions under Chapter VI of the DIA, articles 91 et seq, and it is again introduced as 
an orderly liquidation tool in Chapter VII-2, in article 126-34 of the DIA. 
49  Article 37 BRRD. 
50  BIO-FINMA chapter 2 (bankruptcy) and 3 (reorganization), the latter of which 
includes bail-in (articles 47-50) and the bridge bank (articles 51-52). 
51  Article 43 BRRD.  
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central tool of the EU framework, they are absent from the Chinese 
framework,52 implicit in the US and Japan, 53 and, in the case of 
Switzerland, they are restricted to cases where a reorganization plan is 
implemented.54 
Finally, there are important differences in the degree of detail with 
which the different frameworks regulate the interference with creditors’ 
rights, and the system of insolvency ranking and priorities. In some 
cases, like Japan, there are either no express provisions, or the rules only 
apply to equity or contractual bail-in instruments, so there should not be 
any interference with pre-existing rights.55 In contrast, the US, the EU 
and Switzerland have attempted to enhance the credibility of burden-
sharing by introducing express provisions to deal with ranking and 
priorities. These attempts open the door to potential conflicts between the 
policy goals of insolvency law and bank resolution. The remainder of 
this article will focus on these three jurisdictions: the US, the EU, and 
Switzerland. 
B. Bank Resolution and Insolvency Law: Tensions at the 
Policy Level 
i. General Considerations 
To analyse the tensions at the level of policy, consider, first, 
insolvency law. Its policies and principles aim at dealing with failed 
debtors and protecting creditors.56 This focus can be seen in international 
best practice from the World Bank57 and the United Nations58 in the form 
 
52  FSB, Ten Years On – Taking Stock of Post-Crisis Resolution Reforms, Sixth Report 
on the Implementation of Resolution Reforms, at 26 (July 6, 2017). 
53  In Japan Arts. 102 and 126-2 cover, respectively, the situations of financial crisis 
and resolution, and although the rules make no express mention of write-down and 
conversion, they state that the Prime Minister will “decide on the treatment” of the 
equity, capital treatment and subordinated debt (Art. 102(3) and 126-2(4)). See Ignacio 
Tirado, “Banking Crisis and the Japanese Legal Framework,” Institute for Monetary and 
Economic Studies – Bank of Japan. Discussion Paper No. 2017-E-2, at 55. 
54  Articles 47-50 FINMA Banking Insolvency Ordinance. 
55  Ignacio Tirado, “Banking Crisis and the Japanese Legal Framework,” at 55. 
56  Thomas Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law, Cambridge Mass: 
Harvard University Press, at 7 (1986). 
57  International initiatives have sought to identify and promote best insolvency law 
practices to foster access to credit and economic development, under the aegis of both the 
United Nations and the World Bank. The World Bank’s efforts have focused on the 
principles for effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes. These were originally 
developed in 2001 as part of international efforts to provide sound solutions to the 
problems arisen with the (Latin American, Asian, and Russian) crises of the 90s, and 
revised in 2005, 2011 and 2015. World Bank, The World Bank Principles for Effective 
Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes, Washington (2016), available at 
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of the Insolvency and Creditor Rights Standard (ICR),59 which has 
received the endorsement of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) as one 
of the key standards for sound financial systems.60 Insolvency ranking 
and priorities are critical elements of such best practices.61  
In relatively recent times, different legal systems have combined 
those two goals (dealing with failed debtors and protecting creditors) in 
different ways, sometimes resulting in proceedings of a different nature: 
“insolvency” and “pre-insolvency” proceedings. In essence, legislators 
may prioritize minimizing destruction of value by rescuing the debtor’s 
business or securing a prompt repayment to creditors through quick 
liquidation. Thus, if insolvency rules are designated as a point of 
reference to solve difficult cases in the context of bank resolution, it is 
unclear whether “insolvency” or “pre-insolvency” proceedings will serve 
as an actual reference.62  
 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/518861467086038847/Principles-for-
effective-insolvency-and-creditor-and-debtor-regimes (hereafter: World Bank Principles). 
58  The United Nations, through its Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL), began to contribute to the field in 1997, with the Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency, with a Guide to Enactment and Interpretation being added in 2013. 
See UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (1997) with Guide to 
Enactment and Interpretation (2013) United Nations New York 2014, available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/1997-Model-Law-Insol-2013-Guide-
Enactment-e.pdf (hereafter: UNCITRAL Model Law). In 2004, the Legislative Guide on 
Insolvency Law was added. See UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (Parts 
I and II). Available at: 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/2004Guide.html (hereafter: 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide). This was later expanded in 2010 with its now-called 
Part Three for groups, and in 2013 with Part IV on Directors’ obligations on the period 
approaching insolvency. See UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law. Part 
Three: Treatment of Enterprise groups in insolvency. Available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/Leg-Guide-Insol-Part3-ebook-E.pdf 
and http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/Leg-Guide-Insol-Part4-ebook-
E.pdf.  
59  The mutual influence between UN and World Bank efforts led to a 2011 
amendment, where the Bank’s principles were modified to incorporate the UNCITRAL 
Guide’s updates. This was the case with new principles C16 and C17, regarding 
enterprise groups. Since then, the relationship between the two sets deepened, resulting in 
the ICR, which was formed by the Bank’s Principles and the UNCITRAL Guide, 
available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGILD/Resources/ICRStandard_Jan2011_withC16
17.pdf 
60  See http://www.fsb.org/2011/01/cos_051201/. 
61  They figure prominently both in the World Bank Principles and the UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide. World Bank Principles Principle C12; UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, 
Part II, Chapter V, paras. 51-81. 
62  EU resolution rules, when relying on sources outside resolution rules themselves, 
refer to ‘normal insolvency proceedings’, which are defined as “‘collective insolvency 
proceedings which entail the partial or total divestment of a debtor and the appointment 
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In practice, the similarities between the two proceedings mitigate this 
problem. In particular, the rules that determine the hierarchy of claims 
are normally placed within the rules on “liquidation” but are common to 
both proceedings.63 Existing principles and goals applicable to 
insolvency priorities include the following: (i) insolvency law needs to 
uphold the priorities of claims established prior to insolvency under 
commercial or other laws to protect legitimate expectations and 
encourage predictability;64 (ii) the priority of secured creditors over their 
collateral needs to be upheld;65 (iii) the payment of claims related to the 
costs and expenses of administration has to be prioritized;66 (iv) once 
secured creditors and insolvency expenses have been satisfied, the law 
has to promote pari passu distribution of proceeds, which also means the 
need to restrict priority debt to a minimum;67 and (v) public interests, e.g. 
tax liabilities, should not be prioritized, whereas the importance of 
workers to the enterprise should be acknowledged by giving them 
priority status.68 
This could still leave some interpretive difficulties in the limited 
cases where priority rules can differ between reorganisation proceedings 
and liquidation proceedings.69 More importantly for our purposes, 
 
of a liquidator or an administrator normally applicable to institutions under national law 
and either specific to those institutions or generally applicable to any natural or legal 
person;”. Article 2 (1) (47) BRRD. 
63  This is the case in England, Germany, or Spain. See Hamish Anderson; Charlotte 
Cooke; Louise Gullifer “National Report for England”; Christoph G Paulus; Matthias 
Berberich “National Report for Germany” Ignacio Tirado “National Report for Spain” 
and Annina H person; Marie Karlsson-Tuula “National Report for Sweden” in Dennis 
Faber; Niels Vermunt; Jason Kilborn; Tomas Richter; Ignacio Tirado Ranking and 
Priority of Creditors Oxford University Press, 2016 pp. 225, 289, 529, 556. The case is 
the same in most EU jurisdictions. 
64  World Bank Principles Principle C12.1; UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part II, 
Chapter V, paras. 51-81. 
65  World Bank Principles Principle C12.2; UNCITRAL Recommendations no. 188, 
Recommendations no. 191. 
66  World Bank Principles Principle C12.3; UNCITRAL recommendations no. 189. 
67  World Bank Principles Principle C12.3; UNCITRAL Recommendations no. 187. 
68  World Bank Principles Principle C12.3-12.4; UNCITRAL Recommendations.  
69  This is the case in France. See articles L. 622-17 (reorganisation), and L. 641-13 
(liquidation) of the French Commercial Code. The differences are ‘slight’, however. See 
Gilles Cuniberti; Isabelle Rueda “National Report for France” in Dennis Faber; Niels 
Vermunt; Jason Kilborn; Tomas Richter; Ignacio Tirado Ranking and Priority of 
Creditors cit p. 259. The same authors point that ranking in reorganisation proceedings is 
rarely applied, as it is only relevant in cases where the business is sold as a going 
concern. However, in a hypothetical case this should not be considered exceptional for a 
bank, since the bail – in tool may often be used in conjunction with the sale of business, 
bridge institution or asset separation tools, which involve such sale as a going concern 
(see Article 37 (3) BRRD). Fortunately, French resolution rules make an express 
reference to “liquidation” proceedings for these purposes. See article L. 613-55-5 no. I 4th 
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however, is whether the goals of a specific proceeding can affect priority 
rules. Resolution frameworks, for example, have a different inspiration 
from insolvency law. They were meant to address insolvency’s 
shortcomings. In the wake of the 2007/08 financial crisis, insolvency 
tools turned out to lack expedience, and insolvency courts lacked the 
expertise to handle complex banks’ crises more swiftly and to avoid 
contagion.70 New rules were needed to preserve banks’ key role of 
liquidity creation while at the same time protecting the public interest by 
avoiding the use of taxpayers’ money to support distressed banks deemed 
too-big-to-fail.71 In addition, existing insolvency rules were not capable 
of dealing with the operational complexity of some banks. For example, 
the “centralized” management of functions72 required a greater emphasis 
on the “group” as the relevant resolution unit73 and greater cross-border 
coordination. 
Before the crisis, the US already had in place specific procedures for 
failing banks. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), 
which had been created through the Banking Act of 1933,74 had 
preventive capabilities, such as the power to level cease-and-desist 
orders,75 and the power to act as a receiver for a failing bank.76 In 
addition, its extensive practice helped develop new resolution tools such 
as the sale of business or the “bad bank”.77 What it lacked, however, 
were specific tools to deal with systemic risk. Title II of the Dodd-Frank 
Act aimed at bridging that gap.78 It introduced a new proceeding for 
financial companies whose failure would have an adverse impact on 
financial stability,79 and it vested the FDIC with new (and vast) powers.80  
 
and 5th of the French Financial and Monetary Code, which refers to “liquidation 
proceedings” under Book VI of the Commercial Code.   
70  Eva Hüpkes, “Allocating costs of failure resolution” at 114 in R. LASTRA (ed.), 
Cross-border bank insolvency, Oxford, Oxford University Press (2011). 
71  FSB Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Systems for Financial Institutions at 1 
(October 15, 2014).  
72  Report of Anton Valukas Examiner In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Chapter 11 
Case No. 08‐13555 Vol. 5 Section III.B. Avoidance Actions, p. 1549, report available at: 
http://web.stanford.edu/~jbulow/Lehmandocs/menu.html 
73  Articles 7-8, 12-13, 16, 18, 19-26, 30,  
74  FDIC The First Fifty Years. A History of the FDIC 1933-1983, Washington: Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, 1984, pp. 84 et seq, available at 
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/firstfifty/index.html 
75 Banking Act 1933, 12 USC chapter 16, Section § 1811 et seq. See FDIC Resolutions 
Handbook, Revised Dec. 23 2014, p. 1. 
76  12 USC sections §§ 1818, and 1819 (a) Ninth. 
 77 See FDIC Resolutions Handbook, chapter 4, available at 
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/reshandbook/ 
78  Title II, Sections §§ 201-217 Dodd-Frank Act, 12 USC §§ 5381 et seq. 
79  Section 203 (b) Dodd-Frank Act, 12 USC §§ 5383 (b). 
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Unlike in the US, in the EU the legislator introduced both specific 
procedures for failing banks and specific tools to deal with systemic risk 
simultaneously, and it only did so in response to the 2007/08 financial 
crisis.81 In so doing, EU legislators drew inspiration from the FDIC to 
vest its own resolution authorities with extensive crisis-management 
powers82 and specific resolution tools.83 In order to solve cross-border 
coordination problems, the EU legislator introduced “colleges” of 
resolution authorities.84 Yet, unlike under US law, under EU law the goal 
of tackling systemic risk pervades the whole framework and applies to 
all banks regardless of their significance for systemic stability.85 
Moreover, in the EU, a bank resolution framework was seen as a key to 
pursue an EU-specific goal: the enhancement of coordination in the 
Eurozone through a Banking Union to sever the link between banks and 
sovereigns,86 which included (i) supervision through a centralized Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM),87 (ii) regulation through the Single 
Rulebook,88 (iii) resolution through the Single Resolution Mechanism 
(SRM),89 with centralized decision-making in the Single Resolution 
Board (SRB)90 and (iv) funding through the Single Resolution Fund 
(SRF),91 and (v) a single system of deposit insurance.92 
 
80  Section 210 Dodd-Frank Act, 12 USC §§ 5390. 
81  In the BRRD Directive 2014/59/EU, recital (1) describes the “significant lack of 
adequate tools to deal effectively with unsound or failing credit institutions”, while recital 
(2) discusses systemic risk. 
82  Articles 3, 61, 63-72, 81-84 BRRD.  
83  Articles 37-42 BRRD. 
 
85  Article 1 (1) BRRD. 
86  Niamh Moloney ‘European Banking Union: Assessing its Risks and Resilience’ 
Common Market Law Review Vol. 51 (2014) p. 1622. The process leading to the Banking 
Union was set in motion when the 2007-2009 financial crisis mutated into to a sovereign 
debt crisis in the euro zone in 2010. 
87  See Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific 
tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential 
supervision of credit institutions (hereafter SSM Regulation, or SSMR). See also: 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/about/thessm/html/index.en.html 
88  http://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/single-rulebook. 
89  Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 
July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit 
institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single 
Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 
1093/2010 (hereafter: SRM Regulation, or SRMR). See also 
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/general-policy/banking-union/single-resolution-
mechanism/index_en.htm 
90  Articles 42-56 SRMR. 
91  Articles 67-79 SRMR. 
92  Article 1 SRMR; Intergovernmental Agreement on the Transfer and Mutualisation 
of Contributions to the Single Resolution Fund 8457/14 Brussels (May 14, 2014). See 
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In addition to protecting financial stability, the new rules on bank 
resolution needed to protect taxpayers and address the problem of moral 
hazard.93 This resulted in rules for the write down and conversion of 
equity and debt instruments, i.e. the bail-in, as opposed to bail-out, tool.94 
In the US, bail-in rules were accompanied by the prohibition for the 
central bank to supply liquidity to individual institutions unless it was in 
the framework of a broader liquidity program.95 In the EU, the specific 
aim of severing the link between banks and their sovereigns under the 
Banking Union had led the Commission to insist on burden-sharing by 
investors as a precondition to approve rescue packages under state-aid 
rules,96 a complementarity that was reinforced in the resolution 
framework.97  
This background resulted in a framework of policies quite different 
from that of insolvency law. First, the bank resolution framework is 
characterized by a more ‘macro’ perspective focused on the avoidance of 
contagion, the mitigation of moral hazard, and the protection of public 
funds, as well as the continuity of critical functions,98 rather than the 
 
also Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 
2014 (stating the importance of deposit guarantee schemes). 
93  R. de Weijs, Too Big to Fail as a game of chicken with the state: What insolvency 
law theory has to say about TBTF and vice versa, 14 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 201, 207-
215 (2013). 
94  Joseph H. Sommer, Why Bail-In? And How?, 20 ECON. POL’Y REV. 207, 
207-228 (2014). 
95  12 U.S.C.A. § 226 Section 13 (d) of the Federal Reserve Act. 
96  Article 107 TFEU declares state aids illegal unless they are included within the 
exceptions under section (3), whose letter (b) authorizes such state aid to “remedy a 
serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”. The Commission issued 
Guidelines stating that holders of equity and junior debt in a failed institution had to share 
in the losses in order for the rescue package not to be considered an illegal state aid. See 
Communication from the Commission of 30 July 2013 on the application from 1 August 
2013 of Sate aid rules to support measures in favour of Banks in the context of the 
financial crisis O.J. 2013, C 216/1. 
97  Thus, bail-in would act as the primary mechanism for loss absorption and recovery, 
and resolution funding to cover the gaps left. See e.g. Recitals (73) and (74) and articles 
37 (10), 44 (4) – (12) BRRD. 
98  Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions, FINANCIAL 
STABILITY BOARD (“FSB”), 3-4 (15 Oct. 2014). See Article 31 BRRD (stating the 
objectives of resolution, which include ensuring the continuity of critical functions, 
avoiding contagion, imposing market discipline, protecting public funds, protecting 
depositors and client assets. In the US, one of the goals of the Dodd-Frank Act itself is 
“to end too big to fail”, and protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts”. This is 
completed by Section § 204 Dodd Frank Act, 12 USC §5384, which refers to systemic 
risk, and moral hazard. Preserving key operations was already a goal of in 12 U.S.C. 
1821(d) and 1823(c). New Orderly Liquidation Authority provisions reinforce this by the 
use of the bridge bank as a tool.). See 76 Fed. Reg. 41639 (July 15, 2011). 
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‘micro’ perspective of creditor protection, which ceases to be an end in 
itself, and becomes a means to achieve other goals.  
Second, in contrast to insolvency law, where pari passu treatment 
was the background policy and priorities and privileges were only 
exceptions, in bank resolution, background policies try to protect certain 
liabilities such as deposits or clients’ funds and assets.99 The interests of 
other creditors are secondary and can only be justified in terms of 
resolution goals as the means to minimize resolution costs and the 
avoidance of “unnecessary” destruction of value.100 
 
ii. Specific Examples 
These differences at the policy level between insolvency law and 
bank resolution can give rise to frictions. Resolution frameworks in the 
US, the EU and Switzerland approach these frictions in different ways. 
The US framework for the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) is a 
high-stakes system, which tries to eliminate interpretative friction by 
relying on (i) FDIC discretion, (ii) separate rules, and (iii) legally-
sanctioned discrimination (with limits). It provides that the FDIC, as 
receiver, shall terminate all rights arising from status as stockholder or 
creditor, except for the rights permitted under the specific OLA rules, 
and ensure that stockholders and creditors bear losses in accordance with 
the priority of claims under those rules.101 The transfer of assets and 
liabilities to bridge companies is subject to what the FDIC, in its 
discretion, deems to be appropriate,102 with the exception of equity 
claims, which are not transferred as a matter of law.103 There are separate 
rules that rank unsecured claims in the following order: post-receivership 
financing, administrative expenses of the receiver, amounts owed to the 
United States, wages, salaries and commissions to employees, 
contributions to employee benefit plans, other senior liabilities, 
subordinated liabilities, wages salaries and commissions of senior 
 
99  See, e.g., Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions, 
FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD (“FSB”), 3-4, 6-10,, 85-94 (15 Oct. 2014) (specifically 
preamble, no. 2.3, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 4.1, and App’x. II Annex 3). See 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (the 
U.S. FDIC’s “primary mission is to preserve and promote public confidence in the U.S. 
financial system by insuring deposits.”). See Resolution Handbook, FED. DEPOSIT 
INSURANCE CORP. (“FDIC”), 16 (updated Dec. 23, 2014). See, e.g., Article 34 (2) (d) and 
BRRD (describing the EU’s version). 
100  Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions, FINANCIAL 
STABILITY BOARD (“FSB”) 3, 6 (15 Oct. 2014) (specifically preamble (iv) and no. 
2.3(iii)). See also BRRD Article 34(2) [para. 2]. 
101  12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(1)(M) (2010). 
102  12 USC § 5390 (h) (1) (B). 
103  12 USC § 5390 (h) (3) (A)-(B). 
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executives and directors, and obligations to shareholders.104 Other 
provisions deal with secured creditors105 and prior contracts, including 
the transfer of qualified financial contracts.106 Thus, the approach is not 
dissimilar from the one that could result from insolvency law, but 
regulated independently, and much more subject to discretion. Add the 
fact that there is very limited court intervention,107 and the risks are clear: 
(i) arbitrary conduct, (ii) an all-or-nothing constitutional challenge,108 and 
(iii) drastic legislative upheaval.109  
Even if the system stands, it is unclear how its self-contained rules 
should be interpreted. If, say, there is disagreement as to whether 
liabilities under a complex contract that is not repudiated after 
appointment by the FDIC relate to a “services” agreement and should be 
treated as an “administrative expense of the receiver”, or are post-
receivership financing and should be preferential to it, or are considered 
to be left behind after transfer to the bridge bank,110 it is unclear which 
principles should be used for interpretation. 
The EU, for its part, exemplifies a deceivingly accommodating 
system. For EU rules, bail-in is the central resolution tool, encompassing 
the power to write down or convert equity or debt instruments (i) as a 
resolution tool used in isolation (“open bank” bail-in), (ii) as a resolution 
tool used in conjunction with the sale of business, bridge bank, etc 
(“closed bank” bail-in),111 and (iii) independently, i.e. before resolution 
takes place.112 Bail-in is anchored in an expert valuation, which 
determines the sufficiency/insufficiency of resources, and serves to 
determine the extent of the bail-in,113 but this will normally offer a range 
 
104  12 USC § 5390 (b) (1), and (2). 
105  12 USC § 5390 (b) (5). 
106  12 USC § 5390 (c). Sub-sections (8) and (9) deal with qualified financial contracts. 
107  12 USC § 5390 (a) (9) (D) and (e). 
108  See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Margaret L. Merrill, Dodd-Frank Orderly 
Liquidation Authority: Too Big for the Constitution?, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 165, 247 (2014). 
(examining the framework on procedural grounds (e.g. the strict time-limits, or the 
secrecy of proceedings), but also the discrimination against creditors). 
109  Department of Treasury, Orderly Liquidation Authority and Bankruptcy Reform 
(February 21, 2018). 
110  12 USC 5390 (b) (7) (B) (post-receivership services), (b)(2) (post-receivership 
financing). 
111  Respectively, article 43 (2) (a) and (b) BRRD. See Emilios Avgouleas, Charles 
Goodhart, “Critical Reflections on Bank Bail-ins,” 1 J. FIN. REG. 3, 8 (2015). 
112  Articles 37 (3) and 43-55 BRRD (resolution tool), and 37 (2) and 59-62 (tool 
independent of resolution) BRRD. In any event, the use of the pre-resolution bail-in tool 
is conditional to a state of financial distress, which makes bail-in the alternative to a 
formal resolution process. See, e.g. Article 59 (3) (b)-(d) and (4) BRRD. Karl-Philipp 
Wojcik, Bail-in in the Banking Union, 53 COMMON MKT. L. R. 91, 106 (2016). 
113  Articles 36, 46, 73-74 BRRD. 
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of values, and will not state the amount of instruments that need to be 
bailed-in to restore confidence. 
In contrast, at first glance, EU resolution provisions accommodate 
insolvency law quite well by requiring bail-in to be exercised “in 
accordance with the hierarchy of claims in normal insolvency 
proceedings.”114 Yet this seamless transition between rules is only 
apparent. BRRD provisions regulate the ranking between equity, hybrid, 
and debt instruments,115 introduce an express priority for eligible (retail) 
bank deposits,116 and, more importantly, provide a (long) list of liabilities 
excluded from bail-in.117 The exclusions comprise secured liabilities, 
liabilities arising from holding client money or instruments, or by virtue 
of a fiduciary relationship,118 which are also protected by insolvency law. 
However, they also exclude short-term debt, or liabilities to providers of 
services critical to the daily functioning of operations,119 an exclusion 
inspired by resolution goals. In short, while pretending to accommodate 
insolvency law, EU resolution rules force insolvency law’s ranking, 
where liabilities are “up” or “down” the ladder, to coexist with a parallel 
system, where liabilities are “in” or “out” of bail-in, thereby creating an 
incentive for arbitrage: creditors will tend to plead that their right is “out” 
rather than “up”. 
Thus, classification problems are bound to arise. It is not difficult to 
imagine cases where it may be difficult to determine whether a liability is 
“secured” or arises from “holding client assets or money”, or from a 
“fiduciary relationship”.120 In such cases, it is unclear whether one should 
rely on insolvency law principles or resolution principles as a tie-breaker. 
In principle, bail-in exclusions must be determined before the bail-in 
sequence,121 and thus one must determine that a liability is “in” before 
determining whether it is “up”. However, some liabilities, such as client 
money or securities, or wages, are excluded “provided that” they are 
 
114  Article 48 (1) (d) and (e) BRRD. 
115  Article 48 (1) (a) – (c) BRRD. 
116  Article 108 BRRD. In addition to this, the rules also indicate the first instruments 
that will be subject to bail-in, including CET1, Tier 1 or Tier 2 instruments, regardless of 
what would be the result under insolvency rules. See article 48 (1) (a) – (c).  
117  Article 44 (2) and (3) BRRD. 
118  Article 44 (2) (b)-(d) BRRD. 
119  Article 44 (e), (f), (g) (ii) BRRD. 
120  Infra 3.1.2. 
121  Article 2 (1) (71) BRRD states that “’eligible liabilities’ means the liabilities and 
capital instruments that do not qualify as Common Equity Tier 1, Additional Tier 1 or 
Tier 2 instruments of an institution or entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 
1(1) that are not excluded from the scope of the bail-in tool by virtue of Article 44(2).”  
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protected under insolvency law,122 which reverses the order, i.e. 
insolvency rules must be considered first, resolution rules second. Other 
liabilities, such as those arising from fiduciary relationships, are 
excluded from bail-in if they are protected “under the applicable 
insolvency law or civil law”.123 This requires analyzing insolvency law, 
then private law, then resolution, but with an interpretative gap, because 
resolution provisions require the liabilities to be “protected”, but do not 
specify the level of protection.  
In other cases, liabilities are excluded without any reference to other 
laws, as in the case of “secured liabilities”, but one may need to refer to 
private law or insolvency law to circumscribe the concept.124 Then, some 
cases may be susceptible to classification under more than one category, 
e.g. short-term liabilities “secured” by collateral arrangements under a 
trust (i.e. fiduciary) agreement. In other cases, courts may have protected 
certain creditors “under insolvency law,” yet by using as interpretative 
tools policies such as investor protection to determine the scope of rights, 
125 which scope may be more limited in a resolution context, where 
considerations of stability and moral hazard are more important. Finally, 
in some cases, resolution authorities may be unable to state whether a 
liability is, or is not, protected under insolvency law, since there are no 
precedents on the issue. The case is similar for exclusions that do not rely 
on insolvency law:126 a self-referenced interpretation of concepts like the 
short-term “commercial or trade creditor” may be difficult if, say, the 
case concerns services by a group entity (not excluded from bail-in)127 
 
122 Id. art. 43(2)(c), (g)(iii) (resulting, in the case of liabilities, from the holding of client 
assets or money, or tax and social security liabilities). 
123  Article 44 (2) (d) BRRD. 
124  Article 44 (2) (b) BRRD includes among the excluded liabilities “secured liabilities 
including covered bonds and liabilities in the form of financial instruments used for 
hedging purposes which form an integral part of the cover pool and which according to 
national law are secured in a way similar to covered bonds;”. Thus, a reference is made 
to ‘national law’ for the specific case of financial instruments similar to covered bonds, 
but not for the general category of ‘secured liabilities’; yet a secured liability cannot exist 
unless it is given that category under some national law. Which law, and how this may be 
enforced in other jurisdiction, is another matter. 
125 The need to provide clients holding money or instruments with a “high level of 
protection” weighed heavily in the UK courts decision in the Lehman Brothers (Client 
Money) cases to provide insolvency protection. See infra III.A.2. 
126 This is the case of “covered deposits,” deposit guarantee schemes, short-term 
liabilities, liabilities for employee fixed remuneration, and to trade creditors supplying 
goods or services critical to the daily functioning. Article 43 (2) (a), (e), (f), (g)-(i), (ii), 
(iv) BRRD. 
127  Article 44 (3) (e) BRRD. 
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that is nonetheless critical to the daily functioning of the entity’s 
operations.128  
The Swiss system is two-tracked, with rules on bank bankruptcy, 
which regulate assets, liabilities realization, and distribution, including 
priorities;129 and rules on reorganization that involve the proposal and 
adoption of a restructuring plan, which can apply only if (i) creditors are 
likely to fare better, and (ii) the plan is feasible in terms of time and 
scope.130 Swiss reorganization rules resemble EU resolution rules since 
(i) they rely on the insolvency hierarchy and private law,131 but, (ii) like 
EU rules, they expressly regulate the bail-in ranking between equity 
instruments and debt instruments,132 and provide a list of exclusions from 
bail-in.133 However, Swiss resolution rules simply cross-reference the list 
of preferential creditors under that insolvency law, and preferred 
deposits, as regulated under the Banking Act.134 Resolution rules only 
add the exclusion of “secured claims” and claims subject to set-off,135 
where, again, insolvency law may be used for interpretation. It is 
arguably the approach most in line with pre-existing creditor rights,136 
although this is easier when there is only one insolvency law to 
accommodate, rather than twenty-eight, as in the case of the EU. 
C. Bank Resolution and Insolvency Law: the Role of 
Principles 
The picture that arises from these policy tensions is clear yet 
unsettling. From a system (insolvency law) where creditor protection is 
a, if not the, primary goal, we move to a two-track system (bank 
resolution) with winners, i.e. the creditors whose individual interests are 
 
128  Article 44 (2) (g) (ii) BRRD. 
129  BIO-FINMA, articles 11 et seq, including 16-23 (assets), 24-29 (liabiities), 31-34 
(realisation), and 35-39 (distribution). Priorities are regulated in article 35, in favor of 
bank deposits and administration expenses, and expenses incurred after the opening of 
the proceedings. 
130  CC Aug. 30,2012, CC 952.05 art. 40 (BIO-FINMA). 
131  CC Aug. 30, 2012, CC 952.05 art. 47 (“If the restructuring plan allows corporate 
actions in accordance with this Section, it is necessary to ensure that: a) the creditors' 
interests take precedence over the interests of the owners and the hierarchy of creditors is 
respected; b) the provisions of the Swiss Code of Obligations1apply mutatis mutandis.”). 
132  CC Aug. 30, 2012, CC 952.05 art. 48(1)(b)-(d). 
133  CC Aug. 30, 2012, CC 952.05 art. 49. 
134  CC Aug. 30, 2012, CC 952.05 art. 47(1)(a), with reference to article 219 of the Loi 
fédérale sur la poursuite pour dettes et la faillite (LP), and article 37ª of the Bank Act. See 
also CC Aug. 20, 2012, CC 952.05 art. 25. 
135  CC Aug. 30, 2012, CC 952.05 art. 49(1)(b). 
136  To the mandatory limits to the exercise of bail-in we must add the procedural 
safeguard of allowing creditors’ objection to the reorganization plan. See CC Aug. 30, 
2012, CC 952.05 art. 46. 
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connected with the “macro” goals of bank resolution (e.g. stability, 
contagion), and losers, i.e. the creditors (and shareholders) whose 
interests must be sacrificed to further other goals (e.g. avoidance of 
moral hazard). In this context of clearly diverging policies, a key element 
is the configuration of principles. We consider principles as legal 
propositions, which, like policies, have a dimension of weight and 
importance, i.e. they do not apply in an all-or-nothing fashion, like rules 
do;137 but, unlike policies, they establish rights and obligations rather 
than formulate goals.138  
This distinction is useful since, while policies set the goals to be 
achieved, principles determine the means that are admissible to achieve 
them, in terms of the parties’ rights, duties and responsibilities. 
Resolution goals can widely diverge from insolvency goals, but 
resolution principles need to take into account pre-existing rights 
established by private law and insolvency law if the system is not to 
become arbitrary. Exactly how resolution principles will take those pre-
existing rights into account will depend on our conception of rights. For 
a conception that characterizes rights as “trumps”, those rights, by the 
fact of being “rights to” something, would trump policy considerations 
and constitute absolute limits.139 For views that see rights as 
“optimization mandates”, 140 rights can project themselves ad infinitum 
until they encounter another right, or the public interest, in which case 
they are “balanced” against the colliding policy or right. Thus, those 
rights could be interfered with by policy considerations as long as a 
proper exercise of balancing and proportionality is present. In our view, 
the conflict between these two views is partly a product of viewing rights 
as either “abstract” rights, with a content that is not predetermined ex 
ante, or “concrete” rights, which are rights in a specific institutional 
context and normally entail a right “to” something in that particular 
context.141 The former encompass rights such as “freedom of contract”, 
“property”, or “equal treatment”; the latter encompass the right to receive 
compensation in a specific case of contract breach. 
In this light, it is not difficult to see why the task of resolution 
principles is hard: they need to further resolution’s distinct goals while 
connecting it to the legal system as a whole, where resolution cannot 
 
137  Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 20-22, Duckworth, 1977. 
138  For a general discussion of “goals” or “policies,” compared to “principles,” and the 
contrast of the two with “rules,” see Dworkin, supra note 140. 
139  Ronald Dworkin “Rights as Trumps” in J. Waldron Theories of Rights, Oxford 
University Press,153-167, 1st edition (1984). 
140  Robert Alexy Teoría de los derechos fundamentales (transl.) CEPC, 2007. 
141  Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, HARV. L. REV.1057-1109 (1975). 
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blatantly ignore rights that form part of that system’s notions of fairness, 
such as “property” or “equal treatment”.142 
 
The principle of equal treatment is particularly relevant for our 
purposes. In general, in the context of insolvency law, there is a 
commitment to treat ordinary creditors pari passu.143 When there is a 
need to deviate from a pari passu treatment, many legal regimes provide 
for a compensation to those creditors who have been treated differently. 
This principle is often referred to as the “no-creditor-worse-off” 
(“NCWO”) principle, which, in essence, requires that no creditor be left 
worse than under insolvency liquidation.144 
Different jurisdictions have adopted the NCWO principle at varying 
degrees. For example, in the US, the FDIC shall, in principle, treat 
“similarly situated” creditors in a “similar manner”.145 However, it may 
depart from this principle, if (i) such departure will achieve certain goals, 
e.g. the maximization of asset value or present value return from sale, the 
minimization of losses, or the continuity of key operations,146 and (ii) all 
creditors receive no less than the value that they would have received in 
case of bankruptcy liquidation.147 The latter is also the FDIC’s maximum 
liability against the failing bank creditors.148 However, additional 
payments or credits are permitted if ‘such payments or credits are 
necessary or appropriate to minimize losses’, i.e. typically if they affect 
key functions. Payments cannot exceed the face value of the claims, and 
this privilege does not entail an obligation to pay other creditors.149 
FDIC rules tried to limit uncertainty by excluding the use of 
discretion to favour holders of equity, subordinated debt, and long-term 
senior debt.150 Yet Treasury proposals have emphasized that discretion is 
still too large and a source of uncertainty and unfairness, and they 
 
142  For an in-depth analysis of the potential conflicts between the application of the 
bail-in tool and the right to property and the principle against discrimination, among other 
fundamental rights, see Ramos and Solana, “Fundamental rights: a limit to bail-in?” 
(forthcoming 2019). 
143  FSB Key Attributes no. 5.1 (commitment to pari passu and respect for insolvency 
hierarchy). 
144  FSB Key Attributes no. 5.2 (compensation under the NCWO principle). 
145  12 USC § 5390 (b) (4). 
146  12 USC § 5390 (b) (4) (A). 
147  12 USC § 5390 (b) (4) (B). 
148  12 USC § 5390 (d) (2) 
149  12 USC § 5390 (d) (4). 
150  12 C.F.R. § 380.27. 
28 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:1 
 
recommend the elimination of discretionary disparate creditor 
treatment.151 
The EU rules have created a comparable system, where no creditor 
can incur greater losses than under insolvency.152 Procedurally speaking, 
the NCWO principle generally requires ex post valuation that compares 
the situation of creditors in resolution with a hypothetical valuation of 
their situation under insolvency.153 That valuation gives rise to a right to 
compensation from the resolution fund,154 but creditors do not have a 
right to a certain loss allocation during the resolution process itself. 
In the EU, creditors of the same class must be treated equitably, but 
not equally.155 Such equitable treatment, as well as the priority ranking 
under insolvency law, are taken as reference points, and apply unless 
resolution provisions state otherwise.156 Thus, there is a weak 
commitment to equality as a matter of principle. Resolution authorities 
have the power to exclude “certain liabilities” (ad hoc exclusion),157 but 
unlike the US case, the power is restricted to “exceptional 
circumstances”, and subject to strict requirements.158 One possibility is to 
exclude a liability where the exclusion is “strictly necessary” and 
“proportionate” to achieve the continuity of critical functions and core 
business lines, or avoid widespread contagion;159 or when “it is not 
possible to bail-in that liability within a reasonable time notwithstanding 
the good faith efforts of the resolution authority”.160 Many of these 
concepts, however, are open-textured. Clear principles would help solve 
the interpretation issues that could arise, but the weak commitment to 
equal treatment makes the solution more uncertain. 
Swiss rules are less controversial. The NCWO is a test to simply set 
reorganization proceedings in motion.161 Then, bail-in relies on 
insolvency ranking, and resolution authorities lack the power to exclude 
liabilities other than those stipulated under the law.162 FINMA’s has 
certain discretion on whether to order a write-down or conversion of 
 
151  Department of Treasury Orderly Liquidation Authority and Bankruptcy Reform, 32-
33 (2018). 
152  See article 73 BRRD, and also article 34 (1) (b), (f), (g) BRRD.  
153  Article 74 BRRD. 
154  Recital (73), article 75 BRRD. 
 
 
157  This may increase the burden for liabilities that remain subject to bail-in. Id. art. 
43(3) ⁋ 2 BRRD. 
158  Article 44 (3) BRRD. 
159  Article 44 (3) (b) and (c) BRRD. 
160  Article 44 (3) (a) BRRD. 
161  Article 40 81) (a) BIO-FINMA. 
162  Articles 48-49 BIO-FINMA. 
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claims, but it is always subject to the same rules.163 It does not seem to be 
able to privilege certain classes of liabilities. 
The NCWO principle tends to be associated with fundamental rights: 
if NCWO is not respected, there is a clear risk of a fundamental rights 
violation.164 We have explored this risk in greater detail in another 
paper.165 Suffice it to say here that, in cases where the correct balance 
between principles and policies may result in prima facie violations of 
the principle of equal treatment, procedural safeguards become 
particularly relevant and, when reviewing administrative decisions, 
courts will put a great emphasis on the justification of those decisions.166 
The above shows that the problem of classification and application 
of rules has less to do with the complexity of facts, and more with the 
tension between different policies and principles. Classifying a liability 
as a deposit, secured liability, or essential to preserve critical functions is 
not a mere semantic problem. It is a hard case of legal interpretation, a 
pivotal problem that confronts competing policies and principles, and it 
needs to be solved by adequately identifying those principles and goals, 
finding the best “fit”, and determining its consequences for the parties’ 
rights and obligations.167 
D. A Layered Analytical Framework 
Banks’ funding structures are complex, and they fall in the midst of 
an unresolved tension between the policies and principles enshrined in 
insolvency law and bank resolution. That tension will have to be partly 
addressed on a case-by-case basis, and will, in our view, depend on the 
process’ legitimacy. To address the different angles of this problem in a 
constructive way, we need a proper explanatory plan. We propose a 
“layered” approach that takes the “core” tension between insolvency and 
resolution policies and principles in the context of key types of bank 
funding, and lets it unfold across the different dimensions of the 
 
163  Article 50 BIO-FINMA. 
164  EBA Regulatory Technical Standards on valuation for the purposes of resolution 
and on valuation to determine difference in treatment following resolution under 
Directive 2014/59/EU on recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment 
firms. EBA/RTS/2017/05 - Final draft RTS on valuation before resolution 
EBA/RTS/2017/06 - Final draft RTS on valuation after resolution 23 May 2017 pp. 7-8; 
EBA Handbook on Valuation for Purposes of Resolution 22 February 2019, pp. 10, 12. 
See also World Bank Understanding Recovery and Resolution in the EU: A Guidebook to 
the BRRD April 2017, pp. 139-142. 
165  See Ramos and Solana, “Fundamental rights: a limit to bail-in?” (Forthcoming 
2019). 
166  See Ramos and Solana, “Fundamental rights: a limit to bail-in?” (Forthcoming 
2019). 
167  Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire at 42-43, Oxford, Hart, (1986). 
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problem. Choosing the layers is as important as choosing the order in 
which they will be addressed.  
In our view, Layer 1 needs to address (i) the dimension of the basic 
principle/policy conflict, i.e. between ensuring a fair and equal treatment 
of creditors, and avoiding systemic risk and moral hazard, in relation 
with key categories of bank funding to see where problems may arise. 
We have identified four such key categories: deposits, liabilities resulting 
from the management of money and instruments as collateral, 
derivatives, and contractually subordinated debt. (ii) Layer 1 also needs 
to consider these key categories not only in the context of individual 
banks, but also of bank groups. This external versus intra-group 
dimension will also inform our analysis in subsequent layers. 
The uncertainty resulting from the principle/policy conflict in Layer 
1 leads to regulatory attempts to plan in advance in order to sidestep 
potential problems were the crisis to erupt, thereby eliminating the 
principle/policy conflict before it arises. Yet such rules can also create 
tensions between “prudential” and “crisis management” rules, in both 
external and intragroup funding. Thus, Layer 2 will explore the tension 
between insolvency and bank resolution in the context of prevention 
regulation (or ex-ante resolution mechanisms) and crisis management 
regulation (or ex-post resolution mechanisms). 
Finally, Layer 3 will explore the cross-border dimension of the 
problem. The frictions between resolution and insolvency rules at the 
level of bank and intra-group funding are difficult to comprehend. 
Adding the tensions between crisis-management and preventive rules on 
top of that  further increases the complexity of the challenge. When we 
add yet another level of analysis by exploring  cross-border recognition 
and coordination, the problem becomes truly daunting. Yet we attempt to 
identify the sources of conflict and suggest avenues to mitigate existing 
problems, both from a perspective of external and intragroup funding. 
We explore Layer 3 in a succeeding article. 
III. LAYER 1: THE EXTERNAL FUNDING V. THE INTRA-GROUP 
FUNDING DIMENSION 
A. Operational Liabilities 
i. Deposits and Claims Against Deposit Guarantee 
Schemes 
Enhancing the protection of retail deposits has become a matter of 
public policy. Indeed, the FSB has identified this matter as one of the 
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goals of bank resolution in its recommendations.168 There are two clear 
objectives behind this policy: i) to foster confidence in the system, and ii) 
to guarantee that depositors will continue to have access to their deposits 
despite any resolution action.169 
Nevertheless, bank resolution frameworks treat different types of 
deposits differently. For example, deposits covered under a Deposit 
Guarantee Scheme (“DGS”), i.e. “covered deposits”,170 are given priority 
“up” the insolvency ladder and are left “out” of bail-in.171 “Eligible 
deposits”, however, i.e. deposits that fall under the scope of DGS but 
may not necessarily be “covered”, or at least not in full, are also “up” in 
the insolvency ladder (yet below “covered deposits”)172 but are not 
excluded from bail-in,173 In other words, “eligible (yet uncovered)” 
deposits are “up” (although not as high as “covered deposits”) and “in. 
Claims that the DGS may have against the insolvent institution when 
subrogating to the rights and obligations of covered depositors will rank 
just as high as “covered deposits” in the insolvency ladder,174 but they 
are not excluded from bail-in:175 they are also “up-and-in”. Deposits that 
do not fall under the scope of DGS, i.e. “ineligible deposits”, rank pari 
passu with ordinary liabilities: they are “down” and “in”. 
The different treatment of all these claims can create frictions 
between bank resolution frameworks and insolvency law. For example, 
covered deposits and DGS claims resulting from subrogation are both 
“up” in the insolvency ladder but only the former are “out” (i.e. excluded 
from bail-in). 
More complicated scenarios can be envisaged in cases where, in 
order to avoid a panic, a DGS decides to extend their coverage level 
beyond the amount specified in article 6 of the DGS Directive, i.e. 
 
168  See, e.g. FSB Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial 
Institutions 15 October 2014. See also art. 31(2)(d) BRRD.  
169  See e.g. BRRD, art 69(4)(a). This second objective contributes to the first objective. 
170  This is the term used in EU legislation. See e.g. Directive 2014/49/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 of April 2014 on deposit guarantee 
schemes (“DGS Directive), article 2(1)(5). Art 6(1) of the DGS Directive stipulates that, 
if deposits are unavailable, ‘the coverage level for the aggregate deposits of each 
depositor is EUR 100 000’. The second paragraph of this article requires Member States 
to provide a higher coverage for specific deposits that can last between three and twelve 
months. 
171  See e.g. article 108 (b)(i) (insolvency priority) and article 44(2)(a) (bail-in) BRRD.   
172  See article 108(a)(i) BRRD. Letter (ii) of that provision extends the same protection 
to deposits made through third-country branches of EU institutions. 
173  See article 44(2), fourth paragraph, BRRD. 
174  See article 108(b)(ii) BRRD. 
175  See article 44(2) BRRD. On the other hand, liabilities to “deposit guarantee schemes 
arising from contributions due in accordance with Directive 2014/49/EU” are excluded 
from bail-in. See article 44 (2) (g) (iv) BRRD. 
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€100,000. Bank resolution provisions use the definition of “covered 
deposits” under the DGS Directive to define the scope of the privileged 
treatments in insolvency. If the DGS of any Member State raised the 
coverage level to €250,000, for example, it is unclear whether the 
privileged treatment that article 108(B)(i) BRRD recognises to “covered 
deposits” would only cover the first €100,000, i.e. the coverage level 
defined in article 6 DGS Directive, or whether it would cover the 
€150,000 extension as well. The same doubts would arise in relation to 
DGS claims in insolvency that arose from subrogation of “covered 
depositors”.176 In our opinion, the underlying policy rationale would 
dictate that the privilege be extended to the full amount, but this would 
also raise questions about how DGS in different Member States might 
respond to a looming crisis. Different coverage levels in different 
Member States could introduce additional frictions in the application of 
the bank resolution framework if, for example, one bank goes into 
resolution and its depositors are treated differently depending on the 
bank’s subsidiary with which they entered into the deposit. 
Another problem might arise where a “host” DGS covers the 
deposits of a branch within its jurisdiction because the “home” DGS is 
insufficiently funded. The host DGS can make the payment “on behalf 
of” and “under instructions from” the home DGS, and it is stipulated that 
the home DGS “shall provide the necessary funding prior to payout.”177 
Yet nothing is said about those cases where a host DGS decides to cover 
the liabilities of the home DGS before receiving the funding. Problems 
may arise because the right of subrogation and the right of priority are 
provided to “the DGS that makes payments under guarantee within a 
national framework,” but it is unclear whether a host DGS filing in for 
the home DGS without having received prior funding would be making 
payments “within a national framework.”178 
In addition, it is important to note that short-term debt is excluded 
from bail-in.179 This could give creditors whose deposits could be bailed-
 
176  See article 108(b)(ii) BRRD. 
177  Article 14 (2) DGS Directive (emphasis added.) 
178  The host DGS can make the payment ‘on behalf of’ and ‘under instructions from’ 
the home DGS, and it is stipulated that the home DGS ‘shall provide the necessary 
funding prior to payout’. Article 14 (2) DGS Directive. (Emphasis added.). Yet nothing 
is said about those cases where a host DGS decides to cover the liabilities of the home 
DGS before receiving the funding. Problems may arise because the right of subrogation 
and the right of priority are provided to ‘the DGS that makes payments under guarantee 
within a national framework’, but it is unclear whether a host DGS filing in for the home 
DGS without having received prior funding would be making payments ‘within a 
national framework’. 
179  Liabilities with less than 7-days maturity are excluded from bail-in Article 44 (2) (e) 
BRRD.  
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in, i.e. “eligible (yet uncovered)” and “ineligible” deposits, an incentive 
to replace their deposits with short-term debt. But if the entity is not put 
into resolution but enters insolvency, DGS claims will rank higher than 
short-term debt despite the former not being excluded from bail-in. 
In our opinion, these problems arise because resolution rules have 
blurred the rationale for the protection of DGS claims. In principle, the 
protection of DGS claims is grounded in a “right of subrogation,” yet 
resolution rules deal with the issue as a matter of insolvency “privileges,” 
which means that they de facto take the “right” of subrogation away. 
This also contradicts the constant references to their “equal treatment,” 
which is referred to in insolvency law, while resolution rules introduce 
an additional privilege for covered deposits by excluding them from bail-
in. It is as if a bullseye were moved after the shot had been fired. 
ii. Liabilities Resulting from the Management of Client 
Money and Client Assets 
In principle, liabilities arising from managing client money and 
client assets are expressly excluded from bail-in as long as “[the] client is 
protected under the applicable insolvency law.”180 Liabilities that may 
arise from holding assets for the benefit of another person, e.g. as a result 
of a fiduciary relationship, are also excluded from bail-in provided that 
“[the] beneficiary is protected under the applicable insolvency or civil 
law.”181 These cases raise several concerns. 
First, the protection of the client or the beneficiary under the 
applicable law may itself be unclear. For example, in the Lehman 
Brothers (Client Money) cases, it took three lengthy decisions by the 
High Court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court in the UK to 
clarify that investors’ rights over “client money” were protected despite 
Lehman’s breach of its duty to place that money in segregated 
accounts.182 A constructive trust183 was held to exist:184 clients were 
 
180  Article 44(2)(c) BRRD. 
181  Article 44(2)(d) BRRD. 
182  Instead, Lehman commingled its clients’ money with its own funds in its house 
accounts. In the matter of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) 
and In the matter of the Insolvency Act 1986 [2009] EWHC (Ch) 3228; In the matter of 
Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) and In the matter of the 
Insolvency Act 1986 [2010] EWCA (Civ) 917; In the matter of Lehman Brothers 
International (Europe) (In Administration) and In the matter of the Insolvency Act 1986 
[2012] UKSC 6, (appeal taken from Eng.). 
183  For the purposes of this paper, we regard trusts as an example of “fiduciary 
agreements” as the term is used in Article 44(2)(d) BRRD, supra note 5. Unfortunately, 
however, the BRRD does not provide a specific definition of the term “fiduciary 
agreement”. In reality, trusts are a creature of the English common law and they may 
present some differences with fiduciary agreements as understood, for example, in civil 
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given protection because their money should have been placed in 
segregated accounts. Still, different facts could alter the policy/principle 
considerations at stake.185 
In another Lehman case, Lomas v RAB Market Cycles,186 the 
difficulty was whether the Prime Broker Agreement (Charge version) 
(the “PB Agreement”) that was concluded by LBIE, Lehman’s parent 
 
law jurisdictions. For a detailed analysis of the reception of trust-like mechanisms in civil 
law jurisdictions, see M Lupoi, Trusts: A Comparative Study (Cambridge University 
Press 2000); LD Smith (ed), Re-imagining the Trust: Trusts in Civil Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2012). 
184  The High Court concluded that there was a constructive trust, a conclusion accepted 
by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. Yet, the High Court considered that 
clients’ money were excluded from the specific reimbursement procedure envisaged by 
regulatory rules on “client money”, while the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court 
concluded that they were protected by it. In the matter of Lehman Brothers International 
(Europe) (In Administration) and In the matter of the Insolvency Act 1986 [2009] EWHC 
(Ch) 3228; In the matter of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) 
and In the matter of the Insolvency Act 1986 [2010] EWCA (Civ) 917; In the matter of 
Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) and In the matter of the 
Insolvency Act 1986 [2012] UKSC 6, (appeal taken from Eng.). 
185  The conclusion that the specific protection procedure should apply to all clients, 
regardless of whether their moneys were commingled or not, was based strictly on 
insolvency law, but on a finalistic reading of MiFID rules, specifically article 16 of 
Directive 2006/73/EC (MiFID Implementation Directive), which required States to 
dispense a ‘high level of protection’. The High Court held that, since property law was 
not harmonized, each State should achieve the level of protection ‘taking its property law 
as given’. According to the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, however, the ‘high 
level of protection’ required that the specific restitution procedure arising from the CMP 
should be available to all clients. See In the matter of Lehman Brothers International 
(Europe) (In Administration) and In the matter of the Insolvency Act 1986 [2009] EWHC 
(Ch) 3228; In the matter of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) 
and In the matter of the Insolvency Act 1986 [2010] EWCA (Civ) 917; In the matter of 
Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) and In the matter of the 
Insolvency Act 1986 [2012] UKSC 6, (appeal taken from Eng.). Furthermore, the courts’ 
holding was partly based on the fact that the custody mechanisms available at that time 
left a protection gap. The “alternative approach” sanctioned by UK regulatory rules 
permitted the firm to not segregate the moneys immediately, but to deposit the money in 
house accounts and effect a daily reconciliation procedure. This, together with the lack of 
internal controls, resulted in a failure ‘on a truly spectacular scale’. See In the matter of 
Lehman Brothers International Europe, [2009] EWHC 3228 (Ch) at 4. In contrast, article 
38 of Regulation 909/2014 on Central Securities Depositaries (CSDs) provides for 
segregation by giving clients an express choice between more protective and expensive 
mechanisms (individual segregated accounts) and cheaper but riskier ones (omnibus 
accounts), while CSD participants must inform their clients of the level of protection of 
each system. Clients’ acceptance of the harmful consequences associated with the chosen 
protection mechanism could influence a court’s calibration of the level of insolvency 
protection, which would determine exclusion from bail-in.  
186  Lomas v. RAB Market Cycles (Master) Fund Limited [2009] EWHC (Ch) 2545. 
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entity for the EU, was a trust that would make LBIE a trustee and thus 
give its clients proprietary protection in the event of LBIE’s insolvency. 
Unsecured creditors objected on grounds that, although the PB 
Agreement described LBIE as trustee of the assets for the benefit of its 
clients, it gave LBIE rights to substitute and use its clients’ assets, which, 
unsecured creditors alleged, was incompatible with a trust and should 
have deprived clients of any proprietary rights in the assets in 
insolvency.187 Despite recognising certain anomalies,188 the court 
concluded that, taken as a whole, the PB Agreement did disclose a 
sufficient intention to make LBIE the trustee over the client’s assets or 
their substitute.189 
A second concern is how clients are actually protected. Going back 
to the Lehman (Client Money) saga, it was clear that clients’ rights were 
protected under a fiduciary arrangement, i.e. a trust. Yet the trust itself 
would have merely given them the remedy of “tracing”, which is 
extremely difficult to enforce over money commingled in house 
accounts.190 The real question was whether clients, in addition to 
“tracing”, were also protected under a specific restitution procedure 
envisaged by regulatory rules, with the High Court saying they were not, 
and the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court saying they were.191 In 
the context of bail-in, the question thus becomes whether the protection 
offered by a trust would suffice to exclude the resulting liabilities from 
bail-in despite the practical difficulties associated with the enforcement 
of the trust. 
The problem is worse in civil law countries due to the limited 
admissibility of fiduciary arrangements.192 Otherwise, this figure could 
help fill any gaps in the attempts to determine the specific rights over 
 
187  Id at 20. 
188  Ibid at 49-52.  
189  Ibid at 53-63. The court found the existence of a trust “notwithstanding the conferral 
of rights on LBIE in relation to it which would have made a 19th century trust lawyer turn 
in his grave.” See Justice Briggs, “Has English law coped with the Lehman collapse?” at 
132, Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law (March 2013). 
190  Tracing requires the beneficiary to identify “his” property, which is extremely 
difficult to do in case of money assets commingled in different accounts. See In the 
matter of Lehman Brothers International Europe, [2009] EWHC 3228 (Ch) at 172 et seq. 
191  In other words, if clients simply had had a constructive trust, whereas the specific 
procedure envisaged in regulatory rules, which consisted in the forming of a Client 
Money Pool (CMP) to be promptly restituted, was reserved only for clients whose 
moneys were effectively segregated, there would be a clear difference in treatment. Thus, 
the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court considered that the CMP should encompass 
all clients, regardless of whether their moneys had been effectively segregated. See In the 
matter of Lehman Brothers International Europe, [2010] EWCA Civ 917; and [2012] 
UKSC 6. 
192  Saverio Bartoli Il Trustm 916 Milano: Giuffrè (2001). 
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client assets.193 As a result, jurisdictions that admit fiduciary 
arrangements would effectively grant clients a better protection. The 
difference may be particularly acute when the insolvency law and the 
law of the fiduciary arrangement differ, since, to be excluded from bail-
in, liabilities from client money or instruments must be protected under 
insolvency law, whereas liabilities arising from fiduciary arrangements 
can be protected under insolvency law or civil law.194 
In short, the same liabilities arising in relation to client money and 
client assets may be treated differently under the EU bank resolution 
framework depending on the classification of those liabilities, on the 
level of protection granted by the applicable insolvency law, and on 
elements, such as the recognition of fiduciary arrangements, that are 
deeply embedded in legal culture. Whether such differences are arbitrary 
(and thus potentially illegal) will depend on whether they are backed by 
the principles and policies underpinning resolution rules. 
iii. Liabilities Arising from Derivative Contracts 
Derivatives are financial instruments the value of which is derived 
from the value of an underlying asset.195 Derivatives can be traded in a 
regulated market (“exchange–traded”) or over-the-counter (“OTC”),196 
and they can be cleared on the books of each counterparty i.e. “bilaterally 
cleared,” or on the books of a central counterparty (“CCP”), i.e. 
“centrally cleared.” Exchange-traded derivatives are always centrally 
cleared. 
 
193  In the case of Spain, for example, recent clearing and settlement rules provide for 
the possibility of settlement using special accounts opened by CSD participants on behalf 
of financial intermediaries, who, in turn, use the accounts for their clients. This gives rise 
to complex issues if the financial intermediary goes insolvent, and there are securities 
deposited in those accounts. There are strong arguments, partly based on the law of 
mandate, partly based on insolvency law, to support that those securities do not belong to 
the intermediary’s estate, but admit that this remains an open issue. See David Ramos, 
Ignacio Tirado, “El Procedimiento Alternativo de Liquidación a Través de Intermediario 
Financiero” 693-749 (2017). 
194  Articles 44 (2) (c) or (d) BRRD. 
195  Commodities, securities, currencies, and interest rates or yields are the most 
common underlying assets, but the scope is much broader. See e.g. Directive 2014/65 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial 
instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU (hereinafter, 
“MiFID II”), Annex I, Section C (4) to (10). 
196  That is, directly between the two parties, without the involvement of a regulated 
market. See Regulation (EU) no. 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation 
(EU) No 648/2012 (hereinafter, “MiFIR”), art 2(1)(32); and Regulation (EU) no. 
648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 of July 2012 on OTC 
derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (hereinafter, “EMIR”), art 2(7). 
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Liabilities arising from derivative contracts are, in principle, eligible 
for bail-in,197 but only for the amount that results from the application of 
any close-out netting agreement between the parties, and only if that 
amount is not covered by a “financial collateral arrangement” that the 
parties might have entered into to support the derivative transactions.198 
Thus, in practice, only the part of the derivatives liability that is 
unsecured, for example because it is “under-collateralised,” will be 
eligible for bail-in.199 
It is important to note, however, that crisis prevention or crisis 
management measures will not necessarily trigger the application of a 
close-out netting agreement nor the enforceability of a financial 
collateral arrangement, provided that the substantive obligations under 
the derivative contract continue to be performed.200 In addition, bank 
resolution frameworks vest resolution authorities with the necessary 
powers to suspend payment and delivery obligations,201 to restrict the 
enforcement of security interests,202 and to suspend termination rights,203 
all for a very short period of time: one day after the publication by the 
resolution authority of a notice summarising the effects of the resolution 
action. The scope of these powers, however, is restricted to bilaterally 
cleared derivatives.204 
Despite the clear intention of financial regulators to design a uniform 
framework that would make liabilities arising from derivative contracts 
potentially eligible for bail-in, the divergences in the treatment of these 
liabilities under insolvency law could give rise to potential frictions in 
the application of bank resolution frameworks. For example, in the EU, 
the Financial Collateral Directive does not require any privileged 
treatment of these liabilities in insolvency beyond the enforceability of 
financial collateral arrangements and close-out netting agreements. 
Indeed, most Member States appear to rank claims arising from 
derivatives as general unsecured claims.205 Spain, however, is an 
exception. To incentivize parties to maintain derivatives contracts despite 
 
197  These liabilities are not in the list of liabilities expressly excluded from bail-in. See 
arts 44(1) and (2), BRRD. 
198  See Council Directive 2002/47 of June 6, 2002, on financial collateral arrangements, 
2002 O.J. (L 168) 4, 5, 6, 7. 
199  See BRRD, art 44(2), third sub-paragraph. An “under-collateralised” amount defines 
the part of a liability that is not covered by the value of the collateral assets that secure 
the liability. 
200  See art 68(1) and (3), BRRD. 
201  See e.g. art 69 BRRD. 
202  See e.g. art 70(1) BRRD.  
203  See e.g. art 71 BRRD. 
204  See arts. 69(4)(b), 70(2) and 71(3) BRRD, respectively. 
205  See e.g. the Financial Collateral Arrangements, No.2 (U.K. 2003). 
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the opening of insolvency proceedings, Spanish law makes the claim 
resulting from the early termination of derivatives transactions payable 
against the insolvent estate (i.e. privileged) ahead of all unsecured 
creditors if the early termination event occurs after the filing for 
insolvency, whereas the claim will be ordinary and non-privileged if 
such an event is concurrent with, or prior to, the filing for insolvency.206  
In principle, the privileged treatment that claims arising from 
derivatives receive under Spanish law need not be problematic in the 
context of bank resolution. For example, resolution authorities could 
exercise their right to suspend early termination rights under the 
derivatives in accordance with article 71(1) BRRD. This would allow 
resolution authorities to block any attempt from derivatives 
counterparties to behave opportunistically. Nevertheless, the privileged 
treatment may be upheld if resolution authorities decide not to transfer 
those liabilities to another entity or if they decide not to write down or 
convert those liabilities on the application of the bail-in tool for 
recapitalisation purposes.207 They may also be upheld if resolution 
authorities decide to exclude those liabilities from bail-in due to 
extraordinary circumstances, including the possibility of spreading 
contagion.208 In these cases, the place of incorporation of the derivatives 
counterparty would matter: if the counterparty is a bank incorporated in 
Spain, a derivatives creditor would have a better treatment in insolvency 
than a derivatives creditor whose counterparty is incorporated in another 
Member State. 
In these cases, the privileged treatment of derivatives creditors could 
pose challenges to the resolution of Spanish banks. In addition, it could 
also give participants in derivatives markets an incentive to structure 
their transactions in a way that would allow them to benefit from the 
privileged insolvency treatment under Spanish law, thereby potentially 
challenging the effective resolution of banks incorporated in other 
Member States. We consider that privilege to be unjustified and have 
 
206  Art. 16 (2) second sub – paragraph, of Royal Decree – Law 5/2005, which 
transposes FCD in Spain. At the end of 2015, the Spanish Supreme Court excluded this 
preferential treatment in cases where a bank had entered into one derivative transaction 
with one of its retail customers. The Court did not examine the applicability of such 
privileged insolvency treatment where the counterparty was another sophisticated 
participant nor where the parties had entered into several derivative transactions under the 
same master agreement. For a critical commentary of the decision, see Javier Solana, 
‘Swaps y Concurso: Reflexiones a Propósito de La Sentencia Del Tribunal Supremo 
Núm. 629/2015, de 17 de Noviembre’ [2016] La Ley mercantil 2. 
207  See article 71(4) BRRD. 
208  See article 44(3) BRRD. 
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advocated for legislative reform elsewhere.209 Until that happens, the 
diverse treatment of liabilities arising from derivatives contracts across 
the different insolvency laws of the EU Member States could introduce 
frictions in the effective application of the EU bank resolution 
framework. These frictions further support our call for legislative reform. 
iv. Contractual Subordination 
If bank resolution, and bail-in in particular, is about ensuring that 
losses are absorbed by the bank, holders of “subordinated” instruments, 
broadly conceived to encompass subordinated debt and equity, play a 
determinant role.210 It is therefore necessary to discuss the role of 
subordination provisions under insolvency law. 
Debts may be subordinated as a result of contractual agreement 
(“contractual subordination”), the application of statutory provisions 
(“statutory subordination”) or court order to avoid unfair results 
(“equitable subordination”). In the specific context of banking groups, 
we may also see structural subordination as a reflection of the group’s 
corporate structure. Here we refer to contractual subordination issues, 
dealing with statutory, equitable, and structural subordination in the next 
sub-section. 
The terms “contractual subordination” and “subordination 
agreements” can refer both to agreements that subordinate the payment 
of a certain (typically unsecured) debt to the payment of another debt, 
and to agreements amongst secured creditors that establish the order of 
priority of their security rights. In the US, each of these two types of 
subordination agreements are referred to as “payment subordination” and 
“lien subordination”, respectively.211 In civil law countries, the second 
type tends to be seen as an agreement that is circumscribed to the 
specific security or collateral, not as a subordination agreement. Our 
concern here is thus with the first type, i.e. payment subordination. 
Contractual subordination is admissible in jurisdictions like 
England,212 Germany,213 Spain,214 and France,215 as well as in the United 
 
209  See Javier Solana, "Swaps y Concurso: Reflexiones a Propósito de La Sentencia Del 
Tribunal Supremo Núm. 629/2015, de 17 de Noviembre" [2016] La Ley mercantil 2. 
210  In fact, in the bail-in sequence envisaged in article 43 (2) BRRD, letters (a), (b) and 
(c) are dedicated to Tier 1, Tier 2 capital, and subordinated debt.  
211  See Koback v. National City Bank (In re Koback), 280 B.R. 164 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 
2002). In England, see Cheah v. Equitycorp Finance Group Ltd, [1992] 1 AC 472 (PC). 
212  In Re Maxwell Communications Corp PLC (No 2) ChD [1993] 1 WLR 1402. 
213  § 39 para. 2 Insolvency Statute. 
214  Insolvency Act art. 92. 
215  French Comm. Code, art. L 228-97, L 228-36. 
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States.216 Despite the widespread admissibility of subordination 
agreements, their enforceability can be problematic, particularly if it 
would alter the priority ranking laid down in insolvency law and the pari 
passu principle. Generally, agreements that affect priorities and ranking 
(i) cannot impose additional burdens on the insolvent estate;217 and (ii) 
need to be consented by the parties whose rights are at stake. 
Yet subordination agreements offer variations. We can distinguish at 
least between (i) agreements for “full” and “partial” subordination, 
depending on whether a creditor agrees to be subordinated to all ordinary 
creditors or only to specific creditors; and (ii) “agreements between 
creditors” and “agreements with the debtor”. It makes sense for “full” 
subordination agreements to be concluded with the debtor, but this may 
be also desirable in partial subordination agreements.  
With these basic categories in mind, jurisdictions vary in their 
approach to the validity and enforceability of subordination agreements. 
Countries like France have no general doctrine of contract 
subordination,218 and subordinated securities or loans are often based on 
specific statutory provisions.219 Others, like Germany or Spain, have 
explicit provisions that render enforceable full subordination agreements, 
but say nothing of partial subordination ones.220 
  
 
216  Section § 510 (a) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 510(a), stipulates that “A 
subordination agreement is enforceable in a case under this title to the same extent that 
such agreement is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law,” which means that a 
two-step test will be needed to establish enforceability. 
217  Christoph G Paulus & Matthias Berberich, National Report for Germany, in 
RANKING AND PRIORITY OF CREDITORS, 300 (Dennis Faber, Niels Vermunt, Jason 
Kilborn, Tomas Richter & Ignacio Tirado, OXFORD UNIVERISTY PRESS (2016). 
218  French Comm. Code, art. L 228-97, L 228-36. 
219  Although subordination agreements are allowed, for example between creditors 
secured by a same asset, there is no general doctrine of contractual subordination. Gilles 
Cuniberti & Isabelle Rueda, National Report for France in RANKING AND PRIORITY OF 
CREDITORS, 260-61 (Dennis Faber, Niels Vermunt, Jason Kilborn, Tomas Richter & 
Ignacio Tirado, OXFORD UNIVERISTY PRESS (2016). 
220  Insolvenzordnung [InsO] [Insolvency Statute], Oct. 5, 1994, BGB1 §39(1) (Ger.). In 
Germany, the debt subject to such agreements does not count for purposes of determining 
a balance sheet insolvency. 
2019] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 41
Let us illustrate the specific problems that might arise from 
contractual subordination in the context of bank resolution with an 
example. 
In this example, the status of subordinated bonds would be less 
problematic, but the laws of France, Germany or Spain could pose 
problems for the loan facility with B1-B3, or in reconciling it with the 
other subordination clauses if A1 and A2 entered insolvency.  
In England, although subordination agreements are valid,221 they are 
typically enforced between creditors, not vis-à-vis the insolvency 
administration, and they are often structured through a trust, where 
insolvency proceeds are received by the junior creditor on trust for the 
senior creditor.222 This could spell trouble if, for example, A1 and A2 
entered insolvency, D were an English creditor and senior over B, but the 
latter was located outside England (say, France) and entered insolvency 
as well. In this case, the trust would have to be enforced against A1-A2 
and/or B. 
221  In Re Maxwell Communications Corp PLC (No 2) ChD [1993] 1 WLR 1402. 
222  See Re SSSL Realisations (2002) Ltd [2005] 1 BCLC (where the court also had to 
decide whether the trust agreed upon by the parties had to be re-characterized as a charge 
subject to registration (the court decided in the negative)).  
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In the United States, the trust device operates as a matter of law if the 
debtor were a party to the agreement,223 but the situation is more 
complicated if it were not.224 Furthermore, the agreement will only be 
enforceable if it is enforceable under the applicable non-bankruptcy 
law.225 This can be a source of uncertainty if A1-A2 are located in the 
United States but one of the loan facilities is subject to French law, for 
example, which has no general doctrine of subordination. 
B. Intra-group Funding 
The previous section has illustrated the tension at the level of policy 
and principle that may crystalize in bank resolution if the bail-in tool is 
deployed over a bank’s complex funding structure. To have a complete 
picture of that funding structure, we need to add the dimension that 
compares “external” with “intra-group” funding. The last category of 
debt analysed above provides a smooth transition, since intra-group 
funding is, to a large extent, characterized by subordination issues 
(III.B.1). We then discuss the relevance of the intra-group dimension 
beyond subordination (III.B.2). 
i. Subordinated Debt in Bank Groups 
If the discussion of contractual subordination above showed an 
important level of uncertainty over the enforceability of the agreements, 
the picture is even more uncertain for statutory subordination due to the 
significant differences between jurisdictions and categories of debt,226 
although intra-group debt remains the more relevant category for our 
purposes. In Germany, the country that first provided for a doctrine of 
subordination of shareholder loans, that doctrine stems from corporate 
 
223  The Sumitomo Trust and Banking Co., Ltd. v. Holly’s, Inc., 160  B.R. 643, 667-668 
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992). 
224  Ibid. In that case, the junior creditor must transfer the money to the senior creditor, 
who nonetheless has not been satisfied by the debtor himself, which means that he can 
fully recover the amounts owed by the debtor. The junior creditor, however, has a right of 
“subrogation”, which is an equitable remedy to prevent unjust enrichment. See also 
Michael S. Quinn, “Subrogation, Restitution and Indemnity,” 74 TEX. L. REV. 1361, 
1388-90 (1996). 
225  11 U.S.C. § 510(a) (1984). 
226  Categories of subordinated debt include debt for interests and penalties in Germany 
and Spain, claims filed late in Spain, claims for deferred unsecured provable debts and 
non-provable liabilities in England, costs incurred by creditors due to participation in the 
proceedings, and claims for which no consideration is due by the debtor in Germany, 
claims by bad faith counterparts in transactions subject to avoidance, or under executory 
contracts when the court is satisfied that the counterpart is obstructing the execution of 
the contract in the interest of the insolvency proceedings in Spain. See Insolvenzordnung 
[InsO] [Insolvency Statute], Oct. 5, 1994, BGB1 §39(1) (Ger.). 
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law principles of capital raising (Kapitalaufbringung) and capital 
maintenance (Kapitalerhaltung). The doctrine of “equity-replacing 
loans” tried to dissuade shareholders from supplying funds via loans 
instead of equity by subordinating the loans granted in circumstances 
where a shareholder with the diligence of a prudent businessperson 
would have granted equity, typically in times of crisis; a rule whose 
scope was broadened once it was incorporated into insolvency law.227 
The foundation of the rule lies in the “equity-replacing” character of the 
loans, and in the shareholders’ responsibility for funding a company in 
times of crisis.228  
The logic of preventing opportunistic behaviour by shareholders also 
inspired Spanish rule-making in the same domain, but the risk of using of 
open-textured concepts like “equity-replacing” or “prudent”, and case-
by-case variations, led to a stricter rule that automatically subordinates 
loans by “especially related” parties.229 Despite criticism,230 this approach 
has inspired more recent German rules that omit the “equity-replacing” 
requirement for the loan231 and subordinate all shareholder loans,232 thus 
sacrificing flexibility for certainty. Italian law also subordinates 
shareholder loans; although it uses the German original approach and 
makes subordination conditional on the existence of a situation of a debt 
“imbalance” or a financial situation where an equity contribution would 
have been “reasonable”.233 
The United States makes these adjustments through the use of 
equitable subordination,234 which normally requires that a creditor’s 
“inequitable conduct” results in an “unfair advantage”.235 Alternatively, a 
 
227  Id. at §39(1), (4), (5), (135). Spanish Insolvency Act art. 92(5) and 93 (R.D.L. 2014, 
1664) (Spain). 
228  BGH, NJW (1995) pp. 326, 329. The principles of capital raising and maintenance 
require shareholders to raise the registered capital in full, and subsequently maintain and 
protect it, and encourage them to provide additional equity capital in times of crisis. 
229  Spanish Insolvency Act art. 92(5) (R.D.L. 2014, 1664) (Spain). 
230  See e.g., Carmen Alonso Ledesma, El automatismo en la subordinación de créditos 
y la posición de las entidades de crédito in IMPLICACIONES FINANCIERAS DE LA LEY 
CONCURSAL, 175-83 (Alberto Alonso Ureba & Juana Pulgar Ezquerra, LA LEY, 2009). 
231  Martin Gelter, Jürg Roth, “Subordination of Shareholder Loans from a Legal and 
Economic Perspective,” 2 CESifo DICE Report at 43, 2007. 
232 Insolvenzordnung [InsO] [Insolvency Statute], Oct. 5, 1994, BGB1 §39(1)(5), (4-5) 
(Ger.). The rules exempt only non-managing shareholders holding less than 10% of 
shares, and creditors who acquire shares in the company as a rescue attempt in case of 
illiquidity or balance sheet insolvency. 
233  Article 2467 Italian Civil Code. 
234  See Section § 510 (c) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 510 (c). 
235 As a final condition, equitable subordination must not be inconsistent with the 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. See In re Mobile Steel Co., 563 F.2d 692, 700 (5th 
Cir. 1977). 
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bankruptcy court may use its equitable powers236 to re-characterise a debt 
claim as an equity claim237 although some courts have not clarified 
whether they consider re-characterization admissible under equitable 
powers.238 Being procedural powers, however, they are deployed on a 
case-by-case basis, which is a source of uncertainty. In addition, their use 
is not limited to debt claims by “insiders”,239 which means that they 
provide no firm basis to determine the status of intra-group funding, i.e. 
there is no “law of shareholder/intra-group loans” nor can precedents be 
easily extrapolated to the resolution context, where the procedure and 
powers are different. 
A final point of US Law that connects with the issues that will be 
revisited below is the “source-of-strength” doctrine, which is not part of 
 
236  See 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2010). Re-characterization operates to determine whether a 
debt claim exists, and does not require an unfair conduct on the side of the lender, while 
subordination subordinate an existing debt claim, and requires unfairness. See James 
H.M. Sprayregen, Jonathan P. Friedland, Jo Ann J. Brighton; Salvatore F. Bianca, 
Recharacterization of Debt to Equity: An Overview, Update, and Practical Guide to an 
Evolving Doctrine, William L. Norton, Jr. Annual Survey of Bankruptcy Law (2004). But 
see Matthew Nozemack, Making Sense Out of Bankruptcy Court’s Recharacterization of 
Claims Why Not Use Section 510(c) Equitable Subordination?, 56 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 
689, 716 (1999). 
237  See In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 749 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding an 
authoritative 11-point test, which emphasizes the insufficiency of funds of the subsidiary 
through undercapitalization or otherwise). The possibility to recharacterize a debt claim 
as an equity claim under the court’s general powers is also admitted by courts in the 
Third Circuit, In re SubMicron Sys., 432 F.3d 448, 454 (3d Cir. 2006), the Fourth Circuit, 
Dornier Aviation (North America), Inc. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re 
Dornier Aviation), 453 F.3d 225, 231 (4th Cir. 2006), and the Tenth Circuit, Sender v. 
Bronze Group, Ltd. (In re Hedged Investments Assocs., Inc.), 380 F.3d 1292, 1297 (10th 
Cir. 2004). 
238  This is the case of the Seventh Circuit. See FCC v. Airadigm Commc’ns, Inc. (In re 
Airadigm Commc’ns, Inc.), 616 F.3d 642, 657 n. 11 (7th Cir. 2010). Furthermore, other 
courts, notably those of the Fifth Circuit, have not used the more general powers of 
Section § 105, but Section § 502 (b) (1) of the Code, which provides for the power to 
object to, or disallow, claims based on the applicable laws and rules. See In re Lothian 
Oil, Inc., 650 F.3d 539, 542–43 (5th Cir. 2011), or In re Fitness Holdings International, 
Inc., 2013 WL 1800000, *1 (9th Cir. April 30, 2013). 
239  The definition of “insider” is found in Section § 101 (31) of the Bankruptcy Code, 
and it includes directors and controlling parties. The standard of review is more exacting 
in case of “insiders”, but subordination is also possible in case of non-insiders, although 
“gross and egregious conduct will be required before a court [can] equitably subordinate 
a claim”. See Waslow v. MNC Commercial Corp. (In re Paolella & Sons, Inc.), 161 
B.R.107, 119 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993). Then, subordination in case of insiders may be 
denied in case there has been no harm to creditors as a result of the funding by insiders, 
because subordination is remedial, not punitive. See Wooley v Faulkner, In re SI 
restructuring, Inc., 532 F. 3d 355 (5th Cir. 2008). In a recharacterization case, such as In 
re Lothian Oil, Inc., 650 F.3d 539, 542–43 (5th Cir. 2011) the court held that the powers 
could be exercised beyond loans by insiders. 
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insolvency law, but of the law of bank group supervision.240 Grounded in 
the broad language of the Bank Holding Company Act section granting 
powers to the Federal Reserve Board (the “Fed”) as a supervisor,241 the 
latter used the said doctrine to demand parent holding companies to be a 
“source of strength” for their subsidiaries.242 This doctrine was 
considered valid by the courts,243 but the actual scope of the Board’s 
powers to force a parent holding company to contribute funds to its 
subsidiary remained unclear.244 Yet the Fed or the FDIC could use the 
 
240  See, Paul L. Lee, The Source-of-Strength Doctrine: Reversed and Revisited (Part I), 
The Banking Law Journal Vol. 129 No. 9 (October 2012) at 771;  see, Paul L. Lee, The 
Source-of-Strength Doctrine: Reversed and Revisited (Part II), The Banking Law 
Journal, Vol. 129 No. 10 (November/December 2012) at 867; see, Leonard Bierman & 
Donald R. Fraser, The ‘Source of Strength’ Doctrine: Formulating the Future of 
American Financial Markets, ANN. REV. BANKING. L. 269 (1993); see, James F. 
Groth, Can Regulators Force Bank Holding Companies to Bail Out their Failing 
Subsidiaries? – An Analysis of the Federal Reserve Board’s Source-of-Strength Doctrine, 
86 Nw. U. L. REV. 112 (1991);  see, Kieran J. Fallon, Source of Strength or Source of 
Weakness?: A Critique of the Source-of-Strength” Doctrine in Banking Reform, 66 
N.Y.U. L. REV.1344, 1382 (1991). 
241  Section 3 (c) (2) required the Board to take into consideration “the financial and 
managerial resources and future prospects of the Company or companies” before 
deciding on a transaction subject to its approval, including the authorization for a 
company to become a holding company.  
242  The more specific formulation by the Board was made in Regulation Y, of 1984, 
where it expressly stated that “bank holding company shall serve as a source of financial 
and managerial strength to its subsidiary banks and shall not conduct its operations in an 
unsafe or unsound manner” (Section 225.4(a)(1) of Regulation Y, 49 Fed. Reg. 794 
(1984)), and, in 1987, where the Board published a policy statement stating that a bank 
holding company “should stand ready to use available resources to provide adequate 
capital funds to its subsidiary banks during periods of financial stress”, and it would be 
considered “unsafe and unsound” in the absence of this.  However, the Board’s refused to 
authorize bank holding companies on that basis, a policy that was challenged, and 
reviewed judicially, during the 70s.  
243  First Lincolnwood bank challenged the Board’s power to refuse authorization of a 
holding company on the sole grounds of an absence of “source of strength”. The 7th 
Circuit Court considered that the Board had exceeded its powers, because its powers 
allowed it to restrict unsafe practice, such as the increase of debt, but not to impose new 
requirements if the transaction itself (the creation of a parent holding company) would 
represent no change in the group’s financial profile. See First Lincolnwood Corp. v. 
Board of Governors, 560 F.2d 258, 262 (7th Cir. 1977). However, the Supreme Court 
reversed the 7th Circuit decision, holding that this was a legitimate use of the Board’s 
powers. See First Lincolnwood Corp. v. Board of Governors 439 U.S. 234 (1978).  
244  In 1988 the Board issued a cease-and-desist order against MCorp, a multibank 
holding company, as engaging in “unsafe and unsound practices”, and required it to use 
all available assets to recapitalize the subsidiary banks suffering capital deficiencies. This 
was followed by a declaration of insolvency and receivership by the FDIC, and a 
bankruptcy petition. MCorp sought, and obtained, a court order enjoining the Board from 
supervisory action based on the source-of-strength doctrine. In re MCorp, 101 B. R. 483 
(S.D. Tex. 1989). The order was appealed by the Board. The Fifth Circuit ruled that the 
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doctrine to force the parent holding companies’ commitment to 
recapitalize subsidiaries. As a result of a modification of the Bankruptcy 
Code, parent’s “commitments” made to a regulatory agency to cure any 
deficit or to maintain the capital of the subsidiary now have priority, 
which means that the agency can obtain the payment as a precondition 
for restructuring. This shows that subordinating a parent’s loans can be 
equivalent to forcing it to make fresh contributions. 
The relevance of parent-subsidiary, especially the holding-subsidiary 
relationship in the banking context, justifies distinguishing structural 
subordination as a fourth category. Here, subordination does not result 
from agreement, law, or court powers, but from the very structure of the 
banking group. Once the assets are held by operating subsidiaries (the 
parent holding’s assets being mostly the subsidiaries’ shares), third-party 
funding to the parent will necessarily be subordinated to subsidiaries’ 
funding vis-à-vis the subsidiaries’ assets. This operation is an example of 
resolution planning and will be analysed in section IV.B. 
ii. Intra-group Operational Debt 
As seen above, the law generally tries to dissuade groups from 
adopting strategies that replace equity or subordinated funding with 
ordinary liabilities. The ultimate tool to accomplish this is subordination; 
but, as we will see now, subordination is combined with the exclusion of 
intra-group debt from categories of debt that receive preferential 
treatment from the law. Although this principle is generally sound, in 
light of the absence of arm’s length conditions, it can disrupt banks’ 
intra-group funding structures, which involve “sensitive” types of 
operational debt. Following the order of section III.A, we will discuss 
intra-group deposits and short-term funding, management of client 
money and client assets, and derivatives.  
Starting with deposits, these are generally excluded from bail-in and 
protected by insolvency rules, but this does not encompass interbank 
 
Board could decide to refuse authorization of a parent holding company on the basis of 
the source-of-strength doctrine, but, once the authorization was granted, it could not use 
its power to issue cease-and-desist orders against “unsafe and unsound” practices to force 
parent holding companies to transfer funds to troubled subsidiaries, in a way that would 
force the holding to disregard its separate corporate status, and interest, and thus cause a 
wats of corporate assets, and violate its duty to shareholders. See MCorp. Financial Inc v. 
Board of Governors Federal Reserve System, 900 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1990). The decision 
was appealed to the Supreme Court, which held that the Bankruptcy Court lacked 
jurisdiction to review the Board’s regulatory action. See Board of Governors of Federal 
Reserve System v. MCorp Fin. Inc., 502 U.S. 32, 40 (1991). However, the Supreme 
Court never settled whether it was legal for the Board to force a holding company to fund 
its subsidiary. 
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deposits or deposits with other financial institutions, which include intra-
group bank deposits.245 Considering short-term debt more broadly, 
claims from short-term loans are “out” of bail-in. Therefore, there is an 
incentive to use these loans to replace corporate or interbank deposits, 
which are “in.” Yet this strategy is not available in intra-group situations 
since intra-group short-term liabilities are not left “out” of bail-in.246  
The problem of intra-group deposits is not only that they are “in” 
bail-in; they may also be subordinated to ordinary creditors in countries 
with specific statutory subordination rules (e.g. Spain or Germany) or 
countries that use equitable subordination (e.g. the United States) if a 
court sees them as part of a strategy to defraud ordinary creditors. This 
can raise interpretative issues. 
If rules subordinate “hidden equity contributions” posing as 
shareholder loans, like traditional German rules did, this creates 
important classification problems. If rules are simpler and subordinate all 
intra-group loans, they may still not subordinate liabilities ‘different from 
loans or acts with analogous finality’, like the Spanish rules do,247 which 
raises the question of whether an inter-bank deposit has an “analogous 
finality” to a loan.248 This would largely depend on whether the relevant 
authority or court accepts a finalistic construction of the rule that sees it 
as a provision dissuading from opportunistic behaviour but not from 
managing intra-group liquidity. If bail-in were deployed over some 
liabilities but not others it would be contrary to resolution policies, which 
try to preserve “critical functions”.249 In countries where “equitable 
 
245  They are excluded from the definition of “covered deposits”, under Directive 
2014/49/EU Article 5(1)(a), (d) and (e), and do not fall within any of the categories under 
Directive 2014/59/EU Article 108(a)(i) or (ii). 
246  Directive 2014/59/EU Article 44(2)(e) excludes from bail-in “liabilities to 
institutions, excluding entities that are part of the same group, with an original maturity 
of less than seven days.” 
247  Article 92. 5º Spanish Insolvency Act. 
248  Here we are weighing different interpretations, which always consider the intention 
of the agreement, relying on the reference to ‘finality’, and leaving out a strict and formal 
reading of the agreement’s typified, or objective, causa. For a discussion of ‘objective’ 
and ‘subjective’ or finalistic causa, see L. Diez Picazo Fundamentos del Derecho Civil 
Patrimonial Vol. I. 2007. Even considering the ‘objective legal nature’ of the agreement, 
the bank deposit, as an ‘irregular deposit’, lacks a specific regulation in the Civil code, 
which means that its regime is assimilated to that of the loan. The significant difference 
would be that, under this assumption, each deposit should invariably be the subject of 
separate treatment, and the treatment of the intra-group liquidity management 
arrangement as a whole should cease to be an option. 
249  Against this, one could still argue that resolution rules try to incentivize groups to 
clarify their internal arrangements, corporate and otherwise, and that carving-out an 
exception to the subordination rules for intra-group deposits on grounds that the 
arrangement has a different “finality” to a loan weakens that incentive. 
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subordination” is used, like the United States, it seems less likely that an 
authority or court would consider intra-group deposits as an instance of 
fraud or harm to creditors. 
In light of these difficulties, bank groups will continue to place intra-
group deposits in the context of broader schemes for the management of 
liquidity and instruments, backed by collateral arrangements and set-off 
or netting clauses, which benefit from protections for financial 
collateral.250 Yet  this can give rise to other interpretative problems. For 
example, resolution rules exclude from bail-in those liabilities arising 
from holding client money or client assets.251 In the Lehman Brothers 
(Client Money) case discussed earlier, courts determined that “clients” 
enjoyed proprietary protection despite the commingling of their funds;252 
but the commingling was due to the intra-group funding structure, where 
clients’ balances were used to cover the liquidity needs of group entities, 
with a “reconciliation” being operated later.253 This would raise the 
question whether, in such a case, liabilities incurred with clients could be 
effectively separated from liabilities incurred with group entities.254 
Even if intra-group arrangements are not protected as liabilities 
arising from ‘client money or instruments’, the liabilities resulting from 
those intra-group arrangements may be protected as liabilities arising 
from a ‘fiduciary arrangement’ or as “secured liabilities”.255 Yet the 
complexity of intra-group arrangement can give rise to important 
classification problems, which raises the question of how much certainty 
is needed from the private law of credit and security, and insolvency law 
before a certain class of liabilities is excluded.  
Consider the category of liabilities arising from “fiduciary 
arrangements”. In another Lehman case, Pearson v Lehman Brothers 
Finance,256 generally known by the acronym RASCALS, the group had a 
system for the acquisition of securities: every time a group company 
would acquire securities, the “hub” company (i.e. LBIE, the parent 
company for Europe) would hold all the securities for the account of the 
 
250  For example, Directive 2002/47/EC Articles 4, 6 and 7 protect the enforcement of 
financial collateral arrangements, the recognition of title transfer financial collateral 
arrangements, and that of close-out netting provisions, respectively. 
251  Directive 2014/59/EU Article 44(2)(c). 
252  Supra section III.A.2. 
253  In the Matter of Lehman Brothers International Europe, [2009] EWHC 3228 (Ch) 
“Statement of Assumed Facts”, 2.21-2.50. 
254  We must also remember that courts also granted protection to counterparties, such as 
hedge funds, as ‘clients’ under Primer Brokerage arrangements. See Lomas v RAB 
Market Cycles (Master Fund) Limited [2009] EWHC 2545 (Ch). 
255  Article 44 (2) (b) and (d) BRRD. 
256  Pearson v Lehman Brothers Finance SA [2010] EWHC 2914 (Ch), [2011] EWCA 
Civ 1544. 
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group affiliate and would use the securities for its own purposes, e.g. 
lending them for liquidity management, selling them to meet short 
positions within the group, etc., while crediting the affiliate for whom it 
held the securities with the securities’ value and any income accruing 
from it, e.g. interest or dividend. The securities would be repo-ed on a 
daily basis to LBIE, using an automated system for the period during 
which securities would be held inside the group. After Lehman entered 
insolvency and the automated transfer system was stopped, the question 
before the court eventually was the identity of the beneficial owner of the 
securities. Against the objections of LBIE’s administrators, the court 
held that the automated system only made sense if the parties assumed 
that the beneficial ownership had been transferred to the affiliates,257 
which could only happen if LBIE was a trustee for the securities, which 
revealed a sufficient intention to create a trust.258 
Consider now the category of “secured liabilities” in the context of 
yet another case in the Lehman Brother’s saga, the so-called Lehman 
Brothers ‘Extended Liens’ case.259 In that case, the European parent 
company (LBIE) held securities for group entities, including Lehman 
Brothers Finance (LBF), as part of a Master Custody Agreement 
(“MCA”), signed between LBIE and LBF, which was instrumental for 
the intra-group management of financial instruments. Pursuant to that 
agreement, LBIE, as custodian, held a “lien” over those assets, which 
secured not only the debts of affiliates to LBIE, the parent company, but 
also the debts of affiliates to any other affiliate within the Lehman group 
(hence the term “extended liens”260). LBIE’s “lien” was subject to a sui 
generis clause, copied from client custody agreements, and pasted on an 
intra-group agreement for cash and instruments management.261  
This posed important characterization problems. Under English law, 
a “lien” is a possessory security interest, which cannot be perfected over 
non-movables, which meant that the security interest had to be re-
characterized as a charge,262 and, more specifically, as a floating 
charge.263 The ruling also discussed whether EU financial collateral rules 
 
257  Ibid. 
258  Mr Justice Briggs, “Has English law coped with the Lehman collapse?” 
Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law (March 2013) p. 132. 
259 In the matter of Lehman Brothers International Europe, [2012] EWHC 2997 
(Ch). 
260  See Daniel Saoul, “Lehman and the la won liens,” Butterworths Journal of 
International Banking and Financial Law (November 2011) p. 598. 
261  The clause was initially developed for client custody agreements. It is reproduced in 
In the matter of Lehman Brothers International Europe, [2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch) at 32. 
262  Ibid at 34-48. 
263  Ibid at 70. Ever since Re Spectrum Plus Ltd [2005] UKHL 41, English courts look at 
the substance of the security interest to characterize a charge as fixed or floating. 
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could apply to the arrangement. Justice Briggs held that, although a 
floating charge compliant with the FCD was possible in theory,264 the 
FCD introduced a requirement of “possession or control,”265 which was 
not satisfied, given that, in the accounts LBIE held for LBF as custodian, 
LBF retained uncontrolled rights of recall and disposal.266 Finally, Justice 
Briggs held that any security right held by LBIE was not held under an 
implied fiduciary arrangement for the benefit of the other group 
companies, which meant that, in deciding whether and how to exercise 
the security right, LBIE would take into account its own business 
judgment, and would not be constrained by a fiduciary duty towards its 
affiliates.267 Although the conclusion was quite well reasoned,268 some 
might find it surprising that the potential opportunism of the parent 
within a group would not be contained by fiduciary duties or a similar 
kind of constraint.269 
Therefore, if a group uses some kind of “floating” right for its intra-
group cash and collateral management arrangements to be operational, 
 
264  In the matter of Lehman Brothers International Europe, [2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch) at 
135. 
265  Ibid  at 116 et seq. On this point Briggs J relied on the previous opinion of Vos in Re 
F2G Realisations Ltd: Gray v GTP Group Limited [2011] 1 BCLC 313.   
266  Ibid at 147. Another point was whether the FCD imposed a requirement for 
collateral arrangements to be ‘bilateral’ in order for FCD rules to apply, which Briggs J 
concluded, it did not. The court did so in spite of references to ‘bilateral collateral 
arrangements’ in recital (3) of the Directive, which it took more as a reference to mark 
the contrast with Directive 98/26/EC, on Settlement and Finality Systems. 
267  In the matter of Lehman Brothers International Europe, [2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch) at 
205-211. 
268  As an example: “[T]he Lehman group’s business was not generally 
managed on a company by company basis, but on a product by product basis, so 
that the interests of the group would be in the forefront of the minds of relevant 
business managers when deciding whether, and if so to what extent, to exercise 
rights over the property of street clients,” In that context, “the very existence of 
ill-defined fiduciary obligations would be an impediment to the sensible and 
practical making of business decisions in relation to the exercise of the rights in 
clause 13 [the general lien]”. Thus, subjecting LBIE to a fiduciary duty “would 
require LBIE to maintain a constant watch upon the day to day account 
balances between each of its clients (the subject of an MCA in this standard 
form) and each of its many affiliates. It would enable an affiliate with a modest 
debt to demand enforcement in circumstances where to do so would gravely 
prejudice a continuing business relationship between LBIE and the client in 
question, or between some other affiliate and the same client”. In the matter of 
Lehman Brothers International Europe, [2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch) at 208-210. 
269  See n. 268, supra. Indeed, in Justice Briggs’ reasoning, it was the particular 
dynamics of the Lehman group that justified LBIE’s decisions based on its business 
judgment. 
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such arrangements may be mired in uncertainty. Floating securities are 
valid in several countries; but UK rules, for example, rank creditors 
under floating securities behind creditors with fixed security and other 
preferred creditors (e.g. for winding-up or administration expenses, 
pension contributions, or wages),270 and carve-out a percentage of the 
assets subject to the floating charge (“net assets”) for the satisfaction of 
ordinary, unsecured, creditors.271 Other countries, like Sweden, have 
rules that characterize the charge as a mere privilege over 55% of the 
debtor’s assets, ranking after all special priorities.272 Other countries, like 
Italy, consider “floating securities” valid, but have no specific insolvency 
rules.273 Some, like Germany, do not contemplate floating securities, 
while others, like Spain, may allow things similar to a floating security 
but with a restricted scope.274 
 
270  See s. 176ZA (winding-up expenses); Schedule B1 para. 99 (3) (administration 
expenses); and s. 175(2) (b) in relation to s. 386 and Schedule 6 paras. 8-9 Insolvency 
Act 1986. The resulting ranking upon insolvency was thus stated by Lord Neuberger in 
Re Nortel GmbH [2014] AC 209 (SC) at [39]. The order set out in that decision is (1) 
creditors with a fixed security; (2) expenses of insolvency proceedings; (3) preferential 
creditors; (4) floating charge creditors; (5) unsecured probable debts; (6) statutory 
interests in probable debts; (7) deferred, unsecured, probable debts; (8) non-provable 
liabilities; (9) shareholders’ return on capital and (10) shareholders’ distribution of 
surplus. 
271  The prescribed part is a 50% of the first £10,000 of assets subject to the floating 
charge, and 20% of the remaining part, with a limit of £600,000. See article 3 Insolvency 
Act 1986 (Prescribed Part) Order 2003 SI 2003/2097. Since the amount of assets carved 
out for unsecured creditors is capped at £600,000, the impact should presumably be lesser 
in case of banks.  
272  Priority Rights Act, s. 4 and 5.  
273  In Italy, the Decree Law n. 59 of 3 May 2016, later transformed into Act 119/2016, 
introduced the pledge without dispossession, which also admitted the possibility for the 
debtor to dispose of the assets, in which case the pledge would fall over the 
proceeds/assets that replaced the original collateral. See article 1 (2) Decree Law 59 of 
2016. According to article 1 (8), however, in order for the creditor to enforce its security 
over the collateral it would have to be recognized, first, as creditor with privilege. Article 
1 (6) states that the creditor protected by a non-possessory pledge could not be used 
against a creditor who funds the acquisition of a specific asset with a reservation of title 
or pledge over that asset. The provisions do not expressly address the relationship with 
other secured creditors, or with creditors with general privilege, e.g. workers.   
274 Articles 21-22 of the Act of 16 December 1964, on Mortgages over Movables and 
Non-Possessory Pledge provides for the extension of the mortgage right over commercial 
establishments over the goods that are part of the trade, which, by definition, are 
constantly purchased and sold, and article 54 of the same act permits a non-possessory 
pledge over receivables. In combination, they could provide some basis to something 
close to a floating security, but the basis is too narrow to give rise to a full-fledge version 
of it. See David Ramos Munoz, ‘Transacciones Trascendentes. Operaciones Fuera de 
Balance, Disociación de la Propiedad y Problemas Regulatorios, Patrimoniales y de 
Gobierno’,125 REVISTA DE DERECHO BANCARIO Y BURSÁTIL 216, 231 (2012). 
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Financial collateral rules that pre-empted traditional law of credit and 
security, like the FCD does, were the way to sidestep this uncertainty:275 
they created specific security rights with relatively few formal 
requirements which could be recognizable and enforced across 
borders.276 The Extended Liens case, however, cast a long shadow of 
doubt over the ability to “fit” a floating security as a financial collateral 
arrangement subject to a “possession or control” requirement.277 
To top it all, resolution rules completely exclude from bail-in 
“secured liabilities” and “liabilities arising from fiduciary arrangements” 
without making any distinction.278 Thus, resolution authorities would 
have to first decide whether the security qualifies as a protected financial 
collateral arrangement; and, if so, they would most likely exclude the 
liability from bail-in. Yet, if they could not classify it as a protected 
financial collateral arrangement, they would have to classify it under the 
applicable private law, and determine whether, under that law, it is a 
secured liability or not. This could create friction between (i) the private 
law of security interests and secured transactions; (ii) the insolvency law 
hypothetically applicable; and (iii) resolution rules, if they are 
susceptible of a self-referenced interpretation.  
Presumably, resolution authorities would decide, first, whether the 
security qualifies as a “financial collateral arrangement” under the FCD, 
because that would automatically exclude it. The difficulty would arise if 
the arrangement were considered to fall outside the FCD. In that case, the 
second step would be for resolution authorities to decide which is the law 
(or laws) applicable to the arrangement, a task for which there are no 
uniform conflict rules.279 Simultaneously, resolution authorities would 
need to determine which assets are subject to which law. If the authority 
manages to find a suitable conflicts-of-laws rule, the third step would be 
 
275  In the case MJA and others c. Bank of London and The Middle East PLC decided 
with Arrêt nº 627 of 7 December 2015 (14-18.435) ECLI:FR:CCASS:2015:AP00627, the 
French Civil chamber of the Cour de cassation in plenary session applied the FCD to a 
non-possessory pledge over stocks, and in so doing it overruled the finding of the court of 
appeal, which had decided that, despite the existence of FCD rules, the parties had chosen 
to regulate the relationship through the rules of the Civil code (the issue concerned the 
validity of the pacte commissoire, by which the secured creditor can seize the asset and 
obtain its ownership in case of default). 
276  See e.g. article 3 of the FCD. 
277  In relation to the suitability of floating security interests over cash collateral kept in 
bank accounts to qualify as “financial collateral arrangements” under the FCD, see Case 
C 156/15 Private Equity Insurance Group SIA v. Swedbank AS. 
278  Article 44 (2) (b) BRRD. 
279  Article 21 of Directive 2001/24/EC on the Reorganisation and Winding Up of Credit 
Institutions (the Bank Winding Up Directive) does not provide a conflicts-of-laws rule 
but a mutual recognition rule, which requires, first, to determine which is the law 
applicable to the rights in re. 
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to determine whether the type of security arrangement is admissible and 
enforceable for a specific asset pool under the applicable national law.
Even if the law confirms the validity and enforceability of the 
arrangement, it leaves one final doubt as to whether the conditions and 
exceptions imposed by that law may raise doubts regarding whether the 
liability qualifies as a “secured liability” under resolution rules, and thus 
must be excluded. In principle, the definition of “secured liability” is 
very broad and relies on the classification under domestic laws.280
However, resolution authorities may be reluctant to grant full exclusion 
to something that looks like a mere “general preferential right” rather 
than a secured liability. 
This leaves the final issue of intra-group derivatives exposures, 
where classification problems look no less daunting. In the same way 
that groups adopt liquidity management strategies, they may adopt 
group-level hedging strategies to reduce the overall cost by using internal 
hedges between group entities to minimize the (more expensive) external 
hedges, and then using investment-grade parties for external hedging 
purposes. 
Let us illustrate complexity with an example. 
280  Article 2 (1) (67) BRRD states that: “‘secured liability’ means a liability where the 
right of the creditor to payment or other form of performance is secured by a charge, 
pledge or lien, or collateral arrangements including liabilities arising from repurchase 
trans- actions and other title transfer collateral arrangements;” 
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Here, save for isolated cases, such as A2’s specific derivative 
agreement with B1, A3 acts as group treasurer, with two types of 
strategies: A3 either concludes specific hedging agreements with 
counterparties, e.g. for specific credit risks, and then concludes back-to-
back hedging agreements with the corresponding group entity; or, for 
broader risks, such as FX, it concludes “macro/portfolio” hedging 
agreements with counterparties, and then concludes multiple intra-group 
hedges subject to netting agreements.281 To lower the cost, A3 receives a 
guarantee from A4, its own parent. 
Intra-group derivatives can be a source of uncertainty if their 
treatment varies across jurisdictions, especially in the case of non-
collateralized derivatives, where the counterparty merely holds a 
personal right. The first problem is the risk of subordination in 
jurisdictions that provide so for intra-group loans. This depends on 
whether a derivative can be characterized as a “loan” or a “funding” 
agreement (see above). The fact that derivatives are used for “hedging” 
purposes should exclude subordination. Likewise, the enforcement of the 
netting agreements that typically accompany the conclusion of multiple 
derivatives (including between group entities) should not encounter any 
exception in intra-group agreements,282 nor should the preferential 
treatment enjoyed by the netted debt in some jurisdictions like Spain283 
be excepted in intra-group cases. 
Having said that, the picture of intra-group hedging strategies is 
bound to be complex and varied, and one cannot exclude that a specific 
structure of derivatives is used, or at least is seen by resolution 
authorities or courts as being used, for purposes of funding subsidiaries, 
or, conversely, for drawing resources from them. In such extreme cases, 
characterization and subordination, and the resulting risk of avoidance, 
would remain a possibility. 
IV. LAYER 2: THE EX-ANTE (CRISIS PREVENTION) V. EX-POST 
(CRISIS MANAGEMENT) DIMENSION 
The previous section has shown the tensions at the level of policy 
and principle between bank resolution, specifically the bail-in of debt 
instruments, and insolvency priorities at the intra-group dimension. This 
 
281  Anuschka Bakker; Krzysztof Łukosz “Treading Carefully through the Murky 
Labyrinth of Intra-Group Financial Derivatives” Derivatives & Financial Instruments, 
Vol. 18 No. 4 (2016). 
282  Neither article 7 of the FCD, nor articles 76 (2) (d), or 77 make an express exception 
for cases where the ‘counterparty’ to the netting agreement is a group entity. 
283  Supra 3.1.3. 
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section adds one more layer to the problem. This considers the 
relationship between the ex post crisis management rules, such as bail-in, 
which present the problems outlined before, and the regulatory rules that 
try to plan ahead and ex ante avoid those problems. The first sub-section 
discusses how the planning and prevention perspective has acquired an 
increasing importance under resolution rules, and how this has 
influenced additional changes in insolvency ranking (A). The second 
section discusses the interplay of the ex-ante prevention with the 
‘external v. intra-group’ dimension (B). 
A. Ex-Ante Resolution Planning, TLAC/MREL Standards, and 
Tensions in Policy and Principle 
Rules on ex ante resolution planning anticipate the problems arising 
from insolvency law and try to sidestep them by creating a new type of 
instrument that can guarantee loss absorbency (1). At a regional (that is, 
within the EU) level, this gives rise to implementation frictions due to 
the presence of diverging criteria in different countries (2). In general, 
however, this creates tensions at the level of policy, between financial 
stability and investor protection, and at the level of principle, due to 
considerations of proportionality (3). 
i. TLAC and MREL Standards: Sidestepping the Problem 
of Insolvency Ranking? 
Resolution rules include ex post tools, such as bail-in, which are 
deployed once the entity enters a critical stage, but also include rules to 
plan ex ante for the entity’s “recovery”284 and potential “resolution”.285 In 
these “living wills”, resolution authorities must anticipate any major 
obstacles to resolution (arising, inter alia, from complex corporate 
structures and financial arrangements), remove them, and devise a clear 
resolution strategy, including the use of one or more resolution tools. If 
bail-in is the chosen strategy, as it is in many large groups, the entity 
must have an adequate layer of capital and debt instruments to absorb 
losses and be recapitalized quickly. 
This idea of “ear-marking” a layer of capital and debt has been the 
subject of harmonization efforts at a global and regional, i.e. EU level. At 
a global level, the key concept is Total Loss-Absorbency Capital 
(TLAC), espoused by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) for Global 
 
284  Articles 5-9 BRRD. 
285  Articles 10-18 BRRD. 
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Systemically Important Banks/Institutions (“G-SIIBs/G-SIIs”).286 At an 
EU-level, the key concept is Minimum Requirements for Own Funds 
(MREL), which applies to all banks.287 In both cases, the idea is to use 
TLAC/MREL-eligible debt and equity to absorb losses and recapitalize 
the bank through conversion into equity, to ensure continuity of critical 
functions without taxpayer support (TLAC), or to leave a Core Equity 
Tier 1 (CET1) level compliant with prudential rules (MREL).288 TLAC 
and MREL standards, however, present some differences. These include 
their scope of application (G-SIIs v. all banks); level of uniformity 
(single common requirement v. case-by-case assessment289); 
calculation;290 relationship with prudential requirements (TLAC is 
integrated with them, whilst MREL was initially conceived separately 
under the resolution framework291); and the size of debt-to-equity, 
 
286  See, e.g. FSB Total Loss-Absorbency Capacity Standard, 6 November 
2014; and also its Principles on Loss-absorbing and Recapitalisation Capacity of 
G-SIBs in Resolution Total Loss-absorbing Capacity (TLAC) Term Sheet 9 
November 2015 (hereafter: TLAC Term Sheet). See also Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) Global systemically important banks: updated 
assessment methodology and the higher loss absorbency requirement July 2013.  
287  Article 45 and recital (80) BRRD. 
288  Article 45 (6) BRRD. That is, the entity needs to keep a capital level to keep the 
authorization under CRD (Directive 2013/36/EU) and CRR (Regulation 575/2013). This 
means “the need to ensure that, if the resolution plan anticipates that certain classes of 
eligible liabilities might be excluded from bail-in under Article 44(3) or that certain 
classes of eligible liabilities might be transferred to a recipient in full under a partial 
transfer, that the institution has sufficient other eligible liabilities to ensure that losses 
could be absorbed”.  
289  TLAC requirements are the greater between a 16% of risk-weighted assets (from 1 
January 2019, 18% from 1 January 2022) and the 6% of the assets used to calculate the 
leverage ratio under Basel rules (from 1 January 2019, 6,75% from 1 January 2022). See 
FSB TLAC Term Sheet no. 4, p. 10. Since MREL levels need to ensure a compliant 
CET1, and this is a risk – weighted ratio, MREL levels will vary depending on the 
specific circumstances of the entity. In addition to the achievement of resolution 
objectives, and the need to be compliant with CRD/CRR requirements after resolution, 
the elements to be considered include the size, business model, funding model and risk 
profile of the institution, the potential contribution of the Deposit Guarantee Scheme, and 
the adverse impact of the institution’s failure on financial stability. See article 45 (6) 
BRRD. 
290  There are some differences regarding eligibility of debt, which affect the numerator, 
while, in the denominator, TLAC uses risk-weighted assets (RWA) and the assets used to 
calculate the leverage ratio, whereas MREL uses total liabilities and own funds (article 45 
(1) BRRD) which may cause a problem of double counting 
291  See FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, PRINCIPLES ON LOSS-ABSORBING AND 
RECAPITALISATION CAPACITY OF G-SIBS IN RESOLUTION. TOTAL LOSS-ABSORBING 
CAPACITY (TLAC) TERM SHEET 5-6 (2015). Integration makes it easier, in the case of 
TLAC, to ensure that the calculation of firm-specific requirements is aligned for capital 
and MREL requirements. 
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“expected” to be at least 33% of TLAC,292 whereas there is no minimum 
expectation in the case of MREL. Yet, the potential frictions created by 
these differences led EU authorities to consider reforming MREL rules to 
ensure a better alignment with TLAC.293 This led to new rules in the 
resolution framework,294 but also in the prudential regulation framework 
(see below).295 
It is important to note that not all liabilities that are subject to bail-in 
will be TLAC/MREL-eligible. Insolvency laws vary across jurisdictions. 
Moreover, bail-in can also be disruptive if applied to “operational” 
liabilities. Thus, TLAC/MREL rules try to use planning to impose the 
duty to have enough “clean” liabilities to sidestep ranking and priority 
issues.296  
TLAC and MREL standards try to ensure the “cleanliness” or 
susceptibility to bail-in through a series of requirements, consisting of:  
 
(i) a list of eligibility criteria; i.e. debt fully paid-in, unsecured 
and not subject to set-off/netting, 1-year remaining maturity, 
not redeemable, and not directly or indirectly funded by the 
resolution entity or related party;  
(ii) a list of excluded liabilities, comprised of deposits, 
derivatives, non-contractual liabilities, including taxes, 
preferred liabilities, including secured liabilities, and other 
bail-in-excluded liabilities; and  
(iii) (this one only for TLAC:) a requirement of “subordination” 
of TLAC-eligible instruments to TLAC-excluded liabilities, 
 
292  TLAC Term Sheet no. 6 para. 4, p. 12. 
293  Council of the European Union Press Release, Council Conclusions on a roadmap to 
complete the Banking Union (June 17, 2016). Highlight the amendments to implement 
TLAC standard and reviewing the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible 
liabilities (MREL). See Council Directive 2016/0632, 2016 O.J. (L 852) 377, 378. 
294  Directive 2019/879 of 20 May 2019 amending Directive 2014/59/EU as regards the 
loss-absorbing and recapitalisation capacity of credit institutions and investment firms 
and Directive 98/26/EC (hereafter we will refer to the reformed BRRD provisions as 
BRRD II). 
295  Regulation 2019/876 amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 as regards the 
leverage ratio, the net stable funding ratio, requirements for own funds and eligible 
liabilities, counterparty credit risk, market risk, exposures to central counterparties, 
exposures to collective investment undertakings, large exposures, reporting and 
disclosure requirements, and Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (hereafter we will refer to the 
reformed provisions as CRR 5). 
296  Entities subject to the FSB TLAC framework may use non-subordinated 
instruments to satisfy TLAC requirements only up to a limit of 2,5% of Risk-
Weighted Assets. FSB TLAC Term Sheet no. 11, p. 16. See also article 72b (3) 
CRR 5, which allows non-subordinated instruments to qualify as TLAC up to a 
3,5% of total risk exposures. 
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with some allowance for cases where there is no 
subordination or where the subordination is not full.297 Since 
MREL is calculated case-by-case, it depends on each entity 
and resolution strategy.298 Thus, the new TLAC rules 
modified this aspect to comply with the TLAC standard.299 
 
Another important difference is that the TLAC standard demanded 
TLAC instruments to be subordinated to non-TLAC liabilities, while 
expressly allowing entities to comply with that requirement using 
“contractual subordination,” “statutory subordination” (i.e. ear-marking 
debt that is junior in the insolvency ranking), or “structural 
subordination” (i.e. using debt issued by a “clean” holding company).300 
The latter explicitly deals with the case of banking groups, an essential 
aspect that will be discussed in section III.B.1, and which, originally, 
MREL rules did not address. MREL rules, initially conceived as an 
extension of resolution rules rather than as a “semi-prudential” 
requirement, were less detailed. They did not require subordination 
beyond allowing statutory subordination, contractual subordination and 
“contractual bail-in”, which is similar, but not equivalent, to contractual 
subordination.301 
Reformed EU rules try to align MREL rules with TLAC approach, 
but not fully. They differentiate between G-SIIs, and other banks subject 
to resolution, with a gradation of TLAC/MREL cushions (higher for the 
former, lower for the latter302) subject to a phase-in.303 Furthermore, the 
 
297  Subordination is not required if (i) the amount of excluded liabilities that rank pari 
passu or junior to TLAC-eligible liabilities does not exceed 5% of the entity’s eligible 
external TLAC, (ii) the resolution authority has the authority to differentiate among pari 
passu creditors in resolution, (iii) such differentiation would not give rise to a material 
risk of successful legal challenge or compensation claims, and (iv) this does not have a 
material impact on resolvability. See TLAC Term Sheet no. 11. Article 45 (4) BRRD 
includes the requirements for MREL-eligible debt 
298  EUROPEAN BANKING AUTHORITY, FINAL REPORT ON MREL. REPORT ON THE 
IMPLEMENTATION AND DESIGN OF THE MREL FRAMEWORK 114 (2016) (hereinafter: EBA 
Final Report on MREL). 
299  See Article 45d BRRD II, with reference to new Article 92a CRR 5. 
300  TLAC Term Sheet nos. 9 (eligibility criteria), 10 (liabilities excluded from TLAC) 
and 11 (priority) pp. 14-15. 
301  This means that the contract clauses need to explicitly state that, in case of bail-in, 
the debt will be written down or converted, and that, in case of insolvency, the debt will 
be subordinated. Article 45 (13) and (14) BRRD. Resolution authorities can, in the same 
decision where they set MREL levels, determine which part of MREL shall be met 
through contractual bail-in instruments. 
302  See Articles 45d BRRD II and 92a CRR (G-SIIs), and article 45c (3) BRRD II (other 
banks). 
303  See, e.g. Article 494 CRR (G-SIIs) or 45m BRRD II (other banks). 
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calculation of MREL for GSIIs is based on TLAC rules. However, EU 
rules also apply TLAC-based requirements to a new category of “top-tier 
banks” (more than 100 billion euros, or those “fished-in” by the 
authorities304). Furthermore, MREL is still considered institution-
specific, which means that it is calculated individually for other (i.e. non-
G-SIIs, non-top-tier) banks, while G-SIIs and top-tier banks can be hit 
with additional requirements if justified by the situation of the bank.305 
More important for present purposes, however, is the nature of the 
instruments that can be used to comply with TLAC/MREL (including 
subordination), which we discuss in the next section. 
 
ii. What kind of (TLAC) Instruments? Regional 
Challenges to employ MREL in the EU, and the Risk of 
Fragmentation 
The basic idea underpinning TLAC is simple: make bail-in easier to 
deploy. Yet due to the cost it imposes on banks, countries may have 
different priorities on how to allocate that cost. Indeed, the move from 
TLAC to MREL in the EU has broadened the scope of the concept to 
smaller banks, which, in turn, has made some adjustments necessary, e.g. 
the possibility to use non-subordinated debt to comply with MREL. 
Then, as EU law left some leeway to comply with MREL to Member 
States, they initially pursued different legislative strategies. The UK, like 
the US, adopted a strategy of “structural subordination”. Germany and 
Italy, on the other hand, followed a “statutory subordination” strategy, 
where they amended the insolvency ranking of existing debt instruments. 
Germany established that, in case of insolvency, subordinated senior 
unsecured bonds and similar debt instruments would be subordinated to 
other senior liabilities.306 Italy chose the opposite way, and simply gave 
 
304  Article 45c (5) and (6) BRRD II (top-tier banks). Article 45m BRRD II applies to 
transitional arrangements. 
305  Article 45d (1) (b) BRRD II. In addition to this, EU rules prevent resolution funds 
from making contributions unless an 8% of Total Liabilities including Own Funds 
(TLOF) has been bailed-in (see, e.g. article 44 (5) (a) BRRD). Thus, in practice this 8% 
TLOF provides an extra “floor” or minimum level of MREL. 
306  See Section § 46f (5) et seq. of the German Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz, or 
KWG), and Section § 97 (1) para. 3rd. of the German Act on Recovery and Resolution, 
as introduced by the Resolution Mechanism Act (Abwicklungsmechanismusgesetz, 
AbwMechG) of November 2015. The subordinated instruments included were bearer 
bonds, order bonds, and similar rights tradable in capital markets, as well as promissory 
note loans and registered bonds, with the express exclusion of debt instruments where the 
payment of principal or interest is subject to the occurrence/non-occurrence of an 
uncertain event, e.g. derivatives in securitised form. Section § 46f (7) German Banking 
Act. 
60 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:1 
 
preferential status to all bank deposits, including large corporate deposits 
and interbank deposits.307 Thus, this was more a statutory privilege than 
statutory subordination, strategy. 
The advantage of this approach is that German and Italian banks 
could comply with MREL with their long-term non-operational debt 
without making any new issuance. The ECB concluded that German 
rules made senior debt TLAC/MREL compliant, but ineligible for ECB 
operations,308 but was more cautious about TLAC-eligibility of Italian 
banks’ senior debt: some operational liabilities, such as derivatives, still 
ranked pari passu with senior unsecured bank debt.309  
Interestingly, both Italy and Germany chose to subordinate senior 
debt’s position under insolvency law. This would result in its 
subordination under resolution rules, while avoiding any issues 
concerning the No Creditor Worse-Off principle,310 or discriminatory 
treatment, since creditors would not be treated “worse” than under 
insolvency rules (they would be treated worse than they were under the 
preceding insolvency rules). Still, since both types of measures apply to 
existing rights, they could be challenged as a retroactive interference 
with property.311 By interfering with an ongoing process, the rules are not 
a case of strict retroactivity (echte Rückwirkung), but of “not real 
retroactivity” (unechte Rückwirkung) and are backed by German 
Supreme Court case law, validating, for example, the 2014 incorporation 
via statute of collective action clauses (CACs) in bonds outstanding at 
the time the measure was adopted.312 
Spain and France (especially the latter) introduced a new type of 
“Tier 3 debt”, which, in case of resolution, would be senior to Tier 2 debt 
 
307  See the modifications to article 91 of the Legislative Decree No. 385 of 1 September 
1993, Consolidated Law of Banking (TUB). 
308  In the ECB’s view, they facilitated the implementation of the bail-in tool, 
and carried a lower contagion risk, by postponing financial liabilities to 
operational liabilities. Opinion of the ECB of 2 September 2015 on bank 
resolution (CON/2015/31), at 3.2.2-3.3 pp. 5-6 (and reference to articles 64 and 
141 of the ECB Guideline (EU) 2015/510 (ECB/2014/60) on the Eurosystem 
operations on the issue of (in)eligibility.  
309  Opinion of the ECB of 16 October 2015 on recovery and resolution of 
credit institutions and investment firms (CON/2015/35), no. 3.7.1-3.7.2, pp. 13-
14. TLAC-eligible debt must be subordinated to all TLAC-excluded liabilities, 
i.e. not only deposits. 
310  Opinion of the ECB of 2 September 2015 on bank resolution (CON/2015/31), at 
3.2.2, p. 5. 
311  Admittedly less likely so in Italy, where the rules establish a new privilege, than in 
Germany, where they subordinate senior debt. 
312  Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] July 1, 2014, II ZR 
381/13 (Ger.). 
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but rank below other senior debt,313 such as derivatives, non-covered 
deposits, and other operational liabilities. This approach can be seen 
either as “contractual subordination”, since the debt must include specific 
contract clauses; or as “statutory subordination”, since specific 
legislative provisions regulate the debt’s insolvency or resolution 
ranking.314 The advantage of a Tier-3 approach is its legal certainty and 
“fairness,” as investors can know their status from the moment they 
subscribe the debt. Its disadvantage is the greater cost for banks to raise 
new TLAC/MREL-compliant debt. 315 
Even if each strategy may respond to each State’s perceived 
priorities, there may be trouble in cross-border cases. Suppose that an 
entity issues bonds subject to a clause providing their subordination 
and/or debt indicating its non-preferred status in case of insolvency 
and/or bail-in (i.e. the French/Spanish approach), but the applicable 
insolvency law is that of a “statutory subordination” country, such as 
Germany: Should the order be (1) subordinated bonds, (2) non-preferred 
bonds, (3) other senior bonds, and (4) other senior debt? Should 
subordinated and non-preferred bonds rank pari passu since German law 
makes no express allowance for “non-preferred” debt? Should they rank 
pari passu with senior bonds issued under German law, since the latter 
subordinates all senior bonds? If the applicable insolvency law is 
France’s, should the bonds with a subordination clause be deemed 
subordinated or “equivalent” to Tier-3 bonds? Would there be a 
difference if the clauses make reference to the bonds’ status in 
“insolvency,” “resolution,” or both? 
The risk of uncertainty led to new legislative efforts to further 
harmonize the rules on insolvency hierarchy.316 To the already existing 
 
313  See, e.g. Article L 613-30-3 French Financial and Monetary Code, articles 48 (1) (d) 
and (3). In Spain, see Additional Provision 14th of the Spanish Act 11/2015 on the 
Recovery and Resolution of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms. The Spanish 
provision is drafted in ‘subordination’ terms, but the broad language could be used to 
issue something similar to Tier-3 debt. Spanish banks, however, are not making much use 
of debt to comply with MREL. 
314  Article 151 II and III of LOI n° 2016-1691 du 9 décembre 2016 relative à la 
transparence, à la lutte contre la corruption et à la modernisation de la vie 
économique, JORF n°0287 10 December 2016, which modifies article L-613-
30-3 in the French Monetary and Financial Code states that the provision applies 
to instruments issued, and to liquidation procedures opened, after the act’s entry 
into force. They do not apply retroactively to existing types of debt. 
315  Opinion of the European Central Bank on “The Hierarchy or Creditors of 
Credit Institutions,” 2016 E.C.B. (CON/2016/7) 3, 3. 
316  Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on a roadmap to complete the 
Banking Union (June 17, 2016) (underlining the effort to “put forward a proposal on a 
common approach to the bank creditor hierarchy, to enhance legal certainty in case of 
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deposit preference, the new rules add a provision regulating a new kind 
of senior debt with ‘non-preferred’ status, i.e. an EU-wide Tier-3 debt 
with the following characteristics: (i) maturity of at least 1 year; (ii) no 
features typical of derivatives; and (iii) explicit reference in contractual 
documentation to the (lower) insolvency ranking.317 In line with the 
French approach, the rules introduced a ranking for EU-Tier-3 debt 
below ordinary unsecured debt, and above the CET1, Tier 1 and Tier 2 
instruments.318 This was accompanied by transitional provisions, and 
“grandfathering” provisions that protected different States’ previous 
choices. Thus, (i) insolvency law shall apply to debt issued before the 
new provisions entered into force;,319 (ii) debt issued under the domestic 
laws of Tier-3 countries, like France, shall have the same ranking as 
Tier-3 debt under the new (EU-harmonized) rules;320 and (iii) for debt 
issued under the laws of “statutory subordination” countries like 
Germany or Italy, which split unsecured debt into two or more rankings, 
or changed the ranking of some instruments in relation to others, the 
rules say that those States may give the lowest ranking category of 
ordinary debt the same ranking as “EU Tier-3 debt.”321 Thus, doubts 
would arise only if a State in that situation decided otherwise, or simply 
did not clarify the matter, in which case there would be a lack of 
guidance about the hierarchy between “harmonized” debt (i.e. Tier-3 
debt under harmonized rules) and ordinary debt subordinated by statute. 
Another problem is the relationship between non-preferred debt and 
subordinated debt issued for purposes of complying with TLAC, 
especially if there are ambiguities in the contract language. 
Yet, the rules show the difficulty of combining ex post and ex ante 
approaches. While the ex post rules on insolvency hierarchy put Tier-3 
debt below ordinary liabilities, ex ante prudential rules, with the aim of 
complying with the international TLAC standard, include a long list of 
 
resolution.”); see also Directive 2017/2399, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 December 2017 amending Directive 2014/59/EU as regards The Ranking 
of Unsecured Debt Instruments in Insolvency Hierarchy (hereafter Directive on 
Insolvency Hierarchy of Unsecured Debt Instruments). 
317  New article 108 (2) BRRD II, by Directive on Insolvency Hierarchy of Unsecured 
Debt Instruments. 
318  New article 108 (2) and (3) BRRD II. 
319  New article 108 (4) BRRD is the default provision, and states that insolvency laws 
should apply to standard debt. 
320  New article 108 (5) BRRD. The treatment is conditional upon the debt having the 
features of 1-year maturity (or longer), no embedded derivatives, and an explicit 
reference in the prospectus to its non-preferred status. 
321  New article 108 (7) BRRD. 
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requirements for ‘eligible debt’322 which comprise the MREL-
instruments requirements, plus others that try to ensure that the 
instruments are not subject to early redemption, acceleration or 
modification,323 plus, crucially, the requirement that MREL instruments 
must, in principle, be subordinated to non-MREL ones, at least for G-
SIIs and top-tier banks.324 This could give rise to interpretative 
difficulties if a bank issues both debt indicating its non-preferred status, 
and debt indicating its subordinated status. It would not be clear whether 
the former would qualify for MREL, and whether it would be preferred 
to the latter. Still, as important as establishing the nature of the 
instruments is to identify the market for those instruments, and the 
frictions that this can give rise to between financial stability and investor 
protection, and the resulting favourable setting for big banks, as we 
analyse in the next section. 
iii. Who Should Hold the Instruments? Retail Investor 
Protection’s Interplay with Bank Resolution, EU Rules, 
“Big Bank Bias,” and proportionality issues. 
On a global scale, issues of implementation of MREL in the EU can 
be considered anecdotal and should not obscure the fact that 
TLAC/MREL face more daunting challenges at the level of policy and 
principle, related, first, to the interplay between resolution and investor 
protection, and, second, to considerations of proportionality.  
On the first point, resolution rules adopting TLAC and MREL have 
taken a decisive step towards financial stability with little regard for 
other policy concerns such as investor protection: for a bank to have loss 
absorbency, someone has to absorb that loss. This is particularly 
cumbersome if non-preferred debt is marketed to retail investors, the EU 
being the case in point. Because MREL rules apply to small banks, and 
these often lack access to international capital markets, their only 
possibility is to place MREL instruments among their clients with the 
subsequent risk of mis-selling. Current EU provisions emphasize that the 
debt’s status must be advertised in “the relevant contractual 
documentation and, where applicable, the prospectus.”325 Yet this 
information is of little relevance for retail investors, who do not base 
their investment decisions on the prospectus but on the advice received 
from financial intermediaries. For them, it is MiFID and similar 
standards that matter. If the information is found to be defective, it can 
 
322  Article 72b (2) CRR 5. 
323  Article 72b (2) (g) – (m) CRR 5. 
324  Article 72b (2) (d) CRR 5. 
325 New article 108 (2) (c) and (5) (a) (iii) BRRD. 
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give rise to a wave of mis-selling claims, where the breach of regulatory 
provisions can give rise to actions for annulment, avoidance, or damages 
for the value of the securities sold.326 
The experience of some EU countries like Spain, and, to a lesser 
extent, Italy, shows that the large-scale marketing of instruments by 
sizeable-but-not-systemic institutions intended to boost their prudential 
cushions can result in a problem of mis-selling of those instruments.327 
For years there was little inquiry on marketing practices, until cases of 
the so-called participaciones preferentes reached the civil courts, with 
retail clients claiming that the breach of investor protection rules gave 
them an action for the annulment of the contract under the doctrine of 
“mistake.”328 A system of large-scale arbitration was put in place to deal 
with the majority of retail claims in a systematic,329 rather than case-
specific, manner, but some individual investors continued to press their 
claims in court.330 The result was a reimbursement of a large volume of 
 
326  See, e.g. Bundesgerichshof (BGH) Ref. No. XI ZR 33/10 (March 22, 2011) in 
Germany (damages claim); Rubenstein v HSBC Bank plc [2012] EWCA Civ 1184 in the 
UK (action in damages); Supreme Court Decision Cass. Civ. 16 February 2007, No. 3683 
in Italy (action of avoidance and/or damages); or Supreme Court Decision 20 January 
2014 App. No. 879/2012, in Spain (action of annulment). 
327  See S. Alvaro, M. Lamandini, D. Ramos Muñoz, E. Ghibellini, F. Pellegrini “The 
marketing of MREL securities after BRRD Interactions between prudential and 
transparency requirements and the challenges which lie ahead” CONSOB Legal Research 
Papers No. 15 (December 2017); Marco Lamandini; Giuseppe Lusignani; David Ramos 
Muñoz “Does Europe Have What It Takes to Finish the Banking Union? Non-Performing 
Loans (NPLs) and Their Hard Choices, Non-Choices and Evolving Choices” Columbia 
Journal of European Law (2018 forthcoming); D. Ramos Muñoz “Las participaciones 
preferentes y su contexto: resolviendo el sudoku” Diario La Ley Nº 7970, Tribuna 22 
(November 2012). Italy experienced the same with cases on alleged and mis-selling of 
banks’ shares and bonds on a massive scale. It even went through the first (successful) 
experiment of a public offer of settlement in 2017 to prevent thousands of claims by retail 
investors of Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca from becoming a fatal 
impediment to restructuring (the settlement was finally targeted by a vast majority of 
holders of these securities). 
328  See, e.g. Spanish Supreme Court decision no. 504/2015, of 30 September 2015. The 
decisions from lower courts were much earlier. 
329  Royal Decree-Law 6/2013, of 23 March. Similar schemes were crafted in Italy in 
2016, first for the holders of subordinated debt issued by the four banks resolved in 2015 
and then for MPS subordinated debt mis-sold to retail investors. 
330  In its seventh report in early 2015 the commission indicated that a total of 328.059 
holders of hybrid instruments resorted to arbitration, for an amount of 5.188 million euro. 
This is 79% of all holders, and 65% of the amounts held. Of these, 245.072, or a 75% of 
the requests received, and 53% of the amount, were admitted. That left a 28% of the 
requests presented, and 47% of the total, being rejected. This left 27.232 claims before 
the courts, which looks a low number compared with requests for arbitration but is still 
impressive in terms of the number of judicial proceedings. The figure is more important 
if one considers that the amount of the claims was 1.724 million euro, or 25% of the 
amounts in both arbitration and litigation. In other words, holders of small amounts of 
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instruments. Yet, the goal was not to ascertain the breaches of rules for 
the marketing of instruments, but to address the risk of contagion and 
mistrust resulting from the holding of such volume of instruments among 
the general public, not to mention the bad publicity. Thus, there was not 
an inquiry about the nature, reasons, and extent of the mis-selling.331 Yet, 
the problem resulted in a change of heart in the courts’ towards a more 
investor-friendly stance, one that took place through a modification on 
the doctrine of mistake, with unforeseeable consequences.332  
Apart from causing friction in bank-investor relationships, the 
presence of such instruments and marketing practices can create 
problems for resolution at the level of procedure, policy and principle. At 
the level of procedure, if an entity is put into resolution, a claim of 
damages, avoidance or annulment should, in principle, be classified as an 
“ordinary” claim. This can create a difference in treatment between 
holders of TLAC/MREL instruments, who would be bailed-in right after 
Tier 2 instruments, and holders of “mis-sold instruments,” who would be 
treated as ordinary unsecured creditors, thus ranking above holders of 
instruments with no mis-selling claim.333 This creates an incentive for 
investors to overstate their case and sue for annulment, avoidance, or 
damages if the entity is in financial difficulties with the intention of 
ensuring a better treatment.  
At the level of policy, since the advantage of resolution tools lies in 
their swift implementation, the risk of mis-selling claims could bog down 
the process, and create an impediment to resolution.334 This would make 
it likelier for resolution authorities to exclude TLAC/MREL instruments 
held by retail investors from bail-in. However, this would defeat the 
purpose of distributing TLAC/MREL instruments in the first place. At 
the level of principle, if resolution authorities are aware of evidence 
 
claims went to arbitration, and succeeded, holders of large amounts went to court, often 
succeeding, or went to arbitration, and generally failed. See the Séptimo informe 
trimestral sobre la comercialización de instrumentos híbridos de capital y deuda 
subordinada (real decreto-ley 6/2013, de 22 de marzo). Enero 2015, available at: 
http://www.rdmf.es/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/informe.pdf. See Marco Lamandini; 
Giuseppe Lusignani; David Ramos Muñoz “Does Europe Have What It Takes to Finish 
the Banking Union? Columbia Journal of European Law vol. 24 (2018). 
331  Id. 
332  Id. 
333  In addition to this, the TLAC standard states that entities should be prohibited from 
redeeming debt prior to maturity without supervisory approval. FSB TLAC Termsheet 
no. 12, p. 17. See also EBA Final Report on MREL pp. 104-107, which suggest some 
measures to structure a redemption authorization procedure. Yet this prohibition cannot 
prevent avoidance/annulment/damages claims, which would have the same effect. 
334  FSB Review of the Technical Implementation of the Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity 
(TLAC) Standard 2 July 2019, p. 22. 
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pointing towards mis-selling on a large scale, an argument could be made 
that these authorities would be under a duty to clarify the issue before 
materializing the risk that investors were not duly informed about, or 
even excluding retail-held instruments from bail-in. This would be 
reinforced if one considers investor protection as a general principle of 
the Law of Finance, which helps define the requisite of proportionality, 
which is supposed to apply to resolution action.335 
One alternative would be to adjust the marketing process so that the 
additional complexity of TLAC/MREL securities is not used as grounds 
to presume investors’ lack of information:336 the risk itself is lower than 
the risk of equities, which can be acquired by retail investors. Another 
alternative would be to phase MREL requirements, especially among 
non-G-SIIs.337  
Recently reformed rules, however, simply restrict the marketing 
MREL securities to retail clients. This can only be done if the seller has 
performed a (documented) suitability test, it is satisfied that the securities 
are suitable for the retail client,338and crucially there is both a high 
minimum investment in the instruments; but this does not represent a 
high percentage of the investor’s portfolio.339 The rules try to deter banks 
from marketing MREL securities to retail clients (or do so only to the 
wealthier clients). Similar initiatives are in place in Hong Kong, Japan 
 
335  These tensions are explored in S. Alvaro, M. Lamandini, D. Ramos Muñoz, E. 
Ghibellini, F. Pellegrini “The marketing of MREL securities after BRRD Interactions 
between prudential and transparency requirements and the challenges which lie ahead” 
CONSOB Legal Research Papers No. 15 (December 2017). 
336  It is suggested that a streamlined marketing process where risks are well-identified, 
but intermediaries (and investors) are given relatively simple indications, could also 
improve things. See S. Alvaro, M. Lamandini, D. Ramos Muñoz, E. Ghibellini, F. 
Pellegrini “The marketing of MREL securities after BRRD Interactions between 
prudential and transparency requirements and the challenges which lie ahead” cit. pp. 76-
78. 
337  Id at 74-76. Indeed, the TLAC standard was conceived only for G-SIIBs, and many 
of the problems of the MREL standard arise not in relation with the largest international 
Banks, but in relation with medium-sized Banks, which have no access to international 
capital markets to place their debentures.  
338  Article 44a (1) (a) – (c) BRRD II. Article 44a (1) para. 2nd extends the requirement 
to every instrument classifiable as a potential target for bail-in. 
339  Member States’ options are: (i) a combined requirement that the minimum 
investment is EUR 10,000 and the instruments do not represent more than 10% of the 
investor’s portfolio; (i) an EUR 50,000 minimum denomination for securities subject to 
bail-in; or (iii) (only for smaller banks) that EUR 10,000 is the minimum investment. See 
article 44a (2), (5) (6). 
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and Switzerland, but for TLAC securities,340 i.e. rules applicable to G-
SIIs. The US and Canada have not introduced any such restrictions. 
The consequences of the rules are unclear. Are banks asked to 
monitor how their TLAC/MREL securities are distributed by their own 
personnel, or also all across the market (e.g. by other intermediaries341)? 
Are banks expected to know the composition of their investor base? And 
how accurately? Are resolution authorities expected to perform market 
monitoring tasks, which fall outside their mandate, and within the 
mandate of market regulators (e.g. securities markets commissions, such 
as the SEC)? And what is the consequence of a breach of marketing rules 
(e.g. if TLAC/MREL securities are marketed to retail clients beyond the 
limits)? Is it simply a fine for the institution (in which case, who should 
levy it?) or does that render the instruments not subject to bail-in? Will 
markets perceive that instruments held by retail investors are not subject 
to bail-in? Will that translate into differences in pricing of the same 
instruments? 
These questions illustrate the pattern that results from combining the 
ex ante and ex post perspectives: (i) difficulties are anticipated in the ex 
post implementation stage (e.g. problems of bail-in enforceability over 
instruments held by retail clients); (ii) ex ante rules adopt the more risk-
averse solution (excluding or strictly limiting marketing of TLAC/MREL 
instruments among retail clients); (iii) but that, in turn, creates other ex 
post problems (e.g. bail-in enforceability over instruments sold in breach, 
coordination problems between resolution and markets authorities); (iv) 
as well as unintended consequences (incentives for wealthy retail 
investors to claim mis-selling, monitoring challenges and loss of 
credibility for resolution authorities). 
Such (supposedly) unintended consequences also affect the structure 
of the banking system. Indeed, the most serious consequence that could 
arise if TLAC or MREL instruments cannot be marketed among retail 
investors is that it leaves non-large banks without any options. This is 
especially acute in the EU, where the applicability of MREL to all banks 
 
340  In Hong Kong TLAC securities are marketed only to professional investors, with 
denominations of minimum HKD 2 million, USD 250,000 or EUR 200,000; in Japan the 
minimum denomination is JPY 10million; in Switzerland FINMA requires TLAC 
denominations large enough to deter retail investors. See FSB Review of the Technical 
Implementation of the Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) Standard 2 July 2019, p. 
22. 
341  Even if we restrict the banks’ monitoring efforts to their own clients, how accurately 
can they know the total size of their clients’ portfolio (to apply the maximum of 10% 
discussed in the previous footnote) if they have diversified their investment management 
across several entities? 
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means that, in practice, many of them would be forced to integrate into 
larger groups or breach the rules.342 
This introduces a second consideration about the importance of 
proportionality as a principle of bank regulation and resolution. 
Proportionality evolved as a criterion to adjudicate on the legality of an 
interference by the law or administrative action in fundamental rights.343 
Today, some regard it as an overarching principle in financial 
regulation.344 But although the term “proportionality” is the same in 
form, in substance it is little more than a worthy aspiration,345 one that is 
seldom followed by EU legislation, which tends to apply a one-size-fits-
all.346 This sits in contrast with other jurisdictions, such as the United 
States and Japan, which are characterized by two-tiered, or three-tiered, 
systems of bank regulation and supervision, as the rules of TLAC 
illustrate.347 There is an increasingly perceived need to adjust prudential 
and quasi-prudential requirements, such as MREL, to banks’ size and 
business models, to ensure that rules designed against systemic risk are 
primarily applicable to Systemically Important Financial Institutions 
(SIFIs).348 
Rather than on lofty words, proportionality’s usefulness would run in 
parallel to its “actionability”, i.e. the extent to which it could turn into a 
basis for legal challenges. This could occur if proportionality were to be 
acknowledged as a specific policy goal. In that case, it would still be 
difficult to envisage a case where a set of bank rules could be annulled 
for being “disproportionate”. However, it would introduce a “legitimacy” 
 
342  S. Alvaro, M. Lamandini, D. Ramos Muñoz, E. Ghibellini, F. Pellegrini “The 
marketing of MREL securities after BRRD Interactions between prudential and 
transparency requirements and the challenges which lie ahead” CONSOB Legal research 
papers No. 15 (December 2017). 
343  Moshe Cohen-Eliya; Iddo Porat “American balancing and German proportionality: 
The historical origins” International Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 8, Issue 2, 
(2010) pp. 263-286 
344  Proportionality in Bank Regulation, A Report by the EBA Banking Stakeholder 
Group, London (December 2015), pp. 30. 
345  Bart Joosen; Marco Lamandini; Matthias Lehmann; Kitty Lieverse; Ignacio Tirado 
Stability, Flexibility and Proportionality: Towards a two-tiered European Banking Law? 
EBI Working Paper Series 2018 no. 20 (21 February 2018). 
346 Proportionality in Bank Regulation, A Report by the EBA Banking Stakeholder Group 
cit. 
347  Bart Joosen; Marco Lamandini; Matthias Lehmann; Kitty Lieverse; Ignacio Tirado 
Stability, Flexibility and Proportionality: Towards a two-tiered European Banking Law? 
EBI Working Paper Series 2018 no. 20 (21 February 2018) pp. 12-14. 
348  Ibid. See also S. Alvaro, M. Lamandini, D. Ramos Muñoz, E. Ghibellini, F. 
Pellegrini “The marketing of MREL securities after BRRD Interactions between 
prudential and transparency requirements and the challenges which lie ahead” CONSOB 
Legal research papers No. 15 (December 2017) p. 71. 
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dimension, where supervisory and resolution authorities would have to 
offer a justification if they were to impose burdensome rules without 
distinguishing between institutions. This system is present in the United 
States to some extent through rules that require regulators to make a 
previous assessment of the impact of the rules on small entities before 
adopting them,349 in line with the increasing drive towards requiring a 
Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) of regulatory action across the board.350 In 
some cases, the burden imposed, together with the lack of justification, 
could constitute grounds for an annulment action. A precedent is Metlife 
v Financial Stability Oversight Council,351 where the Court of the 
District of Columbia found the action by the FSOC to classify Metlife, 
an insurance company, as systemically important, and, under the purview 
of the Fed, as “arbitrary and capricious” for lacking a CBA.352 The 
court’s decision was very controversial, and courts in the EU do not tend 
to follow such a strict review of regulatory action, but it remains a useful 
illustration of how courts may react if there is no appropriate process to 
ensure that the rules are proportionate. 
B. The Group Dimension: “Internal TLAC,” Single/Multiple-
Point-of-Entry (SPE/MPE), Source-of-Strength, and 
Interference with Group Structure 
The problems related to TLAC/MREL debt are much more complex 
when we introduce the “external vs. intra-group” dimension. This 
dimension leaves open a series of choices for resolution authorities and 
banks, yet by taking a specific position, resolution authorities constrain 
the choices of banks and largely shape their intra-group organization. 
First, there is a direct interference by resolution authorities on banking 
group structures, with important considerations of policy (1). Second, the 
need to ensure a smooth process to allocate losses and bail-in debt raises 
difficult questions of principles and interpretation, especially in light of 
the interference with banks’ funding structure (2). Finally, the question 
of whether a parent company has an obligation to financially assist its 
subsidiaries poses both questions of principle and policy, as it gradually 
results in a push towards a centralization of functions (3). 
 
349  Regulatory Flexibility Act 1980, see U.S.C. at 601-602. 
350  See, e.g. Cass R. Sunstein “Cost-Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness Review” 
Harvard Environmental Law Review Vol. 41 (2017) p. 1. 
351  Metlife v Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) US Dist. C. D. Col. Civil 
Action No. 15-0045 (2016). 
352  On this the court relied on the US Supreme Court decision in Michigan v. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). 
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i. Internal “TLAC,” SPE/MPE, Interference with Group 
Structure, and Policy Considerations 
The intra-group perspective of TLAC/MREL forms part of the 
group-level resolution planning and assessment of resolvability.353 This 
assessment is no longer restricted to determining levels of TLAC/MREL. 
It now has to encompass (i) an identification of the “resolution entities,” 
i.e. those that will be subject to resolution tools, including bail-in;354 (ii) 
the determination of overall TLAC/MREL levels and the amounts that 
need to be issued and subscribed by third parties; (iii) the internal 
allocation of debt by “down-streaming” the proceeds from externally 
issued debt to subsidiaries,355 which must in turn issue instruments which 
are subscribed by the parent-resolution entity to ensure that TLAC is 
“pre-positioned” in the material subgroups where losses may occur; (iv) 
the up-streaming of losses from operating subsidiaries to the resolution 
entities;356 and (v) if losses are too large for the resolution entity, a bail-in 
of external instruments plus other resolution tools, if necessary. 
Graphically:357 
 
353  See Articles 12-13 BRRD (group resolution plans). This includes an assessment of 
resolvability for the entity/group, to determine whether it could be wound up under 
insolvency or resolved using resolution tools to avoid significant effects in the financial 
system and ensure the continuity of critical functions. Article 16 (1) para. 2nd BRRD. 
The elements to be considered in making such an assessment are listed under the Annex, 
section C of BRRD. The resolution authorities at group-level, and for each subsidiary and 
significant branches have powers to address impediments to resolvability of a group, 
through joint or separate decisions. Article 18 BRRD. MREL are particularly relevant in 
the context of groups, where certain liabilities can be an obstacle for effective group 
resolution. EBA Final Draft Regulatory Standards p. 9-10. 
354  See, e.g. Bank of England The Bank of England’s approach to setting a minimum 
requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) Consultation on a proposed 
Statement of Policy, December 2015, p. 26. See also FSB Principles on Loss-absorbing 
and Recapitalisation Capacity of G-SIBs in Resolution; Total Loss-absorbing Capacity 
(TLAC) Term Sheet 9 November 2015, principle no. (vi), and no. 3 of the term-sheet. 
355  Recital (80) of BRRD states that: ‘it is imperative that loss-absorbing capacity is 
located in, or accessible to, the legal person within the group in which losses occur’. 
356  EBA Final Report on MREL p. 133. 
357  The graph adapts the one in Bank of England The Bank of England’s approach to 
setting a minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) 2015 p. 29 
Figure 2. 
2019] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 71
Initial EU rules provided little guidance, leaving the determination of 
MREL below group level to a collaborative procedure between 
resolution authorities and the binding mediation of the European 
Banking Authority (EBA) in case of conflict.358 Conversely, the TLAC 
standard introduced the conceptual distinction between “external” TLAC 
instruments, which are the equity/debt instruments issued by resolution 
entities and held by third parties, and “internal” TLAC instruments, 
which are issued by group entities that are not resolution entities, usually 
operating subsidiaries, and held by other group entities, usually 
resolution entities.359 as the TLAC standard also introduced the 
requirement that the “pre-positioned internal TLAC” be in a 75-90% 
358  The MREL is imposed at an entity level, if the entity is itself subject to resolution 
rules, regardless of whether that entity is a material subsidiary that will be subject to 
resolution action. Then, the determination of MREL at both an entity level and 
consolidated level will depend on the resolution strategy envisaged in the applicable 
resolution plan. This should be the group resolution plan, unless the host resolution 
authority exercises its power to draw up its own resolution plan pursuant to article 15 (6) 
BRRD. Even if there is a group resolution plan, the MREL at both consolidated and 
individual level is the result of a joint decision of the resolution college. Disagreements 
may be referred to the EBA for binding mediation, but if no agreement is reached the 
decision of resolution authorities for each subsidiary shall apply. See article 45 (10) 
BRRD. 
359  The TLAC Termsheet introduces the distinction between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ 
TLAC in its no. 3 and dedicates 4 points out of 21 to group issues, including 16 (internal 
TLAC), 17 (material subgroups), 18 (size of the internal TLAC requirement), and 19 
(core features of eligible internal TLAC). 
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range of the external TLAC level.360 Amended EU rules are more aligned 
with the TLAC conceptual framework.361  
 
Once the intra-group situation is considered, the question is no 
longer solely about the instruments’ features to ensure loss-absorbency. 
It is about the position of those instruments within group’s structure to 
ensure that resolution tools can be implemented quickly and efficiently. 
This raises the question of whether (and, if so, how much) the law should 
interfere with strategic decisions such as those regarding a group’s 
structure. The basic, stylized choices are two: under a strategy of “Single 
Point of Entry” (SPE) resolution, measures are adopted at the parent 
company level; under a “Multiple Points of Entry” (MPE) strategy, there 
are different “resolution entities” where resolution tools will be 
implemented.  
The purported advantage of SPE is its simplicity: the parent holding 
company is the only resolution entity, a “clean HoldCo”, i.e. a company 
with no operational liabilities. This makes “structural subordination” 
easy:362 losses are up-streamed to the holding company using 
subordinated “internal TLAC/MREL” and then “external TLAC/MREL” 
is bailed-in, which is easy, since it is the only kind of liabilities issued by 
the parent.363 It is also ideal for structures characterized by a financial 
holding company (FHC), typical in the US. The Dodd-Frank Act is 
purportedly neutral,364 as has been the guidance on resolution planning, 
which uses the concept of “legal entity rationalization”, but does not 
openly advocate one approach over the other.365 Yet, American 
 
360  This allocation ensures (i) that only the resolution entity is put into resolution, and 
(ii) that there is adequate cooperation between home and host resolution authorities. FSB 
TLAC Term Sheet, no. 16. 
361  New article 45g BRRD II. Still, some adjustments are needed. One relevant aspect is 
the adjustment needed to the concept of “material sub-groups”, which is defined in the 
TLAC standard as one or more direct or indirect subsidiaries of a resolution entity 
‘incorporated in the same jurisdiction outside of their resolution entity’s home 
jurisdiction’, whilst the EU should, to this effect, be treated as a ‘single jurisdiction’. See 
EBA Final Report on MREL p. 135. 
362  We first discussed ‘structural subordination’ in section III.B.1. The main 
implications of the concept become clear now.  
363  Bank of England The Bank of England’s approach to setting a minimum 
requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) Consultation on a proposed 
Statement of Policy, December 2015, pp. 25-26, 31. 
364  See, e.g. Section § 210 (a) (E) Dodd-Frank Act (power of the FDIC to appoint itself 
receiver of a subsidiary when it has appointed itself receiver of the parent company). 
365  FDIC and Fed Guidance for 2017 §165(d) Annual Resolution Plan Submissions by 
Domestic Covered Companies that Submitted Resolution Plans in July 2015 § VI. 
 
2019] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 73 
 
authorities have decidedly moved towards SPE.366 Advocates of SPE 
argue that EU rules should be bolder and force financial groups into 
American-style FHC structures.367  
While EU rules are neutral,368 UK authorities have opted for an SPE 
strategy with “structural subordination” for all entities subject to bail-in 
on policy grounds, i.e. because it is considered better in general terms.369 
In France, home to some large universal banks, authorities also opted for 
an SPE strategy,370 yet clarifying that the choice is not definitive, 
irreversible or systematic,371 but idiosyncratic, i.e. based on a list of 
factors to choose the best strategy for the larger banking groups that are 
dominant in France.372 When banking groups have been allowed to 
 
366  Wells Fargo was the only group with an MPE approach, and in the December 2016 
assessment of resolvability it was the only one found to have failed in its efforts to correct 
obstacles to resolvability, primarily because of a lack of ‘legal entity rationalisation’. See 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Agencies announce determinations on October resolution plan submissions 
of five systemically important domestic banking institutions Joint Press Release, 
December 13, 2016, available at 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20161213a.htm. Wells 
Fargo’s 2019 Resolution Plan (Public Section) states that: “Since filing the 2017 165(d) 
Plan, we announced on October 13, 2017 that we were moving to a single point of entry 
(SPOE) approach as a part of our Preferred Resolution Strategy for this 2019 165(d) 
Plan submission. We believe this approach better aligns with our business model and 
corporate structure as we continue to evolve as a company.” 
367  This could be achieved by introducing the requirement under structural 
rules for Banks, or by using prudential (Basel) rules to “penalize” structures 
without financial holding companies. See Jeffrey Gordon; Wolf-George Ringe 
‘Bank resolution in Europe: The Unfinished Agenda of Structural Reform’ 
ECGI Working Paper Series WP No. 507 (Jan. 2015), and also ‘Bank 
Resolution in the European Banking Union: A Transatlantic Perspective on 
What It Would Take’ Vol. 115, No. 5 (June 2015), pp. 1297-1369. 
368  See Recital (80) of BRRD. 
369  Bank of England The Bank of England’s approach to setting a minimum 
requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) Responses to 
Consultation and Statement of Policy (November 2016) p. 9. 
370  Autorité de Control Prudentielle et de Résolution (ACPR) Communication 
on the Resolution Strategy of ACPR Resolution Board 18 July 2014. 
371  “The choice of an SPE strategy may be combined with a pragmatic 
approach to resolution. It should not be viewed as definitive, irreversible or 
systematic, but rather as a position in favour of the strategy that seems best 
suited from an operational perspective, given the organisation and functioning of 
the main French entities. ” 
372  These were (i) the centralisation of decision-making; (ii) integration of business 
model; (iii) location of the business in France; (iv) concentration of loss-absorbing 
capacity in the parent company (financial structure); (v) pooling of management of 
support functions (operational structure); (vi) number of significant foreign subsidiaries 
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choose, many have opted for SPE, including large German banking 
groups such as Deutsche Bank,373 with Santander being the exception of 
major banking groups in using an MPE strategy.374  
Yet, despite the relentless move towards SPE, there are clear 
objections to it. First, an approach that considers the structure of US 
FHC-based financial groups as the least risky is debatable.375 Then, the 
SPE dismisses too quickly the usefulness of market forces in disciplining 
subsidiaries when they seek external funding and ignores the rigidities 
that a “clean HoldCo + bail-in” strategy may impose if, say, a sale of 
business is needed and no suitors are found for the whole group, which 
needs to be sold in parts.376 Furthermore, the group-level seamless 
implementation required by an SPE approach may be jeopardized if, say, 
resolution authorities in the parent HoldCo country object to the up-
streaming of losses of a foreign country subsidiary into “their” parent 
holding company and to the subsequent bail-in of “their” investors.377  
Most importantly, stark distinctions between SPE and MPE can be 
equivocal. US bodies, for example, favour SPE for US banking groups, 
but also for the US activities of foreign banks. Large foreign banks have 
to create an Intermediate Holding Company (IHC) for their US 
 
(legal structure); (vii) centralisation of funding; and (viii) level of intragroup transactions. 
ACPR Communication on the Resolution Strategy of ACPR Resolution Board 18 July 
2014 p. 13. A ‘high’ level in each and every of these categories (save for the number of 
significant foreign subsidiaries) favoured SPE as the preferred approach, whereas a ‘low’ 
level favoured MPE. 
373  See, e.g. Deutsche Bank, U.S. Resolution Plan Submission Section 1: Public Section 
July 1, 2015, p. 39. Despite the title of the document, the references to SPE in the plan 
are not restricted to US operations but refer to the overall strategy for the international 
group as a whole. 
374  Banco Santander, S.A. Resolution Plan for U.S. Operations Public Section at 6, 8 
(December 31, 2018). This is due to its business model based on local units with separate 
governance structures. See ibid p. 6, and also Banco Santander, S.A. Resolution Plan for 
U.S. Operations Public Section December 16, 2015, p. 4. 
375  See, e.g. Charles Calomiris; Stephen Haber Fragile by Design Princeton University 
Press, 2014. See also Charles Calomiris ‘The Costs of Rejecting Universal Banking: 
American Finance in the German Mirror, 1870-1914’ in Naomi R Lamoreaux; Daniel 
M.G. Raff (eds.) Coordination and Information: Historical Perspectives on the 
Organization of Enterprise University of Chicago Press, 1992.  
376  Either if the debt issued at the top of the group is insufficient to absorb the group’s 
losses, and/or different parts of the group can continue on a standalone basis, an MPE 
strategy may be preferable. Resolving Globally Active, Systemically Important, Financial 
Institutions A joint paper by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Bank of 
England 10 December 2012, no. 3, p. 1. 
377  See Federico Lupo-Pasini; Ross P. Buckley ‘International Coordination in Cross-
Border Bank Bail-ins: Problems and Prospects’ European Business Organization Law 
Review Volume 16, Issue 2 (2015), pp 203–226, who although signal a preference for 
SPE, also point out some of these coordination difficulties. 
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operations.378 Thus, for non-US banks, the SPE approach at a US-level 
effectively means an MPE at a global level, with different holding 
companies for different countries or regions. 
ii. “Internal TLAC,” Problems of Interpretation, and the 
Resulting Pre-Determining of Intra-Group Funding 
The previous point highlights how the rules on group resolution 
planning have led resolution authorities to position themselves vis-à-vis 
the ideal structure of banking groups. This point shows that there are 
other matters of principle and interpretation with regard to internal 
TLAC that remain open, and that the need to fill those gaps is leading 
resolution authorities to adopt similarly deterministic views on intra-
group funding. These concern (i) the type of instruments that can be 
considered TLAC/MREL and their ranking, (ii) the extent to which 
internal TLAC/MREL levels must be met by pre-positioning instruments 
inside subsidiaries, as opposed to other forms of support, e.g. parent 
guarantees and (iii) the triggers for write-down and conversion.  
Regarding the first matter, i.e. the kind of instruments and their 
ranking, internal TLAC must be equity, or debt susceptible of bail-in. 
However, this is a “prudential requirement”, which merely stipulates ex 
ante the conditions the instrument must fulfil to be eligible as internal 
TLAC, not the ex post enforcement of the bail-in tool over them. The 
entities are thus responsible for the decision of how to comply with the 
rules and through which instruments, which may be designed as own-
funds or debt, as long as they are subordinated to other kinds of debt, and 
do not affect the parent’s control over the subsidiary.379 
 
As said above, whether these conditions are fulfilled, however, can 
only be ascertained ex post, i.e. when the group reaches its point of non-
 
378  See, e.g. BNP Paribas 165(d) Resolution Plan Bank of the West IDI Resolution Plan. 
Public Section. December 31, 2015, p. 3. In spite of espousing an MPE strategy in its US 
plan, Santander US activities are organized around a US holding company. See Banco 
Santander, S.A. Resolution Plan for U.S. Operations Public Section December 16, 2015, 
pp. 2-3. 
379  New Article 45f (2) (a) of BRRD II, as per the Directive on Loss Absorbency 
requires internal TLAC liabilities to be ultimately bought by a resolution entity, to be 
MRE-eligible, and to rank below non-MREL liabilities (other than equity), among other 
requirements. Equity instruments that are TLAC-compliant are CET1 or other equity 
instruments, provided they are subscribed by group entities, or by other entities, as long 
as bail-in does not affect their control by their parent (article 45f (2) (b) BRRDII). 
This could raise difficulties if debt instruments with a contractual subordination clause, 
though not eligible for own funds requirements, have been issued to third parties, e.g. if 
the contract subordination clause suggests that they should also rank below all ordinary 
liabilities.  
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viability. Since the rules do not back the ex ante requirement with an ex 
post determination of the ranking of the instrument (as they do with 
external MREL380) there is room for uncertainty. This concerns cases 
where the entity has issued contractually subordinated debt (or ordinary 
debt subject to conversion into equity) that is held by third parties, in 
which case the problem may not be the internal TLAC itself, but the debt 
held by third parties.  
Another problem may be the status of internal TLAC relative to 
intra-group “operational debt”, such as intra-group loans, deposits, 
derivatives, etc. Liabilities originated between related parties are subject 
to statutory subordination in some countries (e.g. Germany or Spain).381 
EU rules provide that, when certain liabilities are not considered as 
TLAC/MREL, but are subject to subordination by insolvency rules, 
because they are intra-group debt (or debt with related parties) the 
requirement that MREL instruments be “subordinated” shall not be 
assessed by reference to those excluded liabilities.382 Thus, the 
determination of MREL levels shall be done independently of the debt 
subordinated for being intra-group. Yet, on an ex post setting where 
resolution tools have to be deployed, “operational” intra-group debt 
would rank pari passu with internal TLAC, but its bail-in may disrupt 
the group’s operations.383  
Regarding the second matter, i.e. ways to comply with internal 
TLAC/MREL rules, this can be done by pre-positioning instruments in 
the subsidiary, i.e. the subsidiary issues equity or debt instruments, 
subscribed by the parent or the resolution entity, or through a financial 
commitment by the parent to “come to the rescue”, e.g. a parent 
guarantee. The former is better to allay authorities’ fears, since the loss-
absorbing resources are already there, but is costly, and can result in 
“misallocation risk”.384 The latter is better for banking groups, which will 
 
380  See Article 108 (2) BRRD II. 
381  See Section III.B.2., supra. 
382  Article 72b (2) 4th para. 
383  Since subordinated debt is all intra-group debt, one may argue that this problem is a 
relatively minor one. However, we can imagine a situation where internal TLAC is held 
by the parent company, while part of the operational debt is held by sister companies, in 
which case the authorities in the parent company’s home jurisdiction might object to the 
parent’s absorption of the full cost of the “upstreaming” of losses, while intra-group 
loans, derivatives, or cash and collateral arrangements (which they may see as one of the 
sources of risk) remain untouched. 
384  That is, the risk that the pre-positioned internal TLAC at material subsidiaries does 
not match the actual distribution of losses incurred. See FSB Review of the Technical 
Implementation of the Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) Standard 2 July 2019, p. 
45. 
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not wish to bear the cost of issuing the instruments or immobilizing 
recourses beyond the projected needs of local operations.385 
On pre-positioning, TLAC/MREL can be issued directly, i.e. from 
the subsidiary to the resolution entity, or following the existing chain of 
legal entity ownership (“daisy chain”), e.g. if Resolution Entity A owns 
100% of subsidiary B, which holds 100% of subsidiary C, C could issue 
TLAC to be subscribed by A (direct issuance) or B (“daisy chain”). The 
former provides greater transparency, and faster bail-in execution, while 
the latter ensures that there will be no change of ownership.386 
Guarantees are another admissible way to comply with TLAC 
requirements, in theory. Under global standards, to be TLAC-compliant 
these guarantees must fulfil several conditions regarding the guarantee 
itself, the collateralisation agreement, and the collateral itself.387 EU rules 
in cases where the parent and subsidiary are part of the same resolution 
group, and located in the same State, and the parent complies with 
TLAC/MREL, allow the possibility to (i) waive internal TLAC/MREL if 
the parent declares that it guarantees the subsidiary’s commitments, and 
there is no impediment for the transfer of funds or repayment of 
liabilities from parent to subsidiary,388 and also to (ii) comply with 
TLAC/MREL requirements by means of a formal collateralised 
guarantee where the amount of the guarantee is the same as the amount 
of the requirement, the value of the collateral is at least 50% of the value 
of the guarantee, and other requirements that try to ensure the 
guarantee’s enforceability.389 US authorities include parent guarantees as 
 
385  TLAC Termsheet no. 19; EBA Final Report on MREL pp. 137. 
386 See, e.g. FSB Guiding Principles on the Internal Total Lossabsorbing Capacity of G-
SIBs (‘Internal TLAC’) Consultative Document 16 December 2016, p. 19. See also FSB 
Review of the Technical Implementation of the Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) 
Standard 2 July 2019, p. 27, for the (direct/indirect) options followed by authorities in the 
EU, US, UK, or Singapore 
387  These include the following: (i) the amount of the guarantee must be at least equal to 
the amount of internal TLAC for which it substitutes, (ii) the value of the collateral must, 
following conservative haircuts, be sufficient to fully cover the amount guaranteed; (iii) 
the guarantee must be drafted in a way that does not affect the loss-absorbency of the 
subsidiaries’ other capital instruments, such as minority interests; (iv) the collateral must 
be unencumbered, and not used to back any other guarantee; (v) the collateral maturity 
must fulfil the same requirements as external TLAC, i.e. residual maturity of at least 1 
year; and (vi) there must be no legal, regulatory or operational barriers for the transfer of 
the collateral from the resolution entity to the subsidiary. TLAC Termsheet no. 19.  
388 This applies both in cases where the parent is a “resolution entity”, and when the 
parent is not a resolution entity (i.e. the resolution entity is, e.g. the parent’s parent, and is 
located in a different State). See article 45f (3) and (4) BRRD II. 
389 Article 45f (5) BRRD II. No reference is made to the TLAC requirement that the 
guarantee must be drafted to not affect the loss-absorbency of other capital instruments.  
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part of the intra-group funding strategy (see infra IV.B.3), but only 
within the US. 
One possible difficulty could arise with collateral re-use, which is 
contemplated as a right of the collateral taker.390 Collateral re-use gives 
rise to the duty to return equivalent collateral,391 but this is a personal 
obligation, which poses a risk in times of scarcity of collateral.392 EU 
rules require the collateral to be “unencumbered”, and in particular not 
used to back another guarantee,393 but the potential scenarios are three: 
(i) if the collateral is transferred to the subsidiary, which re-uses it; (ii) if 
the same collateral is used to secure different mutual obligations between 
different group members; or (iii) if the parent re-uses collateral taken 
from a client or a third party under a different transaction to secure its 
guarantee with its subsidiary. Because the implications of collateral re-
use are still poorly understood, little is said in the rules about 
requirements of immobilizing, “tracing” or “sourcing” collateral. It 
seems that the collateralisation requirement would be considered fulfilled 
in the first scenario, even if the subsidiary may lose the collateral; clearly 
not fulfilled in the second scenario; and most likely fulfilled in the third 
scenario,, although the case would be less straightforward.394 
Regarding the third matter, i.e. the triggers for the activation of bail-
in, international TLAC principles outline the importance of adequate 
triggers but are skimpy about the details,395 except to indicate that it 
should be possible to bail-in “internal TLAC” without putting the 
 
390  See article 5 FCD, or Section §9-207(c)(3) of the US Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC).  
391  See, e.g. FCD article 5 (2).  
392  Javier Solana, All that Glitters is not Gold: the Re-Use of Securities Collateral as a 
Source of Systemic Risk PhD Thesis, University of Oxford, Faculty of Law (2017), pp. 
142-56, 178-87. 
393  Article 45f (5) (e) BRRD II. 
394  Consider the requirement that the collateral must be “unencumbered”, and in 
particular ‘is not used as collateral to back any other guarantee’ is not breached if the 
parent merely has a personal obligation to return equivalent collateral in case of re-use. 
More difficult may be the case of re-hypothecation of clients’ assets, since some courts 
have concluded that these assets are simply held in trust by the dealer-custodian and 
clients have a right which can be exercised upon insolvency. See In the matter of Lehman 
Brothers International Europe, [2009] EWHC 3228 (Ch); [2010] EWCA Civ 917; and 
[2012] UKSC 6. The ‘maturity’ requirement applies to the collateral, not to any potential 
issues with its return. The main difficulty would come from the requirement that there 
must be no legal, operational or other difficulties to transfer the collateral. 
395 TLAC principles state that: ‘Eligible external TLAC should contain a contractual 
trigger or be subject to a statutory mechanism which permits the relevant resolution 
authority to effectively write it down or convert it to equity in resolution’. TLAC 
Termsheet no. 14, p. 17.  
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subsidiary in formal resolution proceedings.396 Triggers are relevant 
because, even if the relative ranking and hierarchy of the debt 
instruments were clear, the clarity of the picture may be upset if different 
instruments are activated through different triggers, especially if one debt 
instrument ranking pari passu or below, a second instrument, e.g. Tier-3 
non-preferred debt is hierarchically superior to, say, subordinated debt, 
and yet its conversion into equity may be triggered before subordinated 
debt is touched, or if, absent contractual triggers, it is not possible to bail-
in debt without putting the entity into resolution. Initial EU rules, for 
example, only permitted debt (unlike equity) to be bailed-in if the entity 
were put into resolution, but not before.397 New rules, on the other hand, 
provide the possibility of pre-resolution bail-in for both equity and debt 
if the entity fulfils the conditions for resolution, and unless bail-in is 
exercised with respect to the capital or liabilities the entity will no longer 
be viable.398  
A final, and perhaps major, source of difficulties, may be the 
treatment of TLAC/MREL-eligible debt by EU authorities outside of 
areas with a harmonized regime. Such cases may include cross-border 
groups, whereby the debt issued under the laws of one jurisdiction needs 
to be subject to bail-in under the laws of a different jurisdiction. Such 
issues, however, have more to do with the cross-border recognition of 
bail-in decisions and will be examined in a succeeding article. 
iii. Source-of-Strength and Intra-Group Support: Impact on 
the Bail-In Hierarchy and the Push Towards Central 
Planning 
The two previous points show a pattern: group-resolution planning 
requires choosing among different options (group structure, intra-group 
funding instruments and organization). This raises the question of 
 
396  Rules for ‘internal TLAC’ only indicate that ‘internal TLAC that comprises capital 
instruments must comply with the relevant provisions of Basel III, including those in 
relation to write down and conversion ‘at the point of non-viability’, but they add that 
‘Internal TLAC must be subject to write-down and/or conversion to equity by the relevant 
host authority at the point of non-viability, as determined by the host authority in line 
with the relevant legal framework, without entry of the subsidiary into statutory 
resolution proceedings’. TLAC Termsheet no. 19. This is confirmed in point no. 6 c. 
397  Article 59 BRRD, as originally drafted. 
398  Article 59 BRRD II, as reformed by the Directive on Loss-Absorbency and 
Recapitalization. The provision replaces the reference to ‘capital instruments’ with a 
reference to ‘capital instruments and eligible liabilities’ (heading) and clarifies that bail-
in powers can only be exercised independently of resolution action when absent such 
bail-in the entity will no longer be viable (section 3). Such bail-in can only be exercised 
with regard to certain types of liabilities. See article 59 (1a) and article 45f (2) (a) BRRD 
II. 
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whether some options are generally better than others. Resolution 
authorities make policy choices, and, in so doing, constrain and pre-
determine banks’ choices, which raises matters of principle, both with 
regard to the interpretation of the rules, and to the limits of the 
authorities’ exercise of powers. This point shows the same pattern by 
asking a related question: is a parent obliged, as a matter of law or 
policy, to financially assist its subsidiaries? 
It is one thing to say that the law requires organizing intra-group 
funding to facilitate orderly resolution, and quite another to argue that 
such funding must flow from the parent to its subsidiaries. And yet, there 
is some legal basis for this. The best example is the US “source-of-
strength” doctrine, originally envisaged by the Fed under its powers to 
approve transactions399 and recently codified by the Dodd-Frank Act.400 
Under this doctrine, supervisors could require a bank holding company 
to be a “source of strength” to its subsidiaries, including in times of 
liquidity scarcity.401 The doctrine was originally validated by the US 
Supreme Court in Lincolnwood in the context of the authorization of 
acquisition transactions.402  
Yet, saying that a parent company has to be a source of strength in 
that it must not weaken its subsidiaries’ financial position is not the same 
as saying that financial authorities can compel the former to financially 
assist its subsidiaries. Thus, after it was initially validated in theory, the 
Fed tried to use the doctrine to impose upon a troubled bank holding 
company the duty to use the money obtained from the sale of non-bank 
subsidiaries to recapitalize some of its ailing subsidiaries, an attempt that 
was successfully challenged before the Fifth Circuit Court in McCorp.403 
 
399  See the analysis of the traditional doctrine in Leonard Bierman; Donald Fraser “The 
Source-of-Strength” Doctrine: Formulating the Future of America’s Financial Markets” 
12 Ann. Rev. Banking L. (1993) p. 269; Kieran J. Fallon “Notes. Source of Strength or 
Source of Weakness? A Critique of the “Source-of-Strength” Doctrine in Banking 
Reform” Vol. 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. (1991) p. 1344. For a more recent study, comparing the 
former and current approaches, see Paul L. Lee “The Source-of-Strength Doctrine: 
Revered and revisited. Part I” The Banking Law Journal Vol. 129 No. 9 (October 2012) 
p. 771, and its Part II in The Banking Law Journal Vol. 129 No. 10 (December 2012) p. 
867. 
400  Section 616(d) Dodd-Frank Act. 
401  See, e.g. Leonard Bierman; Donald Fraser “The Source-of-Strength” Doctrine” 
supra note 397, p. 269. 
402  The Court accepted that the Board had the power to impose upon the acquirer of a 
bank the need to be a source of strength for its subsidiary as a condition for acquisition. 
Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve System v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U.S. 234, 
238 (1978). 
403  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. MCorp Financial, Inc. affd in 
part and rev'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 459 (1991). 
2019] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 81 
 
The case was granted certiorari by the Supreme Court, which held that 
the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction based on procedural grounds.404 This 
left open the issue about the scope of the Fed’s mandate.  
The current statutory formulation legitimizes authorities’ power to 
require the parent to be a source-of-strength.405 Yet, this answers the 
question of policy, i.e. this is a goal to organize the authorities’ exercise 
of powers, but it does not answer the question of principle of how much 
discretion does this leave authorities to micro-manage intra-group 
funding structures, and in particular whether authorities can impose the 
parent company a duty to financially assist the subsidiaries including 
when this compromises the parent beyond its point of non-viability, or 
whether they can dictate which subsidiaries to assist or how to structure 
the assistance, over the views of the parent’s board. This would seem to 
interfere with the bank’s freedom of enterprise. Should the matter arise in 
an ex post resolution scenario the courts could review the exercise of 
powers under an “arbitrary and capricious” standard, where authorities 
would be required to justify their actions, with or without a cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA),406 or on a “balancing” or “proportionality” assessment, 
which would weigh the finality of the measure against the interference 
with rights.407 In addition to this, parent company creditors may raise 
legal challenges to the execution of financial assistance by the parent 
company through doctrines of fraudulent transfer or breach of fiduciary 
duty.408  
 
 
404  According to the Supreme Court, the court could only review the Federal Reserve 
Board decision when it was a final decision, which the one concerned in the McCorp case 
was not. See Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys. v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 
459 (1991). 
405  Section 616(d) Dodd-Frank Act adds a new Section 38A to the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act. Subsection (a) of the new Section 38A states that: ‘The appropriate 
Federal banking agency for a bank holding company or savings and loan holding 
company shall require the bank holding company or savings and loan holding company 
to serve as a source-of-financial strength for any subsidiary of the bank holding company 
or savings and loan holding company that is a depository institution.’ 
406  Metlife v Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) US Dist. C. D. Col. Civil 
Action No. 15-0045 (2016). See supra 4.1.3. 
407  This could be undertaken under a “proportionality” test, typical of European 
jurisdictions, or under the various forms of “balancing” more typical of US courts. See 
Moshe Cohen-Eliya; Iddo Porat “American balancing and German proportionality: The 
historical origins” International Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 8, Issue 2, (2010) 
pp. 263-286, for a comparison. 
408  Benton E Gup (ed.) Handbook for Directors of Financial Institutions Massachusetts, 
Elgar, 2008, p. 64. 
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The friction between policy and principle, however, is mitigated as 
we move from the ex post scenario of execution of resolution tools to the 
ex ante scenario of resolution planning. In that context, it no longer looks 
excessive for authorities to require banking groups to organize their 
affairs in a way that facilitates the flow of financial assistance from the 
top-down. Actually, it seems a logical next step to an SPE strategy 
(supra IV.B.1), and it helps to rationalize the decisions over the ways to 
comply with internal TLAC/MREL. This tendency can be observed 
clearly in the US. The 2017 Guidance for 2017 Resolution Plans 
introduced the concepts of Resolution Capital Adequacy and Positioning 
(“RCAP”), Resolution Liquidity Adequacy and Positioning (“RLAP”), 
and Resolution Capital (and Liquidity) Execution Needs (“RCEN”, and 
“RLEN”).409 The idea is to require entities to “preposition” sufficient 
resources to meet capital and liquidity needs (RCAP, RLAP) during 
“business as usual” to anticipate a stress scenario, and, when such stress 
scenario arrives, to make real-time projections of capital and liquidity 
needs (RCEN and RLEN),410 and, if necessary, activate a parent support 
agreement,411 typically channeled through a Funding Intermediate 
Holding Company (Funding IHC)). In anticipation of ex post bankruptcy 
challenges, US resolution authorities required major banks to include a 
detailed legal analysis of the potential challenges to the planned 
provision of capital and liquidity to the subsidiaries, and the mitigants to 
those challenges.412 Such mitigants have taken the form of contractually 
binding mechanisms (CBM) including clear triggers synchronized with 
the (centralized) capital/liquidity methodologies, security interests, and 
collateral, and penalties for non-compliance.413 These have taken the 
form of Secured Support Agreements (SSA), which constitute the 
framework of reference for the major US banking groups, such as Bank 
of America,414 Citigroup,415 Goldman Sachs,416 JP Morgan Chase,417 or 
 
409  FDIC and Fed Guidance for 2017 §165(d) Annual Resolution Plan Submissions by 
Domestic Covered Companies that Submitted Resolution Plans in July 2015.  
410  Id. 
411  Federal Reserve FDIC, Guidance for 2017 §165(d) Annual Resolution Plan 
Submissions By Domestic Covered Companies that Submitted Resolution Plans in July 
2015 p. 10. 
412  Ibid. 
413  FDIC and Fed Guidance for 2017 §165(d) Annual Resolution Plan Submissions by 
Domestic Covered Companies that Submitted Resolution Plans in July 2015 § IV 
(Governance mechanisms). 
414  Bank of America Corporation 2019 Resolution Plan Submission Public Executive 
Summary pp. 9-10, 18-20. 
415  Citigroup Inc. 2019 Resolution Plan Public Section, July 1, 2019, pp. 4-5, 15-16. 
416  The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 2019 Resolution Plan Public Section, pp. 19-20. 
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Morgan Stanley.418 Yet, the brief information in the public section of 
those plans does not include a discussion of the actual challenges and 
mitigation techniques. 
A side effect of the source-of-strength doctrine, and its expansion 
into the ex ante planning stage is the push it entails towards operational 
centralization. By requiring firms to centrally plan their capital and 
liquidity needs, financial authorities have incentivized them to centralize 
management, or management and funding, and normally at the level of 
the parent holding company. Citigroup, for example, besides pre-
positioning capital and liquidity, relies on access to a pool of centrally 
managed resources.419 Bank of America relies on a mix of secured and 
unsecured liabilities through a centralized, globally-coordinated funding 
strategy.420 Goldman Sachs relies on a Capital and Liquidity Support 
Agreement, based on a specific sub-holding (Funding IHC), dependent 
of the top parent company (GS Group). This arrangement combines the 
holding (prepositioning) of liquid assets by material group entities, with 
centralization through the holding of liquidity surplus by Funding IHC.421 
A similar arrangement characterizes JP Morgan Chase,422 and Morgan 
Stanley.423 This can create operational rigidities (e.g. if the entity that has 
the resources is not the one with the best expertise to make decisions on 
resource allocation), and while providing a neat picture for a single 
jurisdiction and authority, the push towards centralization can create 
friction when more than one jurisdiction and authority are involved. 
The source-of-strength doctrine may be a US creation, but the 
questions it addresses also arise in the EU framework, where authorities 
have broad powers in regard to (i) the assessment of resolvability;424 and 
(ii) early intervention.425 Yet the EU system for intra-group support 
measures is not discretion-based but rules-based. First, the rules that 
regulate intra-group financial support agreements (IGFSAs) include a list 
of requirements to be fulfilled by those agreements, which need to take 
 
417  JP Morgan Chase 2019 Resolution Plan Public Filing pp. 17-20. 
418  Morgan Stanley 2019 Resolution Plan Public Section, pp. 17-20. 
419  Citigroup Inc. 2019 Resolution Plan Public Section July 1, 2019 p. 68 (resources 
provided by Citibank NA, and managed by Citi Treasury). See also Citigroup Resolution 
Plan July 2015, p. 30. 
420  Bank of America Corporation 2019 resolution Plan Submission. Public Executive 
Summary, p. 43. 
421  Goldman Sachs Group Inc 2019 Resolution Plan Public section, June 28, 2019, pp. 
18-22, 43. 
422  JP Morgan Chase 2019 Resolution Plan Public Filing, pp. 20-21, See also p. 17 to 
see the group arrangement. 
423  Morgan Stanley 2019 Resolution Plan. Public Section pp. 32-36. 
424  Articles 17-18 BRRD. 
425  Articles 27-30 BRRD. 
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into account the interest of all participating entities and the public 
interest to not undermine financial stability, or the resolvability of the 
providing institution.426 Second, the rules regulate two procedures. One is 
to approve the agreement, which requires an application by the group 
parent, the authorisation by the consolidating supervisor and other 
competent authorities,427 and approval by the shareholders of every group 
entity.428 The other procedure is to approve the actual provision of 
financial support under the agreement, which requires a reasoned 
decision from the management of the providing and receiving entities, 
and notification to competent authorities, which have a right to oppose.429 
The combination of substantive and procedural requirements secures a 
robust framework of legality and legitimacy. 
This tighter approach by EU rules does not answer all open 
questions, however. Intra-group support may be adopted by financial 
groups,430 which means there is no statutory source-of-strength duty, 
something in line with the more neutral EU position between SPE and 
MPE strategies. Furthermore, the rules do not state that intra-group 
support can only be provided under cover of a regulated IGFSA. Group 
entities can conclude arrangements on funding, including centralised 
funding, which are not covered by IGFSA rules, provided they are 
conceived for cases where none of the entities meets the conditions for 
early intervention.431 Also, an IGFSA is not a precondition to provide ad 
hoc support, even in the case of financial difficulties.432 Finally, the 
incentives for such agreements are limited. From a supervisory 
perspective, competent authorities may temporarily waive prudential 
 
426  The conditions under article 23 (1) BRRD include the need of a reasonable prospect 
that the agreement will redress financial difficulties, the need that the agreement 
preserves the financial stability of the group as a whole, and is in the interest of the 
providing entities, the need that the agreement reflects the risk of default and loss-given 
default, and benefits and costs, the need of a reasonable prospect of loan repayment 
(which means the need to evaluate collateral) the need to not jeopardise the providing 
entity’s liquidity, solvency, or resolvability, make it breach prudential rules, or 
undermine financial stability. See EBA Guidelines specifying the conditions for group 
financial support under Article 23 of Directive 2014/59/EU EBA/GL/2015/17, 9 July 
2015. 
427  In case of disagreement the rules contemplate the intervention by the EBA. See 
article 20 BRRD. 
428  Article 21 BRRD. 
429  The management of the providing entity and the receiving entity have to approve the 
financial support (through a reasoned decision) and notify the competent authorities, 
which may oppose. Again, the rules contemplate an intervention by the EBA in case of 
disagreement between competent authorities. See articles 24-25 BRRD. 
430  Article 19 (1) BRRD. 
431  Article 19 (2) BRRD. 
432  Article 19 (3) BRRD. 
2019] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 85 
 
requirements on liquidity, solvency or large exposures to the providing 
entity, but are by no means obliged to do so.433 From a company law 
perspective, financial support under cover of an IGFSA has the benefit of 
expedience, as it has been pre-approved by shareholders, but also entails 
rigidity and transaction costs.  
This still leaves open the most important question (which takes us to 
square one), about the relationship between the ex-ante framework on 
planning and the ex-post framework of entities’ rights and authorities’ 
powers. Although a first reading of the rules may suggest that every ex-
post measure has to be accounted for in the ex-ante planning, this is not 
the case from the entities’ perspective. Nor is it the case from the 
authorities’ perspective. Competent supervisory authorities may, as part 
of their powers, request the implementation of measures contemplated in 
the recovery plan, but can do many other things, including changes in the 
business strategy, legal or operational structures, removal of senior 
management and installation of temporary administration, etc.434 For our 
purposes, the authorities may require the entity to update the recovery 
plan, in light of changed circumstances.435 Add to this the fact that the 
supervisory competences include the possibility of imposing extra 
prudential buffers436 and that early intervention measures include 
requiring the entity to negotiate a debt restructuring,437 and the ensemble 
of provisions could be used by supervisors to require a parent company 
to increase financial support to its subsidiary with fresh money and, 
absent that money, through a restructuring of intra-group debt. If the 
measure is not contemplated by the recovery plan, this could be 
correspondingly updated. 
These issues have a high significance in the context of resolution, 
bail-in and the insolvency hierarchy. Resolution powers, including bail-
in powers, are broad, but their use is limited by (i) the exceptional 
situations in which they can be exercised, and (ii) the fact that bail-in 
takes the group’s liability structure as given. The source-of-strength 
doctrine in the US, and the use of pre-resolution powers in the EU 
framework to eliminate obstacles to resolvability or for early intervention 
purposes, can dramatically alter this balance. They could support an 
interference analogous to a bail-in without having to put the entity into 
resolution or reach the point of non-viability, without taking the liability 
 
433  Article 23 (1) (g) and (h) BRRD. 
434  Articles 27 (1) (a) – (h), 28 and 29 BRRD. 
435  Article 27 (1) (a) BRRD. 
436  Article 104 (1) (a) CRD. See also article 27 BRRD, for the reference to article 104’s 
supervisory competences as part of the toolkit for early intervention. 
437 Article 27 (1) (e) BRRD. 
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structure as given, and without any regard for the fiduciary duties 
applicable to the parent company directors.  
In our view, this use would contravene the EU framework, where the 
powers of resolution authorities are constrained by clear rules, principles 
and procedures. Thus, the more reasonable interpretation is to consider 
the exercise of pre-resolution powers by supervisory authorities as 
limited by ex ante planning measures, such as the recovery plan and the 
IGFSA. Changes in the plan should respond to a real change of 
circumstances, be well justified, and should not be a way to alter the 
liability structure or impose greater intra-group funding obligations, 
which should be voluntary and constrained by fiduciary duties.438 The 
US system is more mandate-based, which means that, as long as the 
authority acts within its mandate, the action will not be illegal per se. 
This, however, would still subject the decision to require the parent to 
support its subsidiary with extra funding to justification under an 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard. In practice, however, it is likely that 
the review standard for both types of measures will be a legitimacy-
based “enhanced justification” 439 as the means to subject decisions with 
an important policy component to adequate judicial review. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this article, we have described the tensions that arise between 
bank resolution frameworks and priority rules in insolvency law at the 
level of policies and principles. We have also presented an analytical 
framework to explore how these tensions will give rise to practical 
problems when bank resolution authorities implement the new bank 
resolution rules. This framework identifies three layers of complexity. 
First, the application of these rules in the context of banking groups. 
Second, the existence of ex-ante (crisis prevention) and ex-post (crisis 
management) tools. And third, the need to apply bank resolution rules to 
cross-border banks. In this article, we have examined the practical 
problems that can arise when looking at the first two levels in isolation, 
as well as when superimposing both layers. In a succeeding article, we 
will examine how the application of bank resolution rules at the cross-
border level leads to further complications as a result of underlying 
 
438  We admit that this is easier said than done. This would leave open the question of 
how to limit supervisory authorities’ use of the point of non-viability assessment as a 
threat to coerce intra-group support outside the IGFSA framework. 
439  See Section 2.3, supra for a discussion on the importance of the notion of 
“legitimacy” to assess the legality of measures in this context. 
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tensions with insolvency law. We will also reflect on how these tensions 
are shaping the face of global banking today. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
